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ABSTRACT 
 
This exegesis examines the theoretical concept of contemporary kitsch within a 
creative practice that incorporates sculptural and installation art. Kitsch is a 
distinct aesthetic style. Once designated to the rubbish bin of culture, kitsch was 
considered to be low class, bad taste cheap fakes and copies (Greenberg, 1961; 
Adorno & Horkheimer, 1991; Calinescu, 1987; Dorfles, 1969). I argue, however, 
that this is no longer the case. This research critically examines the way in which 
contemporary kitsch now plays a vital and positive role in social and individual 
aesthetic life. 
 
Although there are conflicting points of view and distinct variations between 
recent cultural commentators (Olalquiaga, 1992; Binkley, 2000; Attfield, 2006) on 
what kitsch is, there is a common sentiment that “the repetitive qualities of kitsch 
address . . . a general problem of modernity” (Binkley, p. 131). The research 
aligns the repetitive qualities to what sociologist Anthony Giddens (1991) refers 
to as “dissembeddedness” (1991) or “the undermining of personal horizons of 
social and cosmic security” (Binkley, 1991, p.131). The research investigates: 
how the sensory affect of sentimentality imbued in the kitsch experiences, 
possessions and material objects people covet and collect, offer a way of the 
individual moving from disembeddedness to a state of being re-embedded; and 
locates the ways in which the artist can facilitate the re-embedding experience. 
 
Through this lens it is demonstrated that kitsch has become firmly rooted in our 
“lifeworlds” (Habermas, 1971), as an aesthetic that reveals “how people make 
sense of the world through artefacts” (Attfield, 2006, p. 201) and everyday 
objects; that the sensory affect of sentimentality on connections to possessions 
and material objects that contemporary kitsch offers is shared across cultures 
and societies. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
This research examines the theoretical concept of contemporary kitsch within a 
creative practice that incorporates sculptural and installation art. Kitsch is a 
distinct aesthetic style. Having been consigned to the unflattering realm of 
cultural rubbish, kitsch was considered to be low class, bad taste, cheap fakes 
and copies (Greenberg, 1961; Adorno & Horkheimer, 1991; Calinescu, 1987; 
Dorfles, 1969). The purpose of this research, however, is to demonstrate that 
this is no longer the case. The research aims to evaluate and validate the ways 
in which the value and meaning of kitsch has shifted to meet the changing needs 
of individuals and societies; and to highlight the vital and positive role that 
contemporary kitsch now plays in individual, and social, aesthetic life. 
 
Several studies between recent cultural commentators (Olalquiaga, 1992; 
Binkley, 2000; Attfield, 2006) have produced more positive analyses of kitsch, 
but there is still little agreement and distinct variations between these theorists 
on what kitsch is, and how it should be defined. There is, however, a common 
sentiment between these theorists that “the repetitive qualities of kitsch address 
… a general problem of modernity” (Binkley, p. 131). This sentiment aligns the 
repetitive quality of kitsch to what political theorist and sociologist Anthony 
Giddens (1991) refers to as “disembeddedness” (1991) or “the undermining of 
personal horizons of social and cosmic security” (Binkley, 1991, p.131). The 
research seeks to address how the sensory affect of sentimentality instilled in 
kitsch experiences, possessions and the material objects that people desire and 
collect, can offer a way for the individual to move from a state of 
disembeddedness to one of being re-embedded. The research therefore aims to 
reveal how, through its ability to re-embed, kitsch can assist people to fulfil 
memories, dreams, and fantasies, and in so doing, find a sense of comfort and 
safety in a changing world (Attfield, 2006).  
 
 xiv 
Through a reflexive analysis of my creative practice, the various exhibitions held 
throughout candidature and a broad cross-section of examples from popular and 
contemporary culture, Olalquiaga’s (1992, 1998) Binkley’s (2000) and Attfield’s 
(2006) recent concepts of kitsch, and the ability of kitsch to re-embed the 
individual (Binkley, 2000) are examined. From this perspective it is demonstrated 
that kitsch has become firmly rooted in our “lifeworlds” (Habermas, 1971), as an 
aesthetic that reveals “how people make sense of the world through artefacts” 
(Attfield, 2006, p. 201) and everyday objects; that the sensory affect of 
sentimentality on connections to possessions and material objects that 
contemporary kitsch offers is shared across cultures and societies.  
 
The fundamental aim of this creative praxis, therefore, is to examine the ways in 
which kitsch functions in contemporary life and to seek to address the following 
question: 
 
• How can kitsch produce an experience that re-embeds the viewer and 
how can my sculptural and installation art practice, which utilises aspects 
of kitsch, facilitate the experience of re-embedding? 
  
 
 
I. Background  
 
Four bodies of work have been developed throughout this research: The main 
work, The Aquarium (2009) installation and residency; the installation 
Budgietopia (2009‒2013); a series of sculptural Snow Domes and Dream 
Spheres (2009‒2010); and the sculpture Jesus (2010). Reference is also made 
to my earlier work, The Lotus Pond (2007, 2008) that was developed during my 
honours candidature. The Lotus Pond (2007, 2008) has been fundamental in the 
development of my doctoral research as it is where my examination of kitsch 
began and has in turn provided a foundation for my creative praxis.  
Due to the close relationship between my creative practice and the theoretical 
framework examined within this research, reviewed literature—particularly 
 xv 
Olalquiaga’s (1992; 1998) and Binkley’s (2000)—and examples of my creative 
work are woven together throughout this exegesis. The artworks I have made 
are by no means literal interpretations of these theories, however they do 
incorporate various aspect of this research. 
There are two appendices in the form of DVDs accompanying this exegesis. 
Appendix 1: The Aquarium, presents a short video of The Aquarium (2009) 
installation and of my time spent inhabiting the tank. Section 3.1 and Section 6 in 
Appendix 2: Additional Images of Artworks, provides supplementary 
photographic documentation of each work produced throughout candidature. 
Images of each of the works are included throughout this exegesis, however, 
due to the size and scale of the works, additional images showing the 
installations and sculptures from various angles and also the finer details of each 
work are included in Appendix 2. It is suggested that Appendix 2 be viewed as 
an accompaniment to Section 3 of this research in which a reflexive overview of 
my creative practice and the use of kitsch is given. A list of the images included 
in Appendix 2 has been included in the table of contents (under the heading 
Appendix 2). 
 
Because the analysis of this praxis is positioned within the everyday and the 
“lifeworld” (Habermas, 1971) a deliberate decision has been made to draw on 
examples of texts from a broad field of discourse beyond the visual arts. The 
examples include popular culture texts from films to fashion accessories as well 
as social culture texts including the story of Janet Williams and her extensive 
collection of British royalty memorabilia, to a Hamster-themed hotel and 
decorative household objects, just to mention a few. It is through these examples 
that I demonstrate the communicative capacity of kitsch and my artwork within 
the lifeworld (Habermas, 1971) and the everyday, and therefore demonstrate my 
critical and reflexive praxis model.   
 
The differing contexts in which the creative works have been exhibited is of 
particular importance to this research, as it positions kitsch within the everyday 
and lifeworld. The works have been exhibited in public spaces and venues 
including a church, and central Perth, Western Australia’s Town Square. These 
 xvi 
venues were specifically chosen, as they are accessible to people, doing 
everyday things.  
 
Aspects of the artworks, which examine kitsch—created throughout this 
research—are explored within my lifeworld, but are foremost examinations of 
broader social and cultural constructs. Throughout the reflexive process of praxis 
it became apparent that the constructs of kitsch and sentimentality are shared 
across cultures and societies and could be applied to a broad demographic, 
almost universally, but more generally in the affluent developed world. Yet the 
experiences of and relationship to these constructs for individuals and societies 
are both unique and subjective. By positioning the creative work developed 
throughout this research within the lifeworld, I aim to offer an insight into the 
unique relationship between experience, sentimentality and kitsch.   
 
 
 
II. The Lifeworld 
 
The term ‘lifeworld’ refers to Jurgen Habermas’ notion of ‘The Lifeworld and 
System’” (Habermas, 1971) and is central to his Theory of Communicative 
Action, published in two volumes (1971, 1987). For Habermas (1971) the 
foundation of any ‘action’ is grounded in ‘communication’. His theory investigates 
the paradigm shift from ‘purposeful non-verbal activity’ (1971, n.p.) (traditions 
and rituals) to those of communicative action. He considers the fundamental 
problem of contemporary societies as being how to create conditions for 
“communicative action” (Habermas, 1987, p. 46). He considers the ‘legitimacy’ of 
societies (social institutions and nation states) to be in crisis. Therefore as 
“advanced capitalist societies” continue developing their central integrative 
function of communication, the lifeworld continues to be weakened or 
systemically “colonised” (Habermas, 1987, p. 46). As a result, society has fallen 
into a legitimacy crisis, whereby communicative action becomes colonised. 
Colonisation in turn undermines the legitimacy of the lifeworld. 
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Habermas links ‘legitimacy’ to social order and the individual’s desire to believe 
that the institutions within their lifeworld are “just, benevolent, in their best 
interest, and deserving of their support, loyalty, and adherence” (University of 
Calgary, n.d., para. 2) From this view communicative action is foremost a critique 
of the manner in which the communicative act has come to be colonised, and of 
colonisation in turn undermining our sense of ‘legitimacy’. It is a process with 
parallels to Giddens (1991) notion of ‘disembeddedness’1.  
 
According to Giddens (1991) disembeddedness effectively lifts out social 
relations from time and space so that they lose their original context. 
Disembeddedness, like the systemic colonisation of the lifeworld, not only 
changes the way in which communication takes place, but breeds radical doubt 
amongst citizens. As with the systemic colonisation of the lifeworld, trust is 
undermined, increasing radical doubt that the “institutions of abstraction” 
(Habermas, 1994) have the interests of their citizens at heart, and are worthy of 
support. 
 
A large portion of Habermas’ (1994) theory of the lifeworld and system is 
dedicated to finding ways of restoring legitimacy through developing conditions 
for ideal speech. However, rather than offering an insight into his critique of ideal 
speech, social rationality or the process of secularisation, this research focuses 
on aesthetic colonisation and how the human lifeworld is shaped by systemic 
influences. I am specifically interested in examining how material pursuits and 
the collective action of modernisation have influenced individuals and societies’ 
aesthetic lifeworlds. It is through this lens that the resulting implications and 
increased value that is now placed on kitsch can be investigated. 
 
Habermas observes an imbalance between the lifeworld and system, claiming 
that the lifeworld has been ‘colonised’, annexed by institutions of authority of 
which he calls ‘systemic imperatives’ (1994). Entwined by systemic ties and 
abstract connections, the theory of communicative action, and therefore the 
lifeworld and system, is in many ways a study of the transition from an agrarian 
                                            
1 The term ‘disembedded’ or ‘disembeddedness is defined in Section 2.6 
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culture and pre-industrial action—to modernity. It links the move from the 
‘authority of the sacred’, to the organisations (Habermas, 1994), and in my view, 
to the modern world.  
 
The term lifeworld has been used by several theorists but was first coined by the 
German theorist Edmund Husserl in his theory of the phenomenology of the 
lifeworld. Habermas has adapted Alfred Schutz’s notion of the lifeworld, which is 
based on that of Husserl. The term lifeworld, as used by Habermas, describes 
the environment in which we live, our intricate universes of day-to-day lived 
experiences. It is the sphere where everyday social life is acted out and where 
communication and the exchange of information take place. The lifeworld is 
where cultural traditions and reflexive socialisation are expressed through 
collective social action and the communicative activities (spoken and non-
spoken) of individuals. It permits us to develop a sense of who we are and whom 
we value being—senses that are also attributed to kitsch. The lifeworld is the 
sphere in which we live, where thoughts, ideas and stories are shared and 
expressed. It is not necessarily a harmonious place as it is the site in which 
social fragmentation occurs. It is where individual and collective social action 
unfolds.   
 
The lifeworld and system are inherently interconnected. The ‘system’ refers to 
the regulating system in which actions are coordinated through “functional 
interconnectedness of action consequences” (Habermas, 1994, p. xxvi). 
Habermas, however, makes a clear distinction between the lifeworld and the 
system. The lifeworld of a social group, for example, is where actions are 
coordinated through “harmonising action orientations” (1994, p. xxiii). Conversely 
“the functional interconnectedness of action consequences” (p. xxvi) means 
society is likewise exposed to the pervasive effect of impersonal self-regulating 
systems. Self-regulating systems are the authoritative institutions (i.e., the justice 
system, educational institutions, governments, etc.) that are associated with 
social needs and that act in response to social problems. Even so, the lifeworld 
is positioned “in peculiar contrast to the explicit knowledge of something” 
(Habermas, as cited in Outhwaite, 1991, p.331). Within the lifeworld, for 
example, day-to-day lived experiences of the individual stand side-by-side with 
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systemic imperatives such as the state, economic markets, and other influential 
institutions. As a form of hegemonic power, this kind of knowledge has subtly yet 
strategically made its way into our daily lives. Habermas sees the infiltration of 
systemic imperatives into the very private sphere of the lifeworld as an assault 
comparative with “colonial masters coming from the outside into a tribal society” 
(1989, p. 335). Systemic dominance forces individuals into a process of 
assimilation that occurs gradually and insidiously. Little by little, the moral values 
that have founded our traditions and values, and therefore our lifeworlds, are 
replaced with what is more often than not some sort of irrational logic 
(Habermas, 1989) the motive of which is to create social integration through the 
process of assimilation. 
 
 
ii.i The Lifeworld and System within my Praxis  
 
My creative practice plays a significant role in my lifeworld and this praxis. It is 
where I translate theoretical concepts, like kitsch into form and content. It is 
where the philosophies I have engaged within my artwork can be communicated 
on a broader-ranging cultural and societal level, as is demonstrated in the 
immersive world of The Aquarium (2009), discussed in Section 6.  
 
To a significant degree, the lifeworld depends on cultural traditions and the 
procedures of reflexive socialisation that in my view, is facilitated through the 
“repetitive quality of kitsch” (Binkley, 2000, p.131). When expressed through the 
process of collective social action and the communicative activities of societies 
and individuals, the lifeworld, kitsch and art meet. Within the everyday, the 
lifeworld is where individual and collective social action is acted out. The 
lifeworld as kitsch is, I assert, where art and the lifeworld touch and because of 
the system of interconnectedness, art, the lifeworld and system affect each 
other.  
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ii.ii Summary of the Lifeworld and System and Theory of 
Communicative Action 
 
In summary, Habermas’ lifeworld and system and theory of communicative 
action operate on the premise that institutions invade social life on many levels. 
In so doing, the interconnectedness of the lifeworld and system effectively 
disconnects individuals and societies from the meaningful content that once 
gave their lives purpose. The colonisation of the lifeworld is a process that holds 
close ties to Giddens’ (1991) notion of ‘disembeddedness’. Disembeddedness 
effectively ‘lifts out’ social relations from time and space so that they lose their 
original context. Disembeddedness, like the systemic colonisation of the 
lifeworld, changes the way in which communication takes place. It is from this 
position of disembeddedness that, I argue kitsch operates within contemporary 
life through its ability to reconnect disembedded individuals to society and to 
their own lifeworld within the system. It is from this position that I argue that the 
use of kitsch by the artist can produce an experience with the potential to re-
embed the viewer and give meaningful content and purpose to their lives. 
 
Thus, the systemic colonisation of the lifeworld simultaneously undermines 
societies and individuals’ ontological security while destroying fixed social 
relations and traditions. However, it can, on the other hand, bring about 
opportunities for change and reveal new possibilities in both social and individual 
realms. It allows for the release of old social patterns that no longer serve us and 
also makes room for new ways of being and for new traditions to develop within 
societies and individuals’ aesthetic lifeworlds.  
 
 
 
III. Structure 
 
The methodology of ‘arts-practice-led research’ (Adams, 2008) and the methods 
I have used within this praxis to create the artworks developed are reflexively 
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examined throughout this research and are defined in Section 1. The 
methodology (the theoretical framework through which this research has been 
developed) and methods (the development of my artworks from theoretical 
conception through to their construction and exhibition) are closely linked. 
Drawing on Christopher Crouch’s Praxis and the Reflexive Creative Practitioner 
(2007) and Carole Gray and Ian Pirie’s ‘Artistic’ Research Procedure: Research 
at the Edge of Chaos? (1995), my approach to practice-led-research as well as 
the use of ‘reflexivity’ (Giddens, 1991) and ‘praxis’ (Gramsci, 1971) is defined. 
 
Section 2, Defining Kitsch, gives a brief examination of the development of the 
term ‘kitsch’, including those by Clement Greenberg (1961), Theodore Adorno 
and Max Horkheimer (1991), Matei Calinescu (1987), Hermann Broch (1955) 
and Gillo Dorfles (1969). The research then surveys my re-evaluation of kitsch 
starting with the shift in the development of taste, culture and status in definitions 
of kitsch that began to emerge between contemporary commentators (Binkley, 
2000, 2002; Attfield, 2006; Olalquiaga, 1992, 1998) in the late 1990s and the 
2000s.  
 
An overview of the concept of ‘taste’ (Attfield, 2006) in analyses of kitsch is given 
and an argument for redefining taste is offered. Popular culture examples of 
Japanese artist and theorist Takashi Murakami (2008) and television chef Nigella 
Lawson (2001) are given, demonstrating the way in which the re-evaluation of 
kitsch and taste function in contemporary life. 
A review of three recent re-conceptualisations of kitsch, is proposed, including 
Binkley’s, Kitsch as a Repetitive System: A Problem for the Theory of Taste and 
Hierarchy (2000), Attfield’s, Redefining Kitsch: The Politics of Design (2006), and 
cultural writer, Tracey Potts, ‘Walking the Line’: Kitsch, Class and the Morphing 
Subject of Value (2007). In doing so, an argument in favour of Binkley’s (2000), 
notion of ‘kitsch as a repetitive system’ is established, a view that is supported by 
Attfield (2006). Binkley’s claim that kitsch “artificially inflates the comfort of 
decoration into a uniquely fake aesthetic statement” (2002, p. 1) is challenged, 
as is Potts’ anti-Binkley (2000) and anti-Attfield (2006) stance, in which she 
asserts taste and hierarchies cannot be separated from analyses of kitsch.  
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Drawing on the work of Giddens (1991), and Binkley (2000), it is demonstrated 
how the repetitive quality of kitsch addresses the general problem of modernity 
that is referred to as ‘disembeddedness’. A detailed explanation and examination 
of disembeddedness is given, supporting the view that disembeddedness, and 
therefore embeddedness, are as “central to any theory of kitsch as [they are] to 
any theory of modernity” (Binkley, 2000, p. 135). Finally, the notion of 
authenticity in analyses of kitsch is addressed. I examine why kitsch has 
generally been viewed as a ‘faker’ or less authentic reality (Broch, 1933, 1951; 
Greenberg, 1939; Binkley, 2000) and not simply just another reality. An 
argument is put forward demonstrating how the effect of historical and cultural 
changes have transformed kitsch to be a very real, aesthetic. It is demonstrated 
that analyses in which kitsch is limited to definitions of being a fake aesthetic 
statement, like that of Binkley’s (2002) Broch (1933, 1951) and Greenberg 
(1939) are no longer relevant.  
 
Section 3, offers a reflexive overview of my creative praxis and the use of kitsch 
within my artwork. The aims, content and context for each artwork, The 
Aquarium, 2009; Budgietopia, 2009‒2013; Snow Domes and Dream Spheres, 
2009‒2010; Jesus, 2010, and my earlier work, The Lotus Pond, 2007‒2008, are 
given and reflexively analysed.  
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The Lotus Pond (2007)  
Installation 
Plastic, vinyl, wood on rubber inner-tubes and water 
.80m x 8m x 14zm (Variable) 
 
Figure 1:  The Lotus Pond (2007) exhibited at Spectrum Project Space,  
(Spectrum) Northbridge, Western Australia, for the Exhibition  
White Monkey Holding Peach (2007) 
 
 
 
 
The Lotus Pond (2008) (Figure 1) was initially developed during my honours 
candidature as part of a body of work called White Monkey Holding Peach 
(2007). Together, The Lotus Pond (2007, 2008) and White Monkey Holding 
Peach (2007) explore cultural incommensurability by looking at East/West 
cultural conventions and ideologies, as well as, contemporary kitsch. Influential 
in the development of my doctoral research, it was from gaining an 
understanding of the historical and cultural contexts of the designs in the plastics 
from which the lotus flowers are made, that my continued research into kitsch 
evolved. The installation has been through several incarnations between 2007 
and 2010, some of which are discussed in relation to kitsch.  
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The Aquarium (2009) 
Glass, steel, wood, hot pink gravel, and mixed media 
3.5 x 2.5 x 2.4? 
 
Figure 2:  The Aquarium installation (2009) exhibited at Spectrum (2009) 
 
The Aquarium (2009) (Figure 2) installation and residency is the principal work 
developed during my doctoral research. Created for a one-month artist 
residency, the installation was exhibited at Spectrum Project Space, Northbridge, 
Western Australia. The aim of this artwork was: to develop an environment 
whereby I could experiment with the ways in which the sensory affect of 
sentimentality associated with kitsch experiences, possessions and material 
objects can act to re-embedded the individual (in this case myself); and to 
experiment with the ways in which the artist, through the use of kitsch, can 
facilitate the experience of re-embedding for an audience. A reflexive analysis of 
my role as a mermaid, ‘living’ within the confines of The Aquarium (2009) is 
given. The analysis is related to Olalquiaga’s ‘three degrees of kitsch’, 
highlighting the intricacies of contemporary kitsch apparent in the lifeworld 
created within the aquarium, and also outlines my observation of how various 
audience engaged with the work.  
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Figure 3:  Image Budgietopia Everest Reunion (2009) exhibited at Spectrum (2009) 
 
The installation Budgietopia (2009‒2013) was an ongoing project that ran 
between 2009 and 2013. Budgietopia (2009‒2013) exists as a utopian bird world 
that explores—through the lives of budgies—how humans can find a sense of 
comfort, value and safety in the world through developing sentimental 
attachments to objects, particularly those that are kitsch. The installation 
incorporates 3,000 lifelike budgie ornaments an excessive array of trinkets and 
knick-knacks and masses of artificial flowers, shrubbery and lawn. Budgietopia 
(2009‒2013) has been exhibited in a variety of different formations, each 
adapted to suit the requirements of the space in which the work was exhibited or 
to portray a specific scenario. These exhibits include: The Budgietopia Everest 
Reunion (2009) (Figure 3), The Budgietopia Evening Commuter Cake Off 
(2010), The Budgietopia Super Rally (2010) and The Budgietopia installation 
developed for City in Bloom (2010). 
 
Budgietopia (2009‒2013) also hosted a budgie adoption program for budgies 
that where either lost, or in search of new friendships (as discussed in Section 
3.2). The research outlines the ways in which the installations, exhibitions and 
budgie adoption program have played a significant role in this praxis when 
examining how people’s experience of objects influences the kinds of 
sentimentality they feel toward kitsch.  
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Ganesha Glory and Call Me Golden Sugar Britches (2009) 
Glass, stainless steel, water and various mixed media 
32cm x 25cm x25cm, 75cm x 50cm x 50cm 
 
 
Figure 4:  Ganesha Glory (2009) and Call Me Golden Sugar Britches (2009) exhibited 
at The Moores Building and Gallery, Fremantle, Western Australia (2009) 
 
 
The Snow Domes and Dream Spheres developed between 2009 and 2010 are a 
study of the things people collect. The sculptures examine the ways in which 
people are able to make sense of the world through the artefacts and everyday 
objects they collect (Attfield, 2006), and of course, kitsch. Each snow dome 
encapsulates a collection of objects that represent the complex day-to-day lived 
experiences that influence us as individuals and as a culture. The body of work 
comprises a collection of fifteen snow domes and dream spheres. Of the fifteen, 
Ganesha Glory (2009) and Call Me Golden Sugar Britches (2009) are reflexively 
examined within this exegesis in relation to ‘Olalquiaga’s three degrees of kitsch’ 
(1992) and Binkley’s concept of ‘kitsch as a repetitive system’ (2000).
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 Jesus (2010)  
Wood, plaster and mixed media 
95cm x 380cm x 195cm 
 
Figure 5:  Jesus sculpture (2010) exhibited in studio (2010) 
 
 
Commissioned in 2010 by Uniting Churches Australia Jesus (2010) (Figure 5) 
was sculpted for The Stations of the Cross (2010) exhibition and was exhibited 
inside Wesley Church, in Perth, Western Australia. Jesus (2010) is my 
interpretation of the ninth station of the cross, where Jesus falls for the third time. 
Analysis of this artwork demonstrates a unique communicative function of kitsch 
within the lifeworld in that the sculpture of Jesus was exhibited for not just 
aesthetic, but religious purposes as well.  
 
Section 4 outlines the theoretical foundation on which the remaining four 
chapters of this exegesis are based. The three key theories relating to methods 
of categorising different types of kitsch are introduced: Olalquiaga’s notion of 
‘three degrees of kitsch’ (1992), Binkley’s notion of ‘kitsch as a repetitive system’ 
(2000), and what I have called ‘Olalquiaga’s modes of perceiving experiences 
and kitsch’ (1998). An outline of the division of the analysis of each artwork in 
relation to both Olalquiaga’s and Binkley’s theories is also given. 
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Section 5 relates to Olalquiaga’s ‘three degrees of kitsch’ (1992), a system 
through which kitsch can be classified based on an object’s means of production 
and cultural function. After an explanation of Olalquiaga’s theory, a breakdown of 
each degree of kitsch is offered followed by examples that illustrate the 
synchronised difference and overlapping of the definitions of each degree 
(Olalquiaga, 2000) of kitsch. These examples include: Jesus (2010) and The 
Aquarium (2009), Janet Williams, the Royalty Lady; Hans Christian Andersen’s 
(1837) and Disney’s (1989) versions of The Little Mermaid; and the work of 
artists Carl Andre, Jackson Pollock and Jeff Koons.   
 
Section 6 is dedicated to a reflexive analysis of The Aquarium (2009) within the 
framework of Olalquiaga’s ‘three degrees of kitsch’ (1992). Particular attention is 
paid to third-degree kitsch (1992), in which “the legitimization of [kitsch’s] 
signifying and visual attributes by the institutionally authorized agency of artists” 
(Olalquiaga, 1992, pp. 46–47) is examined. Through the lens of third-degree 
kitsch it is demonstrated how a creative work, like The Aquarium (2009), is 
developed beyond being an illustrated idea to become a reflexive synthesis of 
the theories examined within this research.  
 
Section 7 examines Binkley’s notion of ‘kitsch as a repetitive system’ (2000). 
Binkley’s theory “establishes three distinct ways in which kitsch aestheticizes 
repetition” (2000, p. 142). These are: through the emulation of other cultural 
products; as a decorative feature; and through a “love for all things sentimental” 
(p.142). Binkley’s classification of the repetitive qualities of kitsch are then 
related to the snow domes Ganesha Glory (2009) and Call Me Golden Sugar 
Britches (2009), Budgietopia (2009-2013) and The Lotus Pond (2008) as well as 
the French rodent themed hotel La Villa Hamster, Queen Elizabeth II and artist 
Allison Jackson. 
 
‘Olalquiaga’s modes of perceiving experiences and kitsch’ is reviewed in Section 
8. Olalquiaga’s theory examines the process by which differing memories, 
experiences and desires affect an individual’s emotional response to objects and 
to kitsch. The installation Budgietopia (2009–2013) is used as a case study in 
which the process of recreating experiences is illustrated. This process 
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demonstrates the manner by which kitsch objects allow us to recreate 
experiences that exist between “an irretrievable past and a fragmented present” 
(p. 68), and the fluid boundaries of memories, fantasies and loss.  
 
In summary, by examining the ways in which the value and meaning of kitsch 
have shifted to meet the changing needs of individuals and societies—and 
establishing the vital and positive role contemporary kitsch now plays—the aim 
of this research is to lift kitsch permanently out of the cultural scrap heap, 
proving that kitsch is no longer just low class, bad taste, cheap fakes and copies 
(Greenberg, 1961; Adorno & Horkheimer, 1991; Calinescu, 1987; Dorfles, 1969). 
Through a critical examination of the ways in which the meaning and value of 
kitsch have shifted to meet the changing needs of individuals and societies; this 
research places kitsch in a position of importance, as it demonstrates the ways 
in which contemporary kitsch now plays a vital and positive role in individual, and 
social, aesthetic life. The research demonstrates the ways by which “the 
repetitive qualities of kitsch” (Binkley, p. 131) address the modern condition of 
“disembeddedness” (Giddens, 1991; Binkley, 2000), reinforcing and 
strengthening individuals, and societies, prospects of replenishing their “social 
and cosmic security” (Binkley, 1991, p.131) enabling them to become re-
embedded. 
 
The chapters that follow will demonstrate the manner in which the sensory affect 
of sentimentality associated with contemporary kitsch is shared across cultures 
and societies. That firmly entrenched in the “lifeworld” (Habermas, 1971), kitsch, 
in modern life, has become an aesthetic through which people are able to “make 
sense of the world through artefacts” (Attfield, 2006, p. 201) and the everyday 
objects that they desire and collect.  
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1. METHODOLOGY AND METHODS  
 
 
This chapter describes the methodology of ‘arts-practice-led research’ 
(Adams, 2008) through which my doctoral research is framed, and the 
methods I have used within my praxis to create the artworks developed 
throughout candidature. As is often the case with creative research, 
methodologies and methods are so closely connected they at times operate 
together. Methods thus relate to the development of my artworks from 
theoretical conception through to construction and exhibition. Methodology 
focuses on the theoretical framework through which this research has been 
developed. Drawing on Christopher Crouch’s Praxis and the Reflexive 
Creative Practitioner (2007) and Carole Gray and Ian Pirie’s ‘Artistic’ 
Research Procedure: Research at the Edge of Chaos? (1995), I explain my 
approach to practice-led-research as well as the use of ‘reflexivity’ (Giddens, 
1991) and ‘praxis’ (Gramsci, 1971). 
 
 
 
1.1 Methodology 
As with many creative praxises, my arts-practice-led-research does not 
follow a linear or easily formulated methodology. My research incorporates 
creative practice and studio-based work supported by theoretical study and 
an exegesis. With this creative praxis the theories adopted and the making of 
my artworks are closely interconnected and can be described as “a way of 
thinking about action and a way of acting on thought” (Crouch & Pearce, 
2012, p. 40). My methodology, therefore, could best be described as a multi-
method series of systems that are in many ways “inclusive . . . chaotic . . .  
and holistic” (Gray & Pirie, 1995, n.p.). The techniques that I adopt for each 
studio-based project or artwork, are generally tailored to suit the specifics of 
each work. ‘Praxis’ (Gramsci, 1971), the relationship between theory and 
practice, and ‘reflexivity’ (Giddens, 1990) play an important role in my 
methodology, as do the materials and concepts upon which I draw.  
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Reflexivity is a model of personal, social and cultural action defined by 
Anthony Giddens. It concerns the way in which knowledge spirals “in and out 
of the universe of social life, reconstructing both itself and the universe as an 
integral part of that process” (Giddens, 1990, p. 16). This is achieved through 
the “reflexive ordering and re-ordering” (p. 52) of knowledge, information and 
social relations, where thoughts and actions continuously bounce off each 
other. For Giddens, the process of “thoroughgoing, constitutive reflexivity” (p. 
52) is undoubtedly a defining attribute of all human action. It is a process that 
he describes as a “chronic revision of social practice in the light of knowledge 
about those practices” (p. 40). By employing reflexivity within my research, I 
am able to monitor, order, and re-order my subjectivities as they are 
mediated by the social constructs of my ‘lifeworld’. It is in this way that 
reflexivity gives the artist/researcher the ability to “explicitly position 
themselves in relation to their objects of study so that one may assess 
researchers’ knowledge claims in terms of situated aspects of their social 
selves and reveal their (often hidden) doxic values and assumptions” (Maton, 
2003, p. 64).  
 
Within this methodology, praxis refers specifically to the theories from which I 
have drawn in the development of my study of kitsch as well as the “creative 
processes” (Crouch, 2007), research and artwork produced throughout my 
candidature. It was the Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci who first 
described praxis, defining it as “the unification of critical theory and 
revolutionary practice” (as cited in Oliga, 1996, p. 217). It is through praxis 
that the creative practitioner, as artist and researcher, is able to reflect upon 
and reconstruct the constructed world (Crouch, 2007). For the artist and 
researcher, adopting praxis as a methodology assumes a process of 
meaning making, where both “meaning and its processes are contingent 
upon a cultural and social environment” that is about “negotiation” rather than 
“acting upon others” (Crouch, 2007, p.112).  
 
Assuming a reflexive approach within my praxis has been an important if not 
essential component of my doctoral research. Christopher Crouch (2007) 
highlights the importance of reflexivity, stating that “adopting a reflexive 
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viewpoint allows an understanding of the creative process from a subjective 
viewpoint” which in turn can “reveal the dynamic relationship between the 
context, construction and the articulation of the [communicative] act” (p. 108).  
 
Aspects of the artworks that I have created throughout this research have 
been explored within my lifeworld but are foremost examinations of broader 
social and cultural constructs. Throughout the reflexive process of praxis it 
became apparent that constructs of these paradigms (kitsch and 
sentimentality) could be related to a broad demographic, across cultures and 
societies, particularly in the affluent developed world. Yet the experiences of 
and relationship to these constructs for individuals and societies, are both 
unique and subjective. By positioning the creative work developed 
throughout this research within the lifeworld, I aim to offer an insight into the 
unique relationship between experience, sentimentality and kitsch.  
 
When Budgietopia (2009‒2013) was first exhibited a significant number of 
budgie ornaments ‘flew the coop’ or simply ‘went missing’ (Additional images 
of Budgietopia (2009‒2013) can be viewed in Appendix 2, Section 3). While 
initially disappointed that the budgies had been stolen, I realised that their 
being taken could be significant to my research. The fact that the budgies 
had been taken seemed to support my view that people liked, or simply 
enjoyed, kitsch things enough that they would risk taking them. From this 
point on, whenever Budgietopia (2009‒2013) was exhibited I strategically 
positioned several budgies in places where people would find them, and I 
would also give some away. Each budgie was either numbered or named 
and held a note in its claws. The note invited the budgie’s new owner to 
make contact with Budgietopia (2009‒2013) via email and to provide 
updates on where their budgie was, and what it had been doing. The 
anecdotal documentation of the budgies’ lives sent to Budgietopia 
(2009‒2013) via email and has been invaluable to this research.  
 
The photographs and text of the ‘cute’ kitsch budgie ornaments sent by the 
adoptees (and some apparently by the budgies themselves) are documented 
evidence that supports this research. An example of this is the man who took 
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his budgie to and from work each day, and even purchased a bag of 
birdseed to feed it. The emails I received, as discussed in Section 3, have 
highlighted the unique ability of kitsch to transform an inanimate object into a 
desirable item that could be imbued with sentimentality, friendship, comfort 
and a range of other affects. The messages detailing the names and daily 
rituals of the budgies, including what they wore or where they liked to sit, 
were also fascinating as they demonstrated that the adoptees were 
personifying the plastic budgie ornaments. The emails were evidence of how 
kitsch operates to re-embed the individual. The ongoing relationships that 
have developed between adoptees and their budgies and the personification 
of the plastic budgie ornaments support my hypothesis regarding the ability 
of material objects and kitsch to re-embed societies and individuals. I discuss 
this in the research that follows. If not for the humanistic and inclusive nature 
of arts-practice-led research, praxis and the reflexive analysis of the emails 
and photographs of people and their adopted budgies, this pivotal aspect of 
my research would not have evolved. 
 
For many of the works I developed I was not only the artist or creator, but 
also the subject and object of the works. For the installation The Aquarium 
(2009) my methodology, and method, involved exploring how contemporary 
kitsch operates as well as the aspects of Olalquiaga’s notion of the ‘three 
degrees of kitsch’ (Section 5). This was achieved by becoming a mermaid — 
adopting a mermaid persona, dressing-up in mermaid costumes and living in 
an aquarium for eight hours a day over a one-month period. The work 
investigated how kitsch objects can fulfil dreams and fantasies, and offer a 
sense of comfort and safety.  
 
When developing works like The Aquarium (2009), as the artist-
practitioner/researcher and also the subject and object, it would be easy to 
fall into the trap of defining kitsch, authenticity and experience within my own 
personal narrative. It is through continually conducting a reflexive analysis of 
my praxis as artist-practitioner/researcher both in and on action (Gray & 
Pirie, 1995) that “the pitfalls of introspection and narcissism . . . towards an 
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analytical engagement with human interaction” (Crouch, 2007, p. 112) can 
be avoided. 
 
Within arts-practice-led research it is necessary for researchers to adapt and 
continually review their methodology and methods reflexively, both in and on 
action (Gray & Pirie, 1995). Gray and Pirie point out how “the artist-
practitioner/researcher is embedded within the procedures and responds to 
the reciprocating relationship between responsive research strategies and 
associative creative artistic practices” (1995, n.p.). Adams (2008) highlights 
the aforementioned relationship, stating “methodologies engaged by arts-
practice-led research involve a process of information gathering; including 
various visual and multi-media methods of selection, analysis, synthesis, 
presentation and communication” (p. 32). By reflexively reviewing my 
methodology and methods throughout this research I was able to monitor 
and adjust, when required, my approach to this praxis both theoretically and 
conceptually. In this manner I was able to modify aspects of my work 
throughout the various stages of conceptualisation, production and 
presentation. In so doing I found that I was more likely to engage an 
audience with my work in ways that communicated the messages or theories 
that I aimed to present.  
 
An example of the type of reflexive adaptation that I am describing occurred 
in Budgietopia (2009‒2013). The budgie ornament was chosen foremost for 
its kitschness, but also because people generally find them cute. Careful 
consideration was also given to the fact that the palm-sized budgies were 
comfortable to hold and also easy to transport on mass. But, the cute small 
budgies were easily lost in the garish and voluminous array of artificial 
flowers and greenery that is also part of Budgietopia (2009‒2013). As a 
result people would not always notice the sweet budgies beckoning them 
toward the work. By adjusting the height at which some of the budgies were 
displayed, so that they were not just overhead but also at ground level and 
eye level for both children and adults, I was able to attract viewers to the 
work. Once just one or two of the budgies were discovered by a passer-by, 
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they would generally start to look around and suddenly notice that they were 
surrounded by hundreds of budgies and become engaged with the artwork.  
 
 
 
1.2 Gathering Information within my Praxis 
 
The process of gathering information within my creative praxis generally 
begins by visiting places and collecting objects or ‘things’; souvenirs, ‘pretty’ 
packaging, trinkets and items that appear common to a particular place or 
culture. These things are often materials that I use in the construction of my 
creative projects, but they are often of equal, if not greater, significance from 
a research and theoretical perspective. An example of this is a trip I took to 
Bangkok to purchase artificial flowers for Budgietopia (2009‒2013). The cost 
of purchasing the volume of artificial flowers needed for Budgietopia 
(2009‒2013) in Australia was prohibitive for me. After some investigation I 
found that I would easily be able to import them from Bangkok at a more 
affordable price. As many travelers to Thailand might attest, parts of 
Bangkok are abundant with kitsch objects for sale. Not only did I purchase 
artificial flowers, but also a multitude of miniature kitsch objects that were 
also included in the work. I was invited to an absolutely incredibly kitschly 
decorated home that belonged to one of the shopkeepers, which gave me a 
fascinating insight to the types of kitsch objects that are common in Thailand. 
It also reinforced aspects of the universal sentiment of kitsch to which I 
attest, a view that is supported by Binkley (2000) (as discussed in Section 7).  
 
My observations of people, places and the objects I collected during this 
project have been juxtaposed and related to theory, continually refined within 
the reflexive process. Gray and Pirie (1995) discuss practice-as-research, 
describing it as a ‘generating’ instrument, whereby “research processes are 
tailored to respond to practice and practice to research, continually  
re-orientating itself to refine the research question through reflexive 
processes” (n.p.).  
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It is through reflexive processes that the ‘interdisciplinary’ nature of arts-
practice-led-research is able to support “a range of research strategies which 
are multi-method in approach, rigorous, open, transparent and accessible” 
(Gray & Pirie, 1995, n.p.). Unhindered by the constraints of more traditional 
modes of research, arts-practice-led-research is a “humanistic model” that is 
“based upon new intellectual paradigms . . . and must consider the 
ontological (knowable in art) and epistemological (relationships of enquirer to 
knowledge) issues, which are ‘adaptive’” (Gray & Pirie, 1995, n.p.) and 
reflexive.  
 
 
 
1.3 Fields of Discourse 
 
This research provides a historical analysis of kitsch; however, the main 
focus of enquiry is to examine and re-contextualise kitsch within a 
contemporary context, and to then demonstrate how kitsch operates within 
my creative praxis. The reason behind this approach is threefold. Firstly, to 
highlight many of the negative misconceptions that surround kitsch in a 
contemporary context, the majority of which can be attributed to the still 
lingering, dated, traditional theories of kitsch that define it as being low class 
and bad taste (Greenberg, 1961; Adorno & Horkeimer, 1991; Callinescu, 
1987; Dorfles, 1969). Secondly, is to demonstrate the particularly positive 
role that kitsch now plays in modern life (Olalquiaga, 1992; Binkley, 2000; 
Attfield, 2006). Thirdly, is to show how kitsch, largely through its connection 
to sentiment (Binkley, 2000; Attfield, 2006), can be a valuable tool for the 
artist. Kitsch achieves this by its ability to positively engage an audience, 
(Binkley, 2000) and to deliver in an easily digestible manner a vast array of 
different subject matters and emotions, be they pleasant or challenging. 
 
The process of data collection and analysis within this praxis crisscrosses 
broad and varied fields of discourse. There is no single field of discourse that 
neatly encompasses all of the theories from which I have drawn. Both my 
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theoretical and creative work include the study of cultural theory and popular 
and social culture across a broad spectrum: my artwork to the work of other 
artists past and present; television from cooking shows to current affairs; 
handbags and trinket collections; easily recognised cultural and religious 
icons; real life examples; my lived experiences or lifeworld; the disciplines of 
cultural theory and sociology. These subjects have each played a significant 
role in repositioning the mostly negative established thinking of earlier 
theories on kitsch (Greenberg, 1961; Adorno & Horkeimer, 1991; Callinescu, 
1987; Dorfles, 1969) in favour of a contemporary perspective that is positive, 
universal, and welcoming (Olalquiaga, 1992; Binkley, 2000; Attfield, 2006). 
 
 
 
1.4 Methods  
 
While the theoretical conception of my artworks is entwined within the 
methodology and methods I employ, the post-theoretical conception of the 
methods—the development, construction and exhibition of the artworks 
themselves—is many and varied. 
 
Unlike many artists who draw, methodically maintain journals, and keep 
visual diaries, I most commonly document my processes by collecting ‘stuff’. 
As a kitsch aficionado, and avid collector of what may appear to some as 
‘random stuff’ or even ‘junk’, I have always surrounded myself, and filled my 
studio, with a vast array of ornaments, gadgets, and things that I love or that 
‘might come in handy someday’ (Figure 6).  
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Figure 6:  Image of my studio (2011) 
 
 
The artworks I make are usually in response to or made with these things. 
Ironically, it took me a long time to discern any rationale behind the random 
things that I surround myself with and how they operate within my practice. In 
time I realised that the answer lay not in what I collect, but in what was 
excluded. I rarely kept or displayed things that made me feel bad or that I 
associated with a bad experience. If I did, they were tucked away in a safe 
place, but kept out of sight. All of the things I surround myself with are things 
that, on some level, make me feel good. On further reflection I realised that 
these objects are either a reminder of, or connection to; a past experience; 
part of a plan or dream of a future experience; or something that I just really 
loved, or saw great potential in, and had to have. A tea set of which almost 
every piece is chipped that belonged to my late grandmother who I adored; 
an entire snow dome collection, 170 pieces in total, bought on impulse at a 
flea market because I’d always wished I’d had one; a collection of 
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ornaments, figurines and statues of religious icons that I started to collect a 
few years before moving onto a new fad, and the pale blue budgie 
paperweight that gazed up at me from the shelf next to my computer that 
was the inspiration for Budgietopia (2009‒2013).  
 
The kitsch objects I covet and collect, the things I have used in my art— the 
budgies, snow domes, religious iconography, fake flowers and mermaid 
paraphernalia—seem to generate an excess of emotions and sensory 
perceptions: comfort and safety, melancholy and nostalgia, memory, fantasy 
and irony. Although unique to my lifeworld, through a reflexive analysis of my 
praxis I came to realise that these kinds of connections to experiences, 
possessions and material objects—particularly those that are kitsch—are not 
just my own, but shared across cultures and societies. That objects like 
these, and the experiences that are associated with them, function by re-
embedding individuals and societies, myself included, and give value and 
meaning to our lives. It is from this understanding that my work is created. 
 
 
1.5 Construction of Works 
 
Once I decide to create a work I begin to plan how the work will be made and 
what other materials I am going to need. As a sculptor and installation artist, 
and also because of the scale in which I like to work, the materials I use are 
likely to be found in hardware stores, flea markets, salvage yards or acquired 
from light industrial suppliers and giftware wholesalers. The armature for The 
Aquarium (2009), for example, was constructed using a set of shop windows 
purchased at a salvage yard, and amongst many other components the tank 
was filled with half a ton of hot pink gravel purchased through a pet supply 
store (Figure 7).  
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Figure 7:  The Aquarium (2009) under construction in studio and completed work 
installed at Spectrum (2009) 
 
 
Often, cost, weight, transportability, safety and a range of other factors will 
dictate how and from what a work is made. The sculpture Jesus (2010) for 
instance, was commissioned for a church and was hung in the nave from 
parapet gables, directly above the pulpit where the choir assembles. This 
proved a great challenge as the work had to meet stringent occupational 
health and safety guidelines.  
 
 
 
Exception to copyright: Section ss40, 103C, Exception, Research or Study. 
 
Figure 8:  Jesus (2010) sculpture ready to be hoisted into position in nave of 
Wesley Church, Perth, Western Australia and the completed 
installation ready for exhibition (2010) 
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There were also stringent heritage regulations to be considered that 
restricted the overall weight of the work and the type of hanging devices that 
could be used. This proved a great challenge as the sculpture had to be 
hung approximately eight metres above the floor, hoisted from a position 
above the church’s organ and then fastened to the gables in front of the 
organ pipes. Finally, to add to the challenge, the largest entrance to the 
Gothic-styled building is less than a metre wide. The sculpture, which is over 
four metres in length, had to be designed to fit through the small door and a 
series of corridors.  
 
 
1.6 Summary 
 
Regardless of the project, adopting a reflexive approach to praxis is an 
important, if not essential, component of my creative process. Arts-practice-
led-research is, in my view, an invaluable intellectual paradigm for artist-
practitioners/researchers to be able to contribute to their field and to 
communicate with other fields of research. As a humanistic model, arts-
practice-led-research—being inclusive, chaotic, and holistic—recognises the 
impact of chance, coincidence and the freedom to explore (Gray & Pirie, 
1995), as has been the case within this research.  
 
An understanding of the power and importance of art to represent a myriad 
of emotions and social or cultural views is valuable to this research. The 
exegesis explains the theories surrounding these works in great detail—
understanding how kitsch operates in a contemporary context, and the 
challenges of defining authenticity, taste and kitsch.  
 
The purpose of my artwork and overall praxis, at its most simple level, is to 
create a happy, pleasant experience for the viewer. As demonstrated in the 
pages that follow, the homeliness and easy visual recognition associated 
with kitsch, unlike other aesthetics favoured by artists, offer an audience an 
uncomplicated entry point to a work of art. As discussed in detail in Section 
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5.2, this type of easy access to art that kitsch offers is supported by 
Olalquiaga’s notion of second-degree kitsch. Kitsch “preserves a unique 
aesthetic sensibility that spurns creativity per se while it endorses a repetition 
of the familiar and a grounding in an affirmation of the everyday” (Binkley, 
2000, p. 134).  Kitsch, as Binkley (2000) has observed, “reduces the 
complexity, desperation and paradox of human experience to simple 
sentiment, replacing the novelty of a revealed deeper meaning” (p. 145). 
 
If the viewer of my work was to ‘have a giggle’ at the humour in The 
Aquarium or find themselves peering over the balustrade into the utopian 
world of Budgietopia smiling at the masses of fake flowers and ‘cute’ budgie 
ornaments, it would be enough for me. If the viewer was to consider the 
objects that they accumulate and how kitsch informs their lifeworld, to walk 
away, feeling more connected to . . . or “re-embedded” (Giddens, 1991), my 
work will have been a success. Kitsch allows the viewer the option, even if 
only initially, to put aside the signifying and/or use value associated with 
other analyses of art and simply enjoy (or not) their experience.  
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2. DEFINING KITSCH 
 
 
 
2.1 What is Kitsch? 
 
Garden gnomes, flying ducks, fake flowers, plastic tablecloths, faux fur and 
suburban ‘weatherboards’1 built in the style of Roman mansions are all 
examples of kitsch. At a glance, kitsch may seem an easy genre to 
categorise; however, kitsch is not limited to just ‘cheesy stuff’, ‘funky retro 
things’ or material objects that are thought to be poor copies or, even worse, 
simply bad taste as is commonly understood. Through contextualising kitsch 
within a contemporary context, this research attempts to re-position kitsch as 
a valuable aspect of everyday life and more specifically of the “lifeworld” 
(Habermas, 1994). This contextualisation is not limited to aesthetic 
judgement and categorisation, but aims to provide a broader sociological, 
theoretical and conceptual framework through which kitsch can be 
understood.  
 
Definitions of kitsch are many and varied (Greenberg, 1961; Adorno & 
Horkheimer, 1991; Calinescu, 1987; Broch, 1955; Dorfles, 1969; Kundera, 
1985; Kulka, 1996; Attfield, 2006; Binkley, 2002). Judy Attfield (2006) notes 
that kitsch “belongs to a genre of …things that elude categorization under 
conventional definitions” (p. 202). Through understanding these varied 
definitions it is apparent that kitsch is more than just a “broad category of 
objects that inhabit the contemporary material world” (p. 202), but has 
continually managed to defy neat definitions within contemporary life, the 
arts, and within popular culture since its introduction in the late nineteenth 
century. 
 
 
                                            
1 A ‘weatherboard’ is a colloquial Australian term use to describe a small house made of 
wood.  
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2.2 The Social and Historical Development of Kitsch  
 
The word ‘kitsch’ first appeared towards the end of the nineteenth century in 
response to the effects of early industrialisation on the ‘common culture’ of 
Western nations (Binkley, 2002). Since its inception, the term ‘kitsch’ has 
continued to evolve and take on various different, often contradictory 
meanings. Kitsch has been used by regimes to impose ideologies (Dorfles, 
1969; Attfield, 2006; Kundera, 1995). It has been applied as a “strategy to 
elevate its own status” (Attfield, 2006, p. 202) allowing its own integration into 
serious critical academic discourse by theorists including Dorfles (1969) and 
Greenberg (1969). It has been used as a way of establishing levels of class 
and status, or lack thereof (Greenberg, 1961; Calinescu, 1987; Broch, 1955; 
Dorfles, 1969) and also to establish what is and is not art (Broch, 1955; 
Greenberg, 1969; Olalquiaga, 1992, 1998). 
 
While the etymology of kitsch is unclear, the term is generally agreed to be of 
German origin, and is thought to have derived from the word kitschen—to 
collect rubbish from the street or verkitschen, to make cheap (Calinescu, 
1987, p. 234). Kitsch was popularised in the mid-1800s (1860–70) by artists 
and art dealers in Munich, Germany, who used the term to describe the 
“aesthetically impoverished reproductions of sketches and drawings that tried 
to be artistic” (p. 235).  
 
Kitsch was thought to lack the creativity and originality displayed in genuine 
art, and to appeal to the naïve tastes of the newly moneyed Munich 
bourgeoisie. In typical nouveau riche style, the bourgeoisie thought that they 
could achieve the status of the cultural elite by copying the most obvious 
features of their cultural habits. They perceived and aspired to ‘high taste’, 
without really knowing what ‘high taste’ actually was (Binkley, 2002; 
Calinescu, 1987). While the bourgeoisie felt they had achieved their cultural 
aspirations, the cultural elite saw the bourgeoisie, and the art that appealed 
to them, as being aesthetically impoverished and morally dubious. As a 
result, the elite believed aesthetic life had been sacrificed in the 
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bourgeoisie’s (usually poor) replications of objects that were thought to have 
a higher level of social status and value2.   
 
Since the late nineteenth century, kitsch has continued to ride through a 
barrage of criticism. Some of its less attractive attributions have stuck while 
others have been shaken, and kitsch has again drawn the attention of 
contemporary cultural commentators. As a result, many established points of 
view have been re-evaluated, previously ignored aspects have gained 
recognition, and several new and valuable insights have been identified. 
 
 
 
2.3 Re-evaluating Kitsch: The Development of Taste, Culture 
and Status in Definitions of Kitsch 
 
Despite ongoing and plentiful research into kitsch, its definition continues to 
be contentious and has been repeatedly modified to suit the conditions of its 
use (Attfield, 2006; Binkley, 2002). This is illustrated by a comparison of the 
work of earlier commentators on kitsch, particularly the mass culture 
theorists including Greenberg (1961), Adorno and Horkheimer (1991), 
Calinescu (1987), Broch (1955) and Dorfles (1969). These writers 
popularised the term by relating kitsch to the ‘avant-garde’ forming a general 
consensus of kitsch as hierarchical, taste and class based—that is, bad taste 
and low class. During the late 1990s and the 2000s, the kitsch debate re-
emerged between contemporary commentators (Binkley (2000; 2002), 
Attfield (2006), Olalquiaga (1992; 1998)). Although only partial consensus 
has been reached between these theorists, each have significantly 
                                            
2 For more on the etymology of kitsch see Matei Calinescu, Kitsch in Five Faces of 
Modernity, Durham: Duke University Press, 1987. pp. 222-262. For early perspectives on 
kitsch a useful point of departure is Kitsch: The World of Bad Taste (1975), edited by Gillo 
Dorfles, this collection of essays has been a key text on kitsch since the 1970s. It includes 
Herman Broch’s essay, ‘Kitsch and Art-With-a-Message’ (1955), pp. 68-70, which is said to 
be the uncredited source of Clement Greenberg’s influential and highly criticised text, ‘The 
Avant-Garde and Kitsch’ (1939), pp. 116-126. Also included is Broch’s essay, ‘Notes on the 
Problem of Kitsch’, (1955), pp. 49-67, where he expanded on his earlier essay. The anti-
kitsch stance endorsed by these texts created the traditional frame through which kitsch has 
typically been understood. It is the traditional frame that I challenge throughout my research.   
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repositioned definitions of kitsch, a significant part of which has included 
separating kitsch from discussions of taste. The repositioning redefines the 
relationship between kitsch and taste as ‘popular taste’ (Binkley, 2000; 
Attfield, 2006) but not necessarily bad taste as was the case with traditional 
views of kitsch (Greenberg (1961), Adorno and Horkheimer (1991), 
Calinescu (1987), Broch (1955) and Dorfles (1969). 
 
The role of taste in analyses of kitsch, is in my view, inextricably linked to 
popular taste, but not limited to the notion of taste hierarchies in the 
traditional view. I assert that the re-evaluation of kitsch should view taste as 
popular, but cutting across high and low class or ‘status’. This research 
supports Attfield’s view that kitsch can be found in “all manifestations of 
visual culture”, not only traditional low class and/or bad taste objects and 
experiences but also in high art and culture. I concur with Attfield (2006) that 
to understand kitsch may help to better understand popular taste. I also 
agree that “kitsch cannot be reduced to a single stylistic genre”, but can most 
certainly be recognised “from within a consciously critical context that has 
something to say about taste” (p. 203). 
 
Herbert Gans (1974) coined the term ‘taste cultures’ in a bid to replace the 
hierarchical distinctions and status that were, and still are, implied by the 
words ‘popular’ and ‘high’. Gans conveyed that ‘taste’ was quite simply 
‘taste’. His intent was to expose and distribute institutional limits and creative 
freedoms evenly up and down the cultural ladder and, effectively, to turn half 
a century of mass culture on its head (1974).  
 
Of the key commentators on taste, Pierre Bourdieu in Distinction (1994), a 
study of France’s consuming public’s taste habits, linked popular taste with 
the working class, characterising popular taste as a direct response to 
aesthetic judgement. Bourdieu classified bad taste as the intellectual 
analytical definition that would have otherwise automatically defined ‘kitsch’ 
as the opposite of classical forms that represent perfection (1994). This view 
is strongly contested. I assert that popular taste plays a particularly positive 
role in contextualising kitsch. As noted by Attfield: 
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. . .  positioning kitsch within a social context of popular taste 
recognises popular culture as a more inclusive field of Inquiry, 
it acknowledges the aestheticisation of everyday life as a 
positive aspect of culture and allows the consideration of taste 
as part of the habitus, the material culture of everyday life. 
(Attfield, 2006, p. 207) 
 
Therefore, ‘popular taste’ and kitsch can be found at all levels of society, and 
can be subjectively analysed as both good and/or bad taste. I agree with 
Binkley (2002) that taste no longer plays an authoritative role in definitions of 
kitsch. I assert that while certain objects may be more common to specific 
groups or classes within society, popular taste and kitsch cannot be 
relegated to any specific hierarchy, taste group, or class as illustrated in 
Figure 9. This thesis re-evaluates kitsch and taste as popular, but as cutting 
across status (or class), as evident in aspects of visual arts and popular 
culture.  
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Table illustrating the re-evaluation (my concept) and the 
traditional views of kitsch and taste. 
 
Figure 9:  Comparison of contemporary kitsch and taste (my concept) and 
traditional views of kitsch and taste 
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2.4 Re-evaluating Kitsch: Examples of the Re-evaluation of 
Kitsch, Taste and Status 
 
Useful examples of the re-revaluation of kitsch and taste as popular but 
cutting across status, can be found in the kitsch iconography identified in the 
work of Japanese artist and theorist Takashi Murakami (2008). As I will 
illustrate, this is contrasted with the television chef and ‘domestic goddess’ 
Nigella Lawson’s dialogue (2001) in her television cooking show “Nigella 
Bites” (2001, n.p.), and text in the cookbook of the same name, where a 
chapter is dedicated to ‘kitchen kitsch’. Although diverse choices, they 
illustrate how the meaning of the term kitsch has evolved within 
contemporary popular culture into popular taste, and how the concept of 
kitsch is often stretched beyond reasonable means and definitions. 
 
The work of Takashi Murakami is an excellent example of the shift in the use 
and meaning of kitsch in contemporary society. Murakami adopts themes 
from mass media and popular culture, mixing art with commercial branding 
and merchandising. He is responsible for an enormous range of high art 
sculptures, paintings and animations as well as mass-produced, low art 
signature products including figurines (Figure 10), toys, clothing and 
accessories. Murakami’s work is recognisable by the use of flat planes of 
colour, and cute heavily codified motifs that have a base in ‘anime’ and 
‘manga’. By the arrangement, and use of flat planes of colour in a non-
hierarchical ‘flat’ manner, in both his paintings and sculptural work, Murakami 
has achieved his own unique style, which he calls “superflat” (Gritz, 2008).  
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Wakaba. (n.d.) Selection of Murakami Figurines. [image]. Retrieved from 
http://art.wakaba.net/imagesKKKK/sfm10.jpg 
Exception to copyright: Section ss40, 103C, Exception, Research or Study. 
 
Figure 10:  Selection of Murakami figurines 
 
 
Critics of Murakami, including Magdalene Perez (2006) and Anna Gritz 
(2008), position superflat as straddling both fine art and commercial 
products,  “blurring” the boundaries between high and low art (p. 1). In an 
interview with Perez for Artinfo in 2006, Murakami noted that rather than 
blurring boundaries, he sees his work as “changing the line” (p. 1) between 
what has typically been considered high or low art. I concur that Murakami’s 
work has changed the line, as is illustrated in the range of handbags and 
accessories he was recruited to make for Louis Vuitton in 2003 (Keehn, n.d.). 
The handbags, although both hand and machine made, are mass-produced 
and are thought of by many to be works of be high art. Yet because these 
‘works of art’ are handbags that have been mass-produced, and not a one 
off painting for example, some traditionalists struggle to accept them as art or 
even low art. It is these types of shifts in perception that Perez (2006) and 
Murakami (2006) are referring to when discussing blurred boundaries and 
the “changing of the line” (p. 1). Over ten years later, the relationship is still 
strong and Murakami continues to work with the brand. 
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Pursepage. (n.d.) Selection of Murakami handbags for Louis Vuitton. [Image]. Retrieved from 
http://www.pursepage.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/02/louis-vuitton-moca-line.jpg 
Exception to copyright: Section ss40, 103C, Exception, Research or Study. 
 
Figure 11:  Murakami's bags for Louis Vuitton 
 
 
Combinations of images from Murakami’s artwork and the Louis Vuitton logo 
were incorporated in a range of handbags and matching accessories with 
graffiti inspired designs, cute smiling cherries and cherry blossoms, a panda 
and other cartoon-like characters (Figure 11). Printed in bright candy colours 
that look as though they have been randomly printed over the top of the 
classic brown and gold LV (Louis Vuitton) logo, the designs have been 
criticised for their “gratingly discordant colour schemes” (Keehn, n.d., p. 2) 
and kitschness. Although having been struck with remarks such as “irritating” 
and “jarring” (Keehn, n.d), the range sent Louis Vuitton’s sales soaring by 20 
percent in the third quarter of 2003 (p. 2). In 2011 the relationship between 
Murakami and Louis Vuitton was still strong with the fashion house launching 
Murakami’s new ‘Cosmic Blossom’ collection (Figure 13, below) and also 
“reinventing the QR code3 together” (Litman, 2011, May 15) (Figure 12). The 
new ranges have continued to maintain their success largely due to what has 
been described as Murakami’s “impressive knack for turning mass culture 
into high art” (Enrique, 2011). 
 
                                            
3 A ‘QR code’ or ‘Quick Response Code’ is “a type of two-dimensional barcode” or “image 
based hypertext link” that can be read using “smartphones and dedicated QR reading 
devices, that link directly to text, emails, websites, phone numbers”. They can be used for a 
very large range of tasks including identification of objects people or places, recognition of 
liking something (i.e. a Facebook page). They are generally found on “product packaging, 
shop displays, printed and billboard advertisements as well as in emails and on websites” 
(What is a QR code, 2012).  
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Murakami, T. (2009). Louis Vuitton QR code (image) Retrieved from http://adage.com/article/behind-
the-work/designer-barcodes/136346/ 
Exception to copyright: Section ss40, 103C, Exception, Research or Study. 
  
Figure 12:  Louis Vuitton QR code designed by Takashi Murakami 
 
 
 
 
Murakami, T. (2011) Louis Vuitton cosmic blossom collection by Takashi Murakami (Advertisement) 
retrieved from http://www.koreanartistnews.com/louis-vuitton-cosmic-blossom-so-colorful-with-takashi-
murakami.html 
Exception to copyright: Section ss40, 103C, Exception, Research or Study. 
  
Figure 13:  Advertisement for Takashi Murakami ‘Cosmic Blossom’ 
 
 
Keehn (n.d.) has described the popularity and strange irony surrounding the 
bags as: 
 
the supreme marriage of the “dark” and of the “light”. A three 
thousand dollar [US] handbag with a kids cartoon design. 
Stifled old European money meets childish computer-geek 
chic. High art meets consumerism, we can go with that, we 
love that…we get it. (Keehn, n.d., p. 2) 
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What is it that we get though? Why have the cutesy, kitsch designs on 
Murakami’s bags for Louis Vuitton been so successful? A possible 
explanation is that the smiling cartoon-like designs and icons operate 
through an attachment of consumers to sentiment. The designs on 
Murakami’s bags may very simply offer a sense of happiness and comfort 
amidst the humdrum of everyday life. The smiley face, for example, possibly 
the most widely recognised insignia of universal happiness, as Binkley 
(2000) states, is a basic form that “calls out ‘have a nice day’” (p. 146). It 
expresses the most “fundamental, trivial and universal of languages—simple 
human love and joy” (Binkley, 2000, p. 146). I concur with Binkley (2000) that 
the simple, happy message delivered by the smiley face is extremely 
“captivating in its ability to elevate the unique charm of the commonplace to a 
value of universal significance” (p. 146). Paradoxically, however, Murakami 
could very well be said to have raised the value of the humble smiley face to 
a new level, as the bags spattered with graffiti and cute kitsch smiling motifs, 
range in price from around two to five thousand dollars each—clearly priced 
well out of range for the average shopper. The success of the kitsch bags 
can be used to illustrate the levelling of taste hierarchies or, to use one of 
Murakami’s terms, the “changing of the line” (as cited in Perez, 2006). In my 
view, the popularity of the bags highlights the shift from traditional notions of 
kitsch (that is, low class and bad taste) to a modern view indicative of the 
flattening of taste hierarchies. Murakami’s bags for Louis Vuitton offer the 
opportunity to literally purchase sentiment and happiness in the form of 
kitsch. 
 
In contrast to Murakami’s ‘cutesy’ pandas and cosmic blossoms, the chapter 
in Nigella Lawson’s cookbook, Nigella Bites (2001) titled ‘Kitchen Kitsch’ 
takes a rather different, even absurd, twist on kitsch. It is my opinion that the 
common and often misguided use of the term kitsch, illustrated by Lawson, 
exemplifies—and is responsible for—the more recent conflation of kitsch and 
the confusion of the position of class surrounding definitions of kitsch. 
Subtitled ‘Trashy’, Lawson (2001) introduces the chapter in her cookbook by 
writing about the very fond place in her heart “for a bit of kitchen kitsch” (p. 
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123). The chapter includes recipes for Coca-Cola glazed ham, Elvis 
Presley’s apparently legendary banana and peanut butter fried sandwich, 
and the use of “low rent ingredients” (p. 145). The recipes appear equally as 
judgemental as Nigella’s instruction to “seek to evoke some food, or food-
related substance that is industrially produced” rather than “naturally 
occurring” (p. 145), and to use “gorgeously garish” vegetable fat—the kind a 
blue-collar worker would commonly use” (p. 145). Rather than kitsch, it is my 
interpretation that Lawson’s ‘trashy’ chapter constitutes a very literal 
judgement of taste (or lack thereof). The dialogue used in Lawson’s recipes 
demonstrates how taste is often directly linked to class hierarchies as an 
indicator of social position and is wrongly associated with kitsch. Lawson’s 
approach demonstrates an elitist approach akin to “class tourism” (Potts, 
2007, p. 14), showing that class hierarchies are definitely alive and well. 
Gastronomy aside, the use of taste hierarchies as status markers as 
opposed to simple good or bad taste in re-evaluations of kitsch remains in 
dispute.  
 
 
2.5 Re-evaluating Kitsch: Contemporary Theories on Kitsch, 
Taste and Status 
 
Of the contemporary theorists re-evaluating kitsch, academic Sam Binkley in 
Kitsch as a Repetitive System: A Problem for the Theory of Taste Hierarchy 
(2000) and Judy Attfield in Redefining Kitsch: The Politics of Design (2006) 
argue, on similar grounds, for breaking away from the traditional analyses 
that categorise kitsch as bad taste, aligned with ‘taste habits’, class identities 
and crass consumerism. Tracey Potts, however, in ‘Walking the Line’: Kitsch, 
Class and the Morphing Subject of Value (2007) contests several of the re-
evaluations of kitsch, particularly those of Attfield and Binkley. 
 
Attfield (2006) argues that “it is no longer acceptable to limit [kitsch] to the 
crude elitist critique that categorizes it as bad taste and as a cynical 
manifestation of consumerism” (p. 201). Attfield states that kitsch, as more 
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than a single style, is an aesthetic that engenders a rapport with a large 
audience. Moreover, when conditioned by mass media, kitsch can create “a 
strategic knowingness about self-identity through taste choices” (p. 201). 
Attfield positions kitsch as a valid category of popular taste, but not as poor 
taste, recognising popular culture as a field of inquiry inclusive of kitsch. This 
in turn allows the consideration of taste as part of the material culture of 
everyday life, but not as a vital constituent of analyses of kitsch (2006). 
Attfield acknowledges the aestheticisation of the everyday as an authentic, 
positive feature of culture, and of kitsch. Therefore, I argue, popular should 
no longer be equated with low status, bad taste, and impoverished art. The 
conflation of class to taste, typical of traditional views of kitsch, is an 
inadequate description of how our society works. Mass culture weaves 
through most aspects of our society; it reaches us through the Internet, 
through film, MP3 players, tablets and smart phones. The once esoteric, 
such as opera, ballet, and theatre are now consumed within the everyday, 
where high and low cultures inhabit the same contexts. 
 
Similarly, Binkley (2000) has broken away from the traditional analyses that 
align kitsch with ‘taste habits’ and class/status identities, asserting that the 
taste hierarchies established by the 1960s mass culture theorists and cultural 
commentators, which inform judgements surrounding kitsch, have been 
dismantled. Binkley maintains that taste habits and preferences are no 
longer easily aligned with class identities. Binkley (2000) argues that kitsch, 
“is not the property of a distinctive strata…but a general corrective to a 
general modern problem, of existential disembeddedness, loss of assurance 
in the community of life and ones place in the world” (p. 149). Binkley’s 
(2000) position is of significance to this research as he not only redefines 
taste hierarchies but highlights the function and value of kitsch in 
contemporary life through its ability to re-embed the individual. 
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2.6 Re-evaluating Kitsch: Disembeddedness and the 
Repetitive Features of Kitsch 
 
Drawing on the work of political theorist and sociologist Anthony Giddens 
(1991), as well as sociologist Sam Binkley (2000), I argue that the repetitive 
qualities of kitsch address the general problem of modernity that is referred 
to as ‘disembeddedness’. I concur with Binkley that disembeddedness, and 
therefore embeddedness, are as “central to any theory of kitsch as [they are] 
to any theory of modernity” (p. 135).  
 
Binkley describes disembeddedness as “the undermining of personal 
horizons of social and cosmic security” (2000, p. 131), arguing that the 
‘repetitive qualities of kitsch’ address the problem of disembeddedness by 
working to re-embed consumers and shore up stocks of ontological security4. 
According to Giddens, disembeddedness is a characteristic of contemporary 
life that expresses the lifting out of social relations from local contexts and 
their rearticulation “across different tracts of time and space” (1991, p.18). 
‘Lifting out’ is precisely what is meant by disembedding and “is the key to the 
tremendous acceleration in time-space distanciation which modernity 
introduces” (p.18). Time-space distanciation is the process of disembedding 
that occurred with the historical movement from traditional to modern 
societies. It is a progression that was set in motion by the process of modern 
industrialisation, which was exacerbated by globalisation, and continues to 
gain momentum. 
 
Giddens deliberately chooses the metaphor ‘disembedding’ in distinct 
opposition to the notion of “differentiation” (p.18), a concept that is often 
used by sociologists to compare modern and pre-modern social systems 
(1991). I concur with Giddens that differentiation is suggestive of a 
“progressive separation of functions” (p. 18), whereby “modes of activity” (p. 
                                            
4 Ontological security is a term used by Giddens to describe “a sense of continuity and order 
in events, including those not directly within the perceptual environment of the individual” 
(Giddens, 1991, p. 243). 
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18) in pre-modern societies were ordered in a “diffuse fashion” (p.18), 
compared with the more specialised and precise social systems that came 
with the arrival of modernity. Whilst a valid approach, I agree with Giddens 
that the concept of differentiation fails to capture “the lifting out of social 
relations from local contexts” or “their rearticulation across indefinite tracts of 
time [and] space” (p. 18). In so doing, the concept of differentiation neglects 
both the nature and impact of the modern institutions, elements that are 
addressed by the concept of disembeddedness. 
 
In contrast to disembeddedness, embeddedness is defined by Giddens 
(1990) as “the re-appropriation or recasting of disembedded social relations 
so as to pin them down (however partially or transitorily) to local conditions of 
time and place” (pp. 79-80). Binkley extrapolates on this, stating that 
embeddedness is: 
 
. . . a condition of daily life in which uncertainties, existential questions 
and a sense of the freedom and creativity of human action are 
bracketed by reassuring traditions and habits of thought which 
penetrate the deepest crevices of the quotidian, is broadly taken to 
represent the forms of sociability characteristic of pre-modern 
societies. (Binkley, 2001, p.135) 
 
I assert that as an aesthetic that gives back some of the reassurance that 
was lost in the process of modernisation when “too much is new, and much 
too little is familiar” (Jensen, 1999) kitsch addresses the modern condition of 
disembeddedness. I concur with Binkley (2001) that kitsch “preserves a 
unique aesthetic sensibility…that endorses a repetition of the familiar and a 
grounding in an affirmation of the everyday” (p. 134). This is not unlike that 
which Pierre Bourdieu (1984) calls “the taste of necessity”, an “aesthetic 
expression that endorses the sense of conventionality, rhythm and meter of 
aesthetic forms, and their embeddedness in daily life” (as cited in Binkley, 
2000, p. 134). Taking pleasure in its “embeddedness in routine, its 
faithfulness to conventions and its rootedness in the modest cadence of 
daily life” (Binkley, 2000, p. 135) kitsch is able to re-embed consumers by 
“replenishing stocks of ontological security” and bolstering “a sense of 
cosmic coherence in an unstable world of challenge, innovation and 
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creativity” (Binkley, 2001, p.135). Through its ability to re-embed, kitsch 
provides a “protective cocoon” (Giddens, 1991, p.40) in which people can 
trust and find relief from the pressures of modern life. 
 
 
2.6.1 Time-Space Distanciation 
 
The term ‘time-space distanciation’, or “distancing’ across time and space” 
(1991, p. 16) was coined by Giddens and is a primary aspect of modernity 
and a precursor to disembeddedness. It is a consequence of the movement 
from traditional, pre-modern societies, like the agrarian age, to the 
contemporary societies of today. Time-space distanciation involves an 
“emptying of time and space” (p. 17) that is characteristic of modern cultures 
and has led to the disembedding of social institutions. Time-space 
distanciation explains why remote interactions have become an increasingly 
important feature of human life. An awareness of time-space distanciation is 
important to contextualising the subsequent discussions on kitsch in relation 
to experience (Olalquiaga, 1992) and authenticity (Binkley, 2000), that follow. 
 
Giddens (1991) proposes that social life is made up of interactions that are 
either face-to-face or remote. In modern societies, the social systems that 
were previously distinctive and separate in traditional societies have become 
connected and interdependent. It is generally agreed that, “there is no [or 
has never been a] society in which individuals do not have a sense of future, 
present or past” (p. 16). Also, “every culture has [or has had] some form of 
standardised spatial markers which designate a special awareness of place” 
(p.16). As societies modernised, formal methods were developed and 
conventionalised to calculate time and to order space, such as calendars, 
clocks and maps. However, in pre-modern cultures “time and space were 
connected through the situatedness of place” (1991, p.16). Therefore, while 
going about basic everyday activities “time and space remained essentially 
linked through place”. This is in distinct contrast to modern societies in which 
the when and where of social conduct is now linked to the substance of the 
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conduct itself. In Australia, for example, if one desires to conduct a 
sophisticated and cosmopolitan lifestyle they might drive a European car, 
drink Italian sparkling water and wear imported designer clothes. 
Furthermore the Internet instantaneously removes time from space, as is 
evident through online share trading, dating sites, and social media groups 
like Facebook and Twitter. Above all, the separation of time from space that 
came with modernity has resulted in “an ‘empty’ dimension of time”, the main 
consequence of which “also pulled space away from place” (1991, p.16). 
 
In modern cultures, "modern time" is now separated from any specific place. 
Modern cultures now operate across regions via systems of uniform 
measurements and technologies (calendars, maps, clocks, etc.). The 
emptying of time was a prior condition of the emptying of space and the 
separation of space from place. Place thus becomes increasingly 
“phantasmagorical”, in a “process whereby local characteristics of place are 
thoroughly invaded by, and recognised in terms of, distanciated social 
relation” (1991, p. 244). As a constantly shifting complex succession of 
things (seen or imagined), place is therefore affected by distant and spatially 
absent social influences. It is this separation of time and space that 
continues to maintain time-space distanciation. 
 
Giddens (1991) uses the invention of the mechanical clock as a prime 
example of time-space distanciation, noting that it is a model that should not 
be considered superficially. The use and spread of “mechanical timing 
devices” (p. 17) like clocks has changed the make-up of time and space not 
just locally, but universally. A world with a “universal dating system” (p. 17), 
and “globally standardized time zones” (p. 17) as ours is today is “socially 
and experientially different” (p. 17) from any pre-modern era.   
 
As “a universalised projection” (p. 17), a globalised world does not privilege 
place, which metaphorically “is the correlate system of the clock” (p.17) as it 
brings about the emptying of space. A universalised projection or “global 
map” (p. 17) such as this is more than just a way of representing “the 
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geography of the earth” (p.17) but is a key aspect of “basic transformations 
in social relations” (p. 17). 
 
The emptying of time and space is in this regard a dialectical process and is 
by no means a “uni-linear’’ development. The separation of time from space 
allows the development of countless forms of ‘lived time’ to become possible 
in a social setting. Therefore, the division of time from space has not 
become a mutually foreign characteristic of social organisation. It has 
instead provided a new foundation for time and place. Re-combined in ways 
that facilitate and order social activities, time and space are left unhindered 
by points of reference that are dependent on the specificities of place 
(Giddens, 1991). 
 
According to Giddens, the ‘organisations’ and ‘organisation’ that are 
characteristic of modernity are barely conceivable without the “reintegration 
of separated time and space” (p. 17). Social organisation in modern life 
relies on “the coordination of many human beings physically absent from 
one another” (p. 17). The ‘when’ and ‘where’ of actions are now directly 
connected, but not as they were in pre-modern epochs in which they were 
mediated by place. 
 
The separation of time from space has been fundamental to the dynamism 
we now experience in modern life and social affairs. As Giddens points out, 
the separation is a phenomenon that has effectively universalised the “use 
of history to make history” (the year 2000, for example is a universal marker 
for all of humanity). It is a constituent in the processes that continue to drive 
modern life and social affairs away from ‘the hold’ of traditions and can be 
seen as having encouraged the development of kitsch. This use of history in 
Giddens’ view “becomes global in the form of creation of a standardised 
‘past’ and a universally applicable ‘future’” (1991, p.17).  
 
As a process, time-space distanciation and the disembedding of social 
institutions have had great implications for the evolution and development of 
kitsch. Many disembedded individuals have, in my view, been left with an 
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intense craving for something that is, or at least feels, real: something 
tangible that can anchor them in time and space, something that they can 
trust. As is demonstrated in the sections that follow, this desire is the reason 
why for many modern societies a shift in the value and meaning of kitsch 
has occurred. 
 
 
2.6.2 Disembedding Mechanisms: Symbolic Tokens and 
Expert Systems 
 
Giddens has identified two types of disembedding mechanisms, ‘symbolic 
tokens’ and ‘expert systems’, which together form ‘abstract systems’ (1991). 
Symbolic tokens are “a media of exchange that have standard value” (p. 18) 
and are therefore “interchangeable across a plurality of contexts” (p. 18). 
Symbolic tokens can thus be circulated without consideration of the specific 
characteristics of the groups, or of the people that handle them. The most 
pervasive example of a symbolic tokens is money (1991). Various larger 
forms of pre-modern social systems developed monetary exchanges of 
some kind, however, with the development and maturation of modernity a 
“money economy becomes vastly more sophisticated and abstract” 
(Giddens, 1991, p. 18). Money brackets time and space—time “because it is 
a means of credit”, and space “since standardised value allows transactions 
between a multiplicity of individuals who never physically meet one another” 
(p.18).  
 
Re-evaluated within a contemporary context, kitsch, in the form of 
sentimentality, I assert, can closely mirror a symbolic token. While the 
objects and experiences that are considered kitsch may vary from person to 
person, or from one culture to another, kitsch’s overarching premise of 
“sentimentality” (as defined in Section 7.4) (Binkley, 2000) is universal and 
therefore “interchangeable across a plurality of contexts” (Giddens, 1991, p. 
19) as are symbolic tokens. However, although kitsch can be transacted 
“between a multiplicity of individuals who never physically meet one 
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another” (p.18), unlike true symbolic tokens (i.e. money) the ‘value’ of 
sentimentality in kitsch is subjective—as is arguably the case with money—
and therefore cannot be standardised across a multitude of contexts, as is 
the case with a true symbolic token. 
 
The most eloquent description of how kitsch mirrors a symbolic token can 
be seen in Milan Kundera’s (1984) statement in the novel The Unbearable 
Lightness of Being: 
 
Kitsch causes two tears to flow in quick succession. The first tear 
says: How nice to see children running on the grass!  
The second tear says: How nice to be moved, together with all 
mankind, by children running on the grass!  
It is the second tear that makes kitsch kitsch. (Kundera, 1984, p. 244) 
 
 
Kundera observes “when the heart speaks, the mind finds it indecent to 
object” (Kundera, 1984, p. 244). It is ‘the second tear’ that flows at the 
simplicity of watching children running on the grass, free and joyful—and the 
sentiment this vision invokes—that “takes us back to our common roots” 
(Binkley, 2000, p. 145). However, what is most significant about kitsch as a 
symbolic token—compared to money—is its ability to reconnect and re-
embed human beings on a deeply personal level. The sentimentality of 
kitsch is recognised and circulated without consideration of the specific 
characteristics of the groups, or people who engage with it. In this way, 
kitsch comes within a hair’s breadth of having true standardised value as a 
symbolic token. The sentimentality of kitsch has become a universal 
currency, arguably a symbolic token, that supports transactions between a 
diverse array of individuals who may never physically meet or come to know 
each other. 
 
Kitsch, like children running on the grass, “calls out our forgotten love and 
wonderment in all things wholesome” (Binkley, p.145). It is a reminder of the 
pleasures that can be found in the simple things in life, and it therefore plays 
an integral role in modern life as it works to re-embed social relations not 
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only to the “local conditions of time and place” (Giddens, 1990, p. 80) but 
globally. 
 
On a side note it must be pointed out that Kundera does not see kitsch as 
being a positive aspect of culture, having unforgettably stated that kitsch is 
“the absolute denial of shit” (1984, p. 242). Kundera is of the traditional view 
that considers kitsch “evil” (Broch, 2003) and an “aesthetic lie” (Greenberg, 
1975) mostly due to his experience of kitsch being used as propaganda in 
totalitarian regimes. I mostly agree with Kundera’s view, given the context in 
which he discusses kitsch. However, as is argued in the chapters that 
follow, I view kitsch as being able to be a positive aspect of culture. This 
research demonstrates the positive and valuable role kitsch can play in 
modern life, providing it is not exploited, as was the case within the 
totalitarian regimes that Kundera rightfully denounces. 
 
The second type of disembedding mechanism Giddens identifies is expert 
systems. Expert systems are an outcome of the industrial and scientific 
revolutions, and mark an increase in technical knowledge and specialisation 
(Giddens, 1991). Expert systems are consequently organisations of the 
technical accomplishments, professional expertise and social relations that 
make a significant contribution to the material and social environment 
(1991).  Expert systems “bracket time and space through deploying modes 
of technical knowledge which have validity independent of the practitioners 
and clients who make use of them” (1991, p. 18). Expert systems filter into 
almost all aspects of social life and are not limited only to technical expertise. 
They range from the provision of the food we eat, where we live and what we 
buy, to social relationships like those with a doctor or a therapist, for 
example.  
 
Giddens (1991) notes that all disembedding mechanisms, both symbolic 
tokens and expert systems, are dependent upon ‘trust’ and abstract 
capacities. In this context, trust is a form of faith or confidence in a probable, 
or expected, outcome. Trust is about having a commitment to ‘something” 
rather than relying on cognitive understanding alone. The dynamic nature of 
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modernity and our reliance on expert systems makes trust an essential 
aspect of kitsch. 
 
 
2.6.3 Trust 
 
Trust is undoubtedly the key to a functioning relationship between 
individuals, symbolic tokens and expert systems. It is the social glue that 
unites and holds modern societies together. Without a trusting relationship 
between the individual and expert systems, modern societies would likely 
fall apart. When trust is diminished, or in some way undermined, the 
individual is exposed to ontological insecurity that can in turn lead to an 
insecure social reality and disembeddedness (Giddens, 1991).  
  
Giddens defines trust as “the vesting of confidence in persons or in abstract 
systems, made on the basis of a ‘leap of faith’ that brackets ignorance or 
lack of information” (1991, p. 244). He makes a clear distinction between 
this view and what Georg Simmel (1978) refers to as “weak inductive 
knowledge” (p.179) that is part of formal transactions. By trust, Giddens 
(1991) is referring to the manner in which many decisions in life are based 
on a confidence in past trends and inductive references that are considered 
a reliable platform for gauging the present. However this is only a singular 
aspect of a trust relationship. Trust requires a leap of faith, a commitment to 
an irreducible belief and is “specifically related to absence in time and 
space” (p. 19). For example, we are more likely to trust a qualified 
professional like a paramedic, fire fighter or pilot than we would a used car 
salesman or a telemarketer (Readers Digest, 2011). Just as with kitsch, 
something that is perceived to be real (perhaps an object that has been 
handed down through generations, or a souvenir bought to mark a specific 
experience) or authenticated (such as limited editions, individually 
numbered or signed copies) will generally attract greater value and a higher 
level of trust. Within symbolic tokens and expert systems, “trust brackets the 
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limited technical knowledge which most people possess about coded 
information which routinely affects their lives” (p.19). 
 
Trust, of many kinds, operates on a variety of levels and in a multiplicity of 
ways. It lies beneath an entire host of daily decisions and experiences that 
orient our activities. However, as Giddens (1991) points out, trusting is by no 
means “always the result of consciously taken decisions” (p.19). It is more 
often than not “a generalised attitude of mind” that underpins our choices. It 
is an attitude that stems from the relationship between trust and the 
development of an individual’s personality. Therefore, as reflexive 
individuals, we are able to make the decision to trust. Yet, in spite of this, 
the leap of faith which trust requires has a tendency to resist any form of 
“calculative decision-making” (p.19). 
 
By calculative decision-making, Giddens is referring to “attitudes of trust in 
relation to specific situations, persons or systems” (p. 19) that on a 
generalised level “are directly connect to the psychological security of 
individuals and groups” (p. 19), the institution of marriage for example. 
Within conditions of modernity “trust and security” together with “risk and 
danger” exist in a multitude of historically individual combinations (p.19). An 
example of this is when disembedding mechanisms take grip of large fields 
of “relative security in daily social activity” (p.19). In industrialised countries, 
people are generally able to receive protection from many hazards, such as 
storms or acts of nature that were commonly experienced in pre-modern 
times. Conversely, disembedding mechanisms have themselves created a 
host of new risks and dangers such as cyber stalking or terrorism for 
example, not only locally but also globally.  
 
 
 
37 
 
 
2.7 Examples of the Embedding Nature of Kitsch 
 
Useful examples of the “disembeddedness” (Giddens, 1991) people 
experience in modern life, and in turn, the ability of kitsch to re-embed the 
individual can be found in the experiences of Cuc Lam, a refugee of the 
Vietnam War and also a woman I observed on the evening news escaping 
severe floodwaters in Queensland. Both women were forced to leave their 
homes with little notice, able to take only a few of their most treasured 
possessions. The significance that a person invests in their possessions 
under extreme circumstances, like war or a natural disaster, I argue is an 
exaggerated but accurate illustration of the embedding nature of kitsch.  
 
I have never forgotten an image I saw on an evening news report that was 
covering some of the worst floods in Australia’s recorded history. Almost 
three quarters of the state of Queensland was underwater. As the rains rolled 
in, and floodwaters continued to rise, ongoing news coverage showed stories 
of great loss, hope, courage and luck. Amidst the turmoil a reporter captured 
footage of a middle-aged woman saving an elaborate chandelier style lamp 
and a very large kitsch elephant ornament from her home. She travelled 
down the stairs of the submerged house and waded through chest deep 
water holding the elephant above her head.  
 
Initially the image proved a moment of light relief from the tragedy that was 
unfolding. However, as the woman risked the unpredictable floodwaters to 
rescue the lamp and the kitsch ornament, the irony of the situation could not 
be ignored. Lives had been lost, family pets and cattle drowned or left 
stranded, and entire homes washed away. Tens of thousands of people had 
been evacuated to makeshift shelters. I do not know who the woman was, or 
why she chose to save the lamp and the elephant. Obviously, the objects 
were of great enough significance to her that they were worth trying to save. 
There was no possible way she could have saved all of her possessions, but 
of the things she was able to save, she had chosen the lamp and the 
elephant ornament. 
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There is the story of Cuc Lam and her husband who like many Vietnamese 
were forced to flee their country as a result of the 19-year long Vietnam War 
(1962–1975). Lam and her husband had tried many times to escape but 
without success (Lam, n.d.). Recounting the ordeal, Lam recalls how in 1978 
she had travelled alone by train to meet her husband. Disguised as 
fishermen and with minimal food and water they attempted yet another 
escape, travelling by riverboat, unaware of whether or not their journey would 
be successful. The plight of Vietnamese boat people like Lam had become 
an international humanitarian crisis. Her young niece and nephew had tried 
to escape with their parents, but were drowned when rough waters hit (Lam, 
n.d.). After being rescued Lam and her husband were taken to a refugee 
camp in Malaysia. Camp life was tough. Three months pregnant with her 
son, they struggled to find enough food and ate “little sea shells” (Lam, n.d., 
p.1) to survive. 
 
Recounting the ordeal in an interview with Museum Victoria, Lam explains 
how having feared so desperately for their lives she, and her husband, fled 
Vietnam with almost nothing except for the clothes they wore, and a small 
pink pouch she had “kept close to her skin” during the escape. Inside the 
pouch was a photographic negative of her family, passport photos of her 
parents, her sister’s watch, her mother’s earrings and her wedding ring. Lam 
explained the significance of some of these items, commenting that her 
“mother pass [sic] away when I was thirteen years old so I thought if I die I 
still have some image [the earrings and picture] from my mum with me . . .  
my mother with me . . . so that would satisfy me” (p. 1).  
 
Months had passed and eventually Lam and her husband were offered 
refugee status and chose to move to Australia. Lam explained how as 
refugees they had almost nothing to bring to Australia with them, only the 
clothes they had worn during their escape from Vietnam, a few tickets and 
notes she and her husband had saved, and the pink pouch containing her 
treasures. Lam touchingly recounted her preparation for Australia, explaining 
that: 
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We decided I sold [sic] my wedding ring to purchase a suitcase . . 
. I don’t want to sell my mother’s earring, you know, I decided to 
sell my wedding ring to purchase that to bring with me, even 
though I have nothing to bring with me but I just want to bring with 
me to show that, you know, I come to a new country I got 
something with me and I don’t come to the new country with 
empty handed. (Lam, n.d., p.1) 
 
 
Lam was determined that despite their ordeal they would appear neat, clean 
and be holding a few possessions when they arrived in Australia. To do this 
Lam and her husband sold her wedding ring for a meager sum to buy a 
small, red vinyl suitcase (Figure 14).  
 
 
Bloomfield, J. (2004). Cuc Lams suitcase. [Medium: Photograph] Retrieved from 
http://www.cv.vic.gov.au/data/1469/mn008557.jpg 
Exception to copyright: Section ss40, 103C, Exception, Research or Study. 
 
Figure 14:  Cuc Lam’s Red Vinyl Suitcase 1 (2004)  
 
To ensure the little red case was not lost while they waited to depart, the 
couple wrote their address at the Malaysian refugee camp on one side of the 
case and their new address in Australia on the other (Investigating National 
Treasures, 2004). Although virtually empty, the kitsch vinyl case was as Lam 
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states “a symbol of a new beginning in a new country” (Investigating National 
Treasures, 2004). 
 
Describing the harrowing nature of refugee life, Lam described how she is 
“still very touched and very emotional because this always in my mind how I 
had to face with the difficulty try to escape and try to survive” (Investigating 
National Treasures, 2004, p. 2). She explained how as a refugee “you don’t 
have anything . . . but you have a courage and a motivation and you have to 
work hard because you come here with bare hand . . .  (p. 2). Bare hands, 
except for a couple of photos, a few items of jewellery, the clothes on their 
back and a very basic, red vinyl suitcase that is symbolic of so many things.  
 
 
 
 
Bloomfield, J. (2004). Cuc Lams suitcase. [Medium: Photograph] Retrieved from 
http://www.cv.vic.gov.au/data/1470/mn008560.jpg 
Exception to copyright: Section ss40, 103C, Exception, Research or Study. 
 
Figure 15:  Cuc Lam’s Red Vinyl Suitcase 2 (2004)  
 
Family photographs, jewellery and important documents are usually amongst 
the first things people gather when fleeing a disaster, as was the case with 
Cuc Lam. If possible, people usually try to save a few other precious objects, 
as did the woman with the lamp and the elephant ornament during the 
Queensland floods. People often covet seemingly random collections of 
objects. The monetary value is usually not only irrelevant but immeasurable 
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because the experiences, sentimental and emotional attachment associated 
with the objects makes them irreplaceable and priceless: family heirlooms; 
gifts received to mark a memorable occasion (births, deaths or weddings); 
something used during, or bought in anticipation of, a significant event 
(Lam’s suitcase for example); childhood toys; or religious icons and symbols 
(religious statues, Christian crosses, prayer beads).  
The items people save in a catastrophic situation often assist in re-
embedding people in a variety of different ways. Objects can assist 
individuals in maintaining a link to the people, places, experiences, memories 
and fantasies they cherish. This is not dissimilar to modern consumer culture 
where as a means of coping with change individuals surround themselves 
with material objects—many of which are kitsch. These kitsch objects, 
imbued with sentimentality and nostalgia, assist the individual to become and 
to remain re-embedded. They allow them to hold on to time, fulfil dreams and 
fantasies, and mediate affects like sentimentality, melancholy and nostalgia 
so that we can create our own highly personalised sense of comfort and 
safety in a disembedding world.  
Fundamental to my thesis is the view that kitsch is an aesthetic that is able 
to yield some of the security, certainty, familiarity and reassurance of the 
unchanging, of the everyday, a reassurance that people lost as they entered 
modernity, when time and space were distanciated. Re-embeddedness, 
however, is only possible if individuals and societies are prepared to trust in 
the consensus generated by expert systems and symbolic tokens like kitsch. 
Kitsch is a system that, in contrast to disembedded autonomy and 
singularity, imitates distinct modes of aesthetic repetition and imitation. I 
concur with Binkley, that kitsch—and the different qualities of kitsch—can be 
used as a way of exploring the disembeddedness of modernity, not unlike 
the sense of dislocation experienced by Cuc Lam and the woman with the 
elephant ornament. By better understanding the disembeddedness of 
modernity we can better understand the significance of kitsch in 
contemporary life and its potential as a tool for the artist. 
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2.8 Re-evaluating Kitsch: A Real or Fake Aesthetic?  
 
The notion of authenticity (or lack thereof) has traditionally been a key 
identifier in conceptualisations of kitsch, which has long been considered as 
an imitative cultural style; Broch (1933; 1951) claimed that kitsch gives a 
distorted reflection of reality, Greenberg (1939) casts kitsch as an aesthetic 
lie. These critics were renowned for the most unflattering attacks on kitsch, in 
the mid-twentieth century. Intriguingly, of the contemporary theorists who 
have re-evaluated kitsch, Binkley (2002) does not consider kitsch to be 
authentic. Binkley (2002) states “what makes kitsch, kitsch . . . is not simply 
its decorative nature, but that kitsch artificially inflates the comfort of 
decoration into a uniquely fake aesthetic statement” (p. 1). This is a view I 
fervently contest. I am intrigued as to how Binkley can purport to see kitsch 
as having “re-embedded its consumers at the ‘deepest’ personal level” 
(p.135) as part of the everyday, and yet still view kitsch as a ‘faker’, 
representing a less authentic reality rather than ‘another’ form of reality. 
While I agree with Binkley that “kitsch is a unique aesthetic style” (p. 1), I 
argue that style is the result of specific social and historical circumstances. I 
argue that the effect of these historical and cultural changes is to have 
transformed kitsch from the ‘uniquely fake aesthetic statement’ described by 
Binkley (2002), to a ‘very’ real, aesthetic firmly embedded in everyday life. 
 
Walter Benjamin was one of the earlier commentators on aesthetic 
authenticity and was perhaps the only one to address this issue in his 1936 
essay ‘Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’. Benjamin (1936) 
described how the proliferation of mechanically reproduced copies 
(particularly photographs) effectively dismantled the notion of an ‘authentic 
experience’ based on privileged ownership or contact with a unique aesthetic 
product. Benjamin placed greater value on kitsch over art (or original 
objects), stating, “what we used to call art begins only four feet away from 
the body” (n.p.). Now however, with kitsch, the object world approaches 
human beings. It yields to their touch, shaping its own figures within them 
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(Benjamin, 1936). Judy Attfield states that kitsch “responds to a wider need 
for an engagement with authenticity” (2006, p. 207). Olalquiaga in 
Megalopolis (1992) touches on this, claiming that: 
. . . the definition of the real has expanded and become more 
complex, including representation as a determining element of 
perception that eliminate the traditional hierarchy between 
reality and simulation. Theatricality, artifice, and the 
presentation of a reality whose saturation with signifying codes 
makes it into hyper-reality, are finally some of the ways of 
knowledge and aesthetic enjoyment of our time. (Olalquiaga, 
1992, n.p.) 
 
Kitsch always has and still does represent, copy, emulate, imitate and 
reproduce. However, some objects are considered kitsch in their original or 
authentic form. I cannot help but question whether re-conceptualisations of 
kitsch, like Binkley’s, that still partner fake with kitsch—instead of 
authenticity—are carrying the baggage of a lingering class-consciousness.  
 
 
2.9 Other Commentators on Kitsch 
 
There are, of course, those commentators who cling to the traditional ‘class 
equals taste’ notions of kitsch. Tracy Potts (2007) has strongly contested 
many of the re-conceptualisations of kitsch, particularly those of Binkley and 
Attfield, arguing for what I consider to be the traditional definitions of kitsch. 
Potts finds taste hierarchies still extremely prevalent, with no sign of 
aesthetic judgement being relaxed any time soon. In her essay ‘“Walking the 
Line”: Kitsch, Class and the Morphing Subject of Value’ (2007), Potts draws 
attention to what she calls the “subtle symbolic economic activity that attends 
kitsch in its rehabilitated state” (n.p.). Potts highlights what she sees as the 
intricate manoeuvrings of kitsch that has brought about the revaluation of 
many kitsch objects. Potts claims that she has identified “a set of obscured 
class actions” (p. 1), but this is not a systematic classification methodology 
as Binkley and Olalquiaga have developed, merely scattered examples and 
anecdotes. Potts seem to believe there is hegemonic power at play, securing 
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social distinction for kitsch and remaining unseen by commentators such as 
Binkley and Attfield. 
 
I propose that there is a major problem with Potts’ analysis of kitsch, which 
stems from her understanding or analysis of taste, the key focus of her 
argument. Potts appears to have radically misunderstood both these 
theorists by opposing the limited role of taste in definitions of kitsch, to which 
both Binkley and Attfield assert. Binkley and Attfield’s arguments separate 
kitsch from subjective notions of good or bad taste, the distinction of which is 
vital to Potts’ interpretation of their definitions. Binkley and Attfield’s 
contestation of the role taste plays in analyses of kitsch refers directly to the 
notion of taste being unrelated to hierarchies, class and status, which they 
claim no longer play a significant role, if any, in definitions of kitsch. They do, 
however, agree that hierarchies, class and status are inextricably linked to 
evaluations of taste, a distinction that I have ascertained Potts overlooks.  
 
Taking into consideration the overwhelming profusion of ‘so-called kitsch’ we 
are confronted with, as well as the obvious difficulties in defining kitsch, it is 
easy to understand why there is little consensus as to what kitsch is. I 
contend that the taste debate can be better understood if kitsch is positioned 
within a social context of popular taste and as an important aspect of popular 
culture (Attfield, 2006). Acknowledging the aesthicisation of everyday life as 
a positive aspect of culture, both taste and kitsch can be seen as playing an 
intrinsic role in the habitus and material culture of everyday life (2006).   
 
Using Attfield’s analysis, which clearly operates in the new and changing era 
of modernity, we are able to better negotiate the recent debates on how to 
re-contextualise kitsch, as illustrated in Figure 9. Given the confusion 
described, it is necessary to clarify the kinds of objects that I identify as being 
kitsch within the context of this exegesis. Having re-contextualised the 
relationship between kitsch and everyday experiences Section three will now 
show how I have negotiated the kitsch aesthetic within my practice. 
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3. Reflexive Overview of Creative Praxis and the Use of 
Kitsch  
 
The methodology (or theoretical framework) and methods (the development 
of my artworks from theoretical conception through to construction and 
exhibition) within this praxis are closely connected, at times operating 
together. Therefore, rather than being a linear unfolding of ideas the theories 
examined, and the artworks produced, are strongly intermeshed. The 
reflexive praxis model employed has enabled me to monitor, order, and as 
has often been the case, re-order, my own subjectivities within the works as 
they develop. Thus, specific aspects of my analyses of kitsch have been 
privileged within the artworks developed (sentimentality and the ability of 
kitsch to re-embed for example), as is demonstrated in the following outline 
in which the aim, content and contexts of the works are given.  
Mediated by the social constructs of my lifeworld as an artist/researcher, the 
reflexive approach taken has enabled me to position myself critically in 
relation to the works I have developed and the theories by which the works 
within this praxis have been examined. The works are related to both 
Olalquiaga’s (1992; 1998) and Binkley’s (2000) theories in the following 
Sections of this exegesis. However, in order to ensure a rigorous 
examination of how each artwork operates within this praxis, analysis of 
individual works is related to specific aspects of each theory: Olalquiaga’s 
notion of ‘three degrees of kitsch’ (1992) is applied to The Aquarium (2009) 
and Jesus (2010); Binkley’s concept of ‘kitsch as a repetitive system’ (2000) 
to Budgietopia (2009–2013), and Snow Domes and Dream Spheres 
developed in 2009‒2010; ‘Olalquiaga’s modes of perceiving experiences and 
kitsch’ (1998) to Budgietopia (2009‒2013). I establish how these theories can 
be applied to the communicative capacity of my artwork, and therefore 
demonstrate my critical and reflexive praxis model. It must be clarified that 
my creative work is by no means a literal demonstration of Olalquiaga’s 
(1992; 1998) and Binkley’s (2000) theories, but rather, is a synchronous 
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amalgam of theory and practice. My creative work therefore does embody 
aspects of Olalquiaga’s (1992; 1998) and Binkley’s (2000) philosophies, but 
as noted previously, is not rendered as a visual expression of their theories. 
The sections of this exegesis that follow, examine in detail, each of the works 
pertaining to this research in relation to Olalquiaga’s and Binkley’s theories. 
In this section, however, a description of the aims, content and context of 
each work is given. The differing contexts in which my work has been 
exhibited, is of particular importance for two reasons. Firstly, because my 
research positions kitsch within the everyday and lifeworld, I have made a 
conscious decision to exhibit the works in a variety of locations and public 
spaces, not just art galleries. This decision was made as I have wanted my 
work to be viewed by a broad range of people, in everyday situations, and 
attract a larger and wider demographic than visitors to art galleries. 
Secondly, an understanding of the contexts used in my approach is an 
important aspect of the critical and reflexive decisions that I make as an 
artist. 
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3.1 The Lotus Pond 
 
 
 
 The Lotus Pond (2007) 
Installation 
Plastic, vinyl, wood, on rubber inner-tubes and water 
.80m x 8m x 14m 
(Photographer: Brendan Beirne) 
 
Figure 16:  The Lotus Pond (2007) exhibited at Spectrum for the exhibition White 
Monkey Holding Peach (2007) 
 
 
 
The Lotus Pond (2008) was initially developed during my honours 
candidature and resulted from an artist residency undertaken in Ho Chi Minh 
City, Vietnam in 2007—which culminated in the development of the 
interactive work—that conveys ideas regarding the lifeworld, culture and 
kitsch. Philosophically, although pivotal in my investigation of kitsch, The 
Lotus Pond (2007, 2008) also explores cultural incommensurability by 
looking at East/West cultural conventions and ideologies. The work 
examines what I have identified as the “multidirectional cycle of 
appropriation, commodification, and the hybridisation or homogenising of 
everyday cultural symbols and icons, as they are trafficked across national 
and cultural borders” (Stewart, 2008, p.20). The materials used to make the 
lotus flowers, the central aspect of this work, were collected as souvenirs 
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while travelling to various locations in South East Asia. For me, the lotus 
flowers have acted as a metaphor for identity and the individual lifeworlds 
that we create and inhabit. As lifeworlds, each lotus flower could be said to 
hold what Olalquiaga has called “collective remembrances and desires” 
(1992, p.47). In the works I likened this to personal histories, wishes and 
sentimentality, all of which I assert, play an important role in the development 
of society, creating a significant part of the lifeworld, and of kitsch. 
 
The Lotus Pond (2007, 2008) has been pivotal in the development of my 
doctoral research as it has provided a context to the background and 
longevity of my creative praxis. It was through gaining an understanding of 
the historical and cultural contexts of the designs in the plastics from which 
the lotus flowers are made that I first observed what appeared to be sensory 
the affect of sentimentality, that this research demonstrates, is facilitated by 
kitsch. Furthermore, it is where I first came to realise, that the sensory affect 
of sentimentality associated with kitsch, is shared throughout cultures and 
societies– that the affect of sentimentality associated with kitsch is arguably 
universal, a theory that is supported by Binkley (2000). This realisation is 
pivotal to my research because it identified a gap in analyses of kitsch in 
which researchers (Greenberg, 1961; Adorno & Horkheimer, 1991; 
Calinescu, 1987; Broch, 1955; Dorfles, 1969; Potts, 2007) had struggled to 
define, and reach consensus, on exactly what kitsch is, and in turn, how to 
classify kitsch objects. By linking my definition of kitsch to sentimental affect 
instead of actual objects, in which meaning is highly subjective dependant on 
context (culture, class, status, race for example), I have developed a 
definition of contemporary kitsch that is inclusive of cultural and societal 
difference and can be applied to a broad range of cultural and societal 
objects and experiences. 
 
Although there are many aspects of kitsch at play in The Lotus Pond (2007, 
2008) installation, within my doctoral research, the lotus flowers are 
examined as an example of kitsch as a “decorative feature” (Binkley, 2000)— 
an aspect of this work first reviewed during my honours research. Through 
the lens of kitsch as a decorative feature (Binkley, 2000), it is demonstrated 
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how the designs on the various plastics and vinyls from which the lotus 
flowers are made have evolved through several cycles of repetition and 
kitsch. As demonstrated through my earlier research, it is explained how as a 
decorative feature, the plastics become encoded by the personal contexts in 
which they were used or experienced and the impact this has on the 
individual and on kitsch.  
 
Since first being exhibited in 2007 the installation has been shown in a 
variety of configurations and contexts, but generally incorporates a large 
pond at 70m x 4m x 9m, and 17 lotus flowers made of plastic, vinyl and wood 
attached to rubber inner tubes. The lotus flowers range in size from 
40‒120cm in diameter. 
 
The installation when exhibited at Spectrum Project Space, included the 
lotus flowers, which were floated in a room of the gallery, filled from wall-to-
wall with water (Figures 16 and 17, above). As it was an interactive 
installation, visitors were able to literally wade through the water, which 
divided the gallery into two. The expanse of water created a trafficking zone, 
with the intention of demonstrating how we negotiate barriers within cultural 
exchange. Floating on inner tubes that came from car tyres, many of the 
lotus flowers had random, odd petals. This was to give the appearance of 
cross-contamination or pollination as they made contact with other lotus 
flowers, becoming hybridised as they were trafficked through the expanse of 
water.  
 
In 2008, the work was re-shown at the Perth Institute of Contemporary Arts 
(PICA) as part of the annual Hatched exhibition (Figure 17). Due to the 
confines of the institute, instead of filling a room with water, I constructed a 
transportable pond in which the lotus flowers where exhibited. The Lotus 
Flowers (2007) have appeared in several other locations including an exhibit 
in Ipswich Queensland, with the final showing of the work being for the City 
of Perth’s 2010 City in Bloom exhibition (Figure 18, below) in which the lotus 
pond was exhibited at the entrance to The Art Gallery of Western Australia.  
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The Lotus Pond (2008) 
Installation 
Perth Institute of Contemporary Art 
Plastic, vinyl, wood on rubber inner-tubes and water 
.70m x 4m x 9m 
(Photographer: Michael Gray) 
 
Figure 17:  The Lotus Pond (2008) exhibited at Perth Institute of Contemporary 
Arts, (PICA), Western Australia (2008) 
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The Lotus Pond (2008) 
Installation (detail) 
Perth Institute of Contemporary Art 
Plastic, vinyl, wood on rubber inner-tubes and water 
.70m x 4m x 9m 
 
Ashby, T. (2010) Top Shots [Medium: Photography]. Retrieved from 
https://au.news.yahoo.com/thewest/a/7960037/top-shots/ 
Exception to copyright: Section ss40, 103C, Exception, Research or Study. 
 
Figure 18:  The Lotus Pond (2008) exhibited at entrance to The Art Gallery of 
Western Australia (2010) 
 
 
Although there are many aspects of kitsch at play in The Lotus Pond (2007, 
2008) installation, within this research, the lotus flowers are examined as an 
example of kitsch as a “decorative feature” (Binkley, 2000). Through the lens 
of kitsch as a decorative feature (Binkley, 2000) it is demonstrated how the 
designs on the various plastics and vinyls from which the lotus flowers are 
made have evolved through several cycles of repetition and kitsch. It is 
explained how as a decorative feature, the plastics become encoded by the 
personal contexts in which they were used or experienced and the impact 
this has on the individual and on kitsch.  
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3.2 The Aquarium Installation  
 
 
 
The Aquarium (2009) 
Glass, steel, wood, hot pink gravel, and mixed media 
3.5 x 2.5 x 2.4 
 
Figure 19:  The Aquarium installation (2009) exhibited at Spectrum (2009) 
 
 
The Aquarium (2009) (Figure 19, above) installation and residency is the 
major work that was undertaken during this research. The overarching 
philosophy behind the development of this work was: to gain a deeper 
understanding of how the sensory affect of sentimentality associated with 
kitsch experiences, possessions and material objects offers a way for the 
individual to move from disembeddedness to a state of being re-embedded; 
and, to investigate how my creative practice, which utilises aspects of kitsch, 
can facilitate the experience of re-embedding. In addition to this, The 
Aquarium (2009) installation and residency, and my performative role within 
this work have proved to be a rich source of information when reflexively 
analysing the various communicative functions of kitsch that are examined 
throughout the following sections of this exegesis.  
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The Aquarium (2009) was developed specifically for a one-month residency 
at Spectrum Project Space, Northbridge, Western Australia. Spectrum 
Project Space (Spectrum) is “an exhibition and performance space that 
functions as a laboratory for exploration and experimentation” (Spectrum 
Project Space, para. 1) run by the School of Communications and Arts at 
Edith Cowan University, Perth, Western Australia. Unlike many traditional 
galleries, as a project space, works exhibited at Spectrum do not have to 
necessarily be completed prior to being shown to the public. The Aquarium 
(2009), which was prefabricated in my studio, was assembled at Spectrum 
for the opening of the residency and remained a work in progress 
throughout the entire month. The permanent features of The Aquarium 
(2009), a glass, timber and steel aquarium structure included: a mermaid 
throne, treasure chest, Grecian pillars, artificial coral and other underwater 
foliage and sea creatures; deep sea treasure including large urns, a bust of 
David, dolphin ornaments; 400kg of hot pink gravel and a waterfall on the 
rear glass panel of the tank. 
 
However throughout the residency I continually added and removed various 
other objects and mermaid paraphernalia, and redecorated the inside of the 
tank. Interchanging these objects was an important part of this research as 
it enabled me to reflexively examine the various theories and aspects of 
kitsch that have been researched throughout this exegesis. The two DVDs 
accompany this exegesis, Appendix 1: The Aquarium presents a short 
video of the installation and of my residency. Section 2 of the other DVD, 
titled Appendix 2: Additional Images of Work, offers supplementary 
photographic documentation of The Aquarium (2009), including images that 
detail the various objects that were housed inside the tank. 
 
The Aquarium (2009) was positioned in the front window of Spectrum, which 
at the time of my residency was located in Northbridge, Perth City’s arts and 
entertainment district. Positioning The Aquarium (2009) where it could be 
viewed from the street was a deliberate decision, as I wanted people to be 
able to view the installation, and my performances, on an ongoing basis, and 
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to also capture a broad audience. Because Spectrum was positioned on a 
commuter route for the central business district, as well as Perth City’s 
shopping precinct—by being in the window—I was able to attract the 
attention of passers-by who would generally not visit an art venue. Attracting 
their attention was a particularly important aspect of the delivery of The 
Aquarium (2009), as with other works developed throughout this research. I 
have positioned my thesis on kitsch within the lifeworld and as part of the 
everyday. It has therefore been an essential aspect of this creative praxis 
that the works I display were not just viewed within the gallery paradigm, but 
shown in a variety of contexts and experienced as part of the everyday, by 
people, doing everyday things. 
 
 
3.2.1 Behind The Aquarium: Ariel and The Little Mermaid 
 
The concept behind The Aquarium (2009) came by chance, after visiting a 
friend’s house where the children were watching the 1989 Disney remake of 
Danish author Hans Christian Andersen’s The Little Mermaid (1837). Having 
years earlier read the original story by Andersen, I recognised a distinct 
adaptation of the storyline that held an important link to my research. Ariel, 
the little mermaid in Andersen’s story, like most tradition mermaid fables, 
seeks to lure those around her through offerings that are “for the fulfilment of 
others wishes” (Olalquiaga, 1992, p. 247). The Disney version of The Little 
Mermaid (1989) comparatively, places a modern consumerist spin on the 
original storyline, demonstrating just how disembedding modernity can be. 
This is an adaptation that in my view highlights the shifting value of kitsch in 
contemporary life. Disney’s version depicts Ariel roaming the great depths of 
the sea, exploring shipwrecks for the remains of human objects like silver 
and glassware, vases and bottles. She arranges them on the rocky 
crevasses that double as shelves in her underwater cave. Olalquiaga (1998) 
too observed the “spinoff and twist” (p. 247) in Disney’s adaptation of The 
Little Mermaid (1989). She poetically describes how the interstices between 
the rocks and the water’s surface saw the cave’s tower become “a dizzying 
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spiral of objects where the mermaid princess can get lost in her daydreams” 
(p. 246). In stark contrast to Andersen’s little mermaid, Disney’s Ariel 
displays fetishism for late twentieth century commodities (Figure 20). Instead 
of offering the fulfilment of others’ wishes, as do the mermaid of myths and 
legends, Disney’s Ariel collects objects to enhance her own daydreams and 
life. She collects objects in which she places her own sentimental 
attachment, her own personal and unique narrative and symbolic 
connections.  
 
 
Walt Disney Pictures. (1989). The Little Mermaid [DVD]. [Still] Available from http://www.disney.com.au 
Exception to copyright: Section ss40, 103C, Exception, Research or Study. 
 
Figure 20:  Still from Disney’s Little Mermaid, Ariel in her underwater cave with 
collected objects 
 
 
This reflexive analysis, I assert, demonstrates the visual and conceptual 
signification of Disney’s version of The Little Mermaid (1989). This text 
embodies my position of how kitsch operates in the contemporary 
consumerist society we inhabit.  
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Through the rhythm (repetition, imitation and emulation) of “the repetitive 
qualities of kitsch” (Binkley, 2000), Ariel attempts to ‘re-embed’ (Binkley, 
2000; Giddens, 1991) herself in her underwater world. She uses kitsch as a 
“decorative feature” (Binkley, 2000, p. 142) as she works to create a homely 
environment by displaying the trinkets and treasures she has found in the 
cracks and crevasses of her cave. Instead of collecting objects that naturally 
occur in the sea, she searches for objects that “emulate other cultural 
products” (Binkley, 2000)—those of the human world. Furthermore, the 
intrinsic connection of kitsch to a “love of all things sentimental” (Binkley, 
2000, p. 142) is undeniably apparent in the Disney version. Ariel’s 
sentimental attachment to and love of the objects she collects is both 
“melancholic “and “nostalgic” (Olalquiaga, 1998) as she laments that she 
cannot be with her prince, the love of her life, and live on land. 
 
It is important to mention that The Aquarium (2009) utilises the symbolism of 
the mermaid for its value as an “inanimate curiosity” (Olalquiaga, 1992, p. 
237) and easily recognisable construct. I therefore do not offer a historical or 
sociological study of mermaids, as The Aquarium (2009) installation 
concerned creating a private (yet very public) world that exposed the multiple 
workings of kitsch examined within this research. Furthermore, my 
performative role in this work, taking on the persona of a mermaid, enabled 
me to systematically and reflexively communicate with the audience the 
workings of kitsch and the everyday. 
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3.2.2 The Aquarium Residency 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21:  In character within The Aquarium (2009) exhibited at Spectrum (2009) 
 
 
Through the reflexive process, my decision to take a performative role in The 
Aquarium (2009) (Figure 21) was extremely important for a variety of 
reasons. As an artist-researcher adopting a mermaid persona and living 
within the confines of the aquarium, was like being an anthropologist on a 
field trip. Only performing as a mermaid within the aquarium, I was an artist-
researcher reflexively analysing the intricacies of contemporary kitsch in the 
lifeworld I had created. More importantly, as part of the exhibit, I was able to 
closely observe how viewers’ engaged with the kitsch environment I 
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inhabited. It gave me a platform to explore the paradoxical reality between 
the imaginary world I had created, and the symbolic narratives that 
commonly accompany the sentimentality associated with kitsch, and to 
reflexively order and reorder the knowledge, information and social 
relationships that developed throughout the month spent inside the tank. 
 
Having adopted a “throughgoing, constitutive reflexiv[e]” (Giddens, 1990, p. 
52) process within my practice I was able to constantly review the social 
practices of both myself and the audiences of The Aquarium (2009). As both 
the inhabitant of the tank and as the artist-researcher negotiating my way 
through this reflexive process I was able to “reveal the dynamic relationship 
between the context, construction and the articulation of the [communicative] 
act[s]” (p. 108) apparent in the work. This not only enabled me to refocus if 
required and reflexively fine-tune the aims of my research, but also afforded 
me the opportunity to adjust accordingly the manner in which the work was 
communicated to the audience.  
 
An example of this was the decision not to engage with the audience, 
especially by speaking, while performing in the aquarium. However, people 
seemed determined to communicate with me, gentle calls sometimes 
reverting to shouts, soft taps on the glass, often turning to firm and loud 
knocking, in a bid to gain my attention. After only a few days I decided it 
would be fascinating to know what people wished to communicate. I began 
to collect empty bottles, which I placed outside the tank with a notebook and 
pen. Visitors to the gallery were able to write messages which were then 
placed in the bottles and deposited into the tank (Figure 22, below). 
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Figure 22:  Messages in bottles left by exhibition visitors at Spectrum (2009) 
 
 
The messages varied greatly from technical questions about the construction 
and development of the work, to compliments and a few criticisms. 
Surprisingly, people most often wrote seemingly private, sentimental wishes 
or confessions—a greeting to a deceased love one, hopes of marriage, love 
and travel and an affirmation to one day become a ‘rockstar’ (Figure 23).  
 
 
 
Figure 23:  Example of messages in bottles left by exhibition visitors at Spectrum  
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The Aquarium (2009) examines kitsch through creative practice and how the 
objects and experiences we collect can fulfil dreams and desires, and play a 
significant role in the lifeworlds we inhabit. The work aims to embody and 
therefore to communicate the human desire to be surrounded by the things 
we cherish. The belongings to which we feel intense sentimental attachment, 
for me metaphorically, ‘give something back’—a sense of reassurance and 
safety from the pleasures and/or pain of our lifeworlds. 
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3.3 Budgietopia 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24:  Image of Budgietopia from The Everest Reunion pop-up installation 
(2009) at Spectrum (2009) 
 
 
 
Budgietopia (2009‒2013) was an ongoing project that ran between 2009 and 
2013. This work exists as a utopian bird world that explored—through the 
lives of budgies—how humans are able to find a sense of comfort, value and 
safety in the world through developing sentimental attachments to objects, 
particularly those that are kitsch. It is a celebration of the simple things in 
life—the things we collect and enjoy—the ‘stuff’, through which the 
sentimental affect of kitsch, simply makes life feel good. Budgietopia (2009-
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2013) was initially developed over a twelve-month period while artist-in-
residence at Spectrum, but continued to evolve depending on the 
circumstances and context in which it was exhibited. The installation 
incorporates 3000 lifelike budgie ornaments and an excessive amount of 
artificial flowers, lawn and shrubbery. Combined with a vast array of trinkets 
and knick-knacks, the budgies have been incorporated in various 
installations and exhibitions as well as in a budgie adoption program.  
 
As the artist in residence at Spectrum from March 2009 to March 2010, I held 
a series of pop-up exhibitions of Budgietopia. These exhibits included The 
Everest Reunion (2009), The Evening Commuter Cake Off (2010), and the 
Budgietopia Super Rally (2010). For The Everest Reunion (2009) (Figure 24) 
around 1000 budgies were exhibited congregating on a mountaintop for 
‘high’ tea. Viewed through the gallery front window the display could be 
viewed by passers-by. The Evening Commuter Cake Off (2010) (Figure 25) 
involved attaching garlands of budgies and flowers to the underside of the 
galleries awning, while playing sweet bird songs in the street and giving 
lamingtons to evening commuters. The Budgietopia Super Rally (2010) 
(Figure 26) involved 12 budgies with racing regalia that drove convertible 
cars (that were operated behind the scene by remote control) throughout the 
front floor of the gallery. The super rally, was observed by an audience of 
several thousand budgies, exhibited singing and cheering budgie anthems 
as the cars raced past.  
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Figure 25:  The Evening Commuter Cake Off (2010) (Detail) exhibited at Spectrum 
(2010) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26:  The Budgietopia Super Rally (2010) (Detail) exhibited at Spectrum 
(2010) 
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There were eleven pop-up exhibitions of Budgietopia (2009‒2013) in total. 
Because the exhibits were shown between other programmed events within 
the space, they were only ever displayed for short periods of time. In 
between the pop-up exhibits I would, from time to time, leave budgies resting 
on the window ledge outside Spectrum. The combination of the ongoing pop-
up events and the random budgies left outside overtime began to attract a 
following. People began to enquire what the budgies were for, when the next 
exhibit would be and others became a part of the budgie adoption program 
discussed in Section 1. 
 
The main exhibition in which Budgietopia appeared was the City of Perth’s, 
City in Bloom Exhibition (2010). The narrative behind Budgietopia’s City in 
Bloom (2010) is based on two budgies, ‘Reggie’ and ‘Rose’. Reggie and 
Rose, determined to fulfil a lifelong dream of experiencing city life, left their 
flock and set to the sky in pursuit of finding a new place to nest. Having 
reached the city but, unsure of their way, the couple headed to Perth’s tourist 
information kiosk, located in the city square, know as Forrest Chase. Tired 
after their long journey they built a nest on the roof of the kiosk and settled in 
for the night. They awoke the following day spellbound by the vast range of 
activities, pleasures and material pursuits offered in modern city life—food, 
fashion, shopping, sightseeing and people watching. Wanting to share their 
experience, they invited a thousand of their closest friends to join them. 
Within days the flock arrived, joining Reggie and Rose on top of the kiosk.  
 
The fortuitous opportunity to exhibit Budgietopia (2010) within the city centre, 
on the roof of an information kiosk, was greatly welcomed, as it again 
provided a chance to locate my artwork and praxis within the public domain. 
Theoretically, the development and use of Budgietopia (2009‒2013) in this 
research has been multifaceted and strongly influenced by Binkley’s notion 
of kitsch as a repetitive system (2000). Foremost, Budgietopia focuses on 
the sentimentality, the third feature of the repetitive system of kitsch. It 
explores, through the lives of budgies, how humans are able to find a sense 
of comfort, value and safety in the world through developing sentimental 
attachments to objects. Binkley’s theory of kitsch as a repetitive system 
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(2000) coupled with what I have called ‘Olalquiaga’s modes of perceiving 
experiences and kitsch’5 (1992), have been influential in Budgietopia 
(2009‒2013) when examining how people’s experience of an object 
influences the kinds of sentiment that they feel. This has been achieved 
through reflexive analysis of the various aspects of Binkley’s theory at play 
within the installations, exhibitions, the budgie adoption program and this 
reflexive creative praxis. By bringing to light the embedding nature of the 
repetitive qualities of kitsch identified by Binkley (2000), that are operating in 
this work, it is demonstrated that the repetitive rhythm of kitsch presents a 
support system propped up “by reassuring traditions and habits” (p. 135). 
 
The budgies incorporated in this project have been utilised in two distinct 
ways. First, they are exhibited in ways that enact everyday human scenarios 
where the comfort and warmth of kitsch and its repetitive qualities can be 
found (tea parties, relaxing at home and group gatherings, for example). 
Second, the budgies are particularly kitsch objects, in and of themselves, 
and the work examines the interactions and relationships people have 
developed with them. Overall, the budgie ornaments and Budgietopia 
(2009‒2013) have been reflexively examined throughout this praxis to 
explore how the repetitive nature of kitsch and the sentimentality associated 
with kitsch operate.  
 
 
 
                                            
5 What I have called Olalquiaga’s ‘modes of perceiving experiences and kitsch’ is a critique 
on kitsch from The Artificial Kingdom (1998). Based largely on Walter Benjamin’s (1973) two 
types of memory, Olalquiaga’s modes of perceiving experiences and kitsch examines the 
process by which differing memories, experiences and desires affect an individual’s 
emotional response to objects and to kitsch. Section 8 of this research is dedicated to an 
analysis of this theory. 
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3.4 Snow Domes and Dream Spheres 
 
 
 
 
Collection of Snow Domes and Dream Sphere’s (2009) 
Glass, stainless steel, water and various mixed media 
Dimensions ranging between 50cm x 40cm x 40cm – 32cm x 25cm x25cm 
 
Figure 27:  Snow Domes and Dream Spheres (2009) exhibited at The Moores 
Building and Gallery, Fremantle, Western Australia (2009) 
 
 
Each of the snow domes and dream spheres developed in this body of work 
were produced with the intention of encapsulating a collection of objects 
that represent the complex universe of day-to-day lived experiences that 
influence us as individuals and as a culture. The sculptures are foremost a 
study of kitsch, of the things people collect—of how people make sense of 
the world through artefacts and everyday objects (Attfield, 2006)—and the 
interrelationship between the experiences we collect and the aesthetic 
colonisation of the lifeworlds we create.  
 
The often absurd combinations of aspirations, dreams and fantasies 
encapsulated in each of these works preserves a brief moment in time; 
experiences and memories that shape our day-to-day lives. They explore 
how, through the objects and souvenirs we collect, we develop a sense of 
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assurance in life, a sense of who we are and value being (Attfield, 2006): the 
collective memories and desires that influence the highly individualised 
lifeworlds that we create and inhabit. 
 
The works were developed throughout 2009‒2010 and were exhibited at the 
Moores Building Contemporary Art Gallery, Fremantle, Western Australia as 
part of the exhibition, Ummmm . . . The Articulate Practitioner (2009). The 
body of work comprises a collection of 15 snow domes and dream spheres. 
Of the 15, Ganesha Glory (2009) and Call me Golden Sugar Britches (2009) 
are reflexively examined in relation to Olalquiaga’s ‘three degrees of kitsch’ 
(1998) in Section 5 and Binkley’s concept of Kitsch as a Repetitive System 
(2000) in Section 7. 
 
 
3.4.1 Ganesha Glory 
 
 
  
 
Ganesha Glory (2009) 
Glass, stainless steel, water and various mixed media 
32cm x 25cm x25cm 
 
Figure 28:  Ganesha Glory (2009) exhibited at The Moores Building and Gallery, 
Fremantle, Western Australia (2009) 
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The snow dome Ganesha Glory (2009) (Figure 28) explores the concept of 
being a cultural tourist, collecting kitsch souvenirs as memories of an exotic 
experience. The snow dome encapsulates, in a glass dome, a cast resin 
figurine of the Hindu deity Lord Ganesh, heart shaped prayer beads, silk 
lotus flowers and buds suspended in a solution of water and glycerine with 
golden glitter snow. 
 
During my undergraduate studies in visual arts, I spent a year abroad as 
part of an international exchange program. The final three months of the 
year were spent in India. Ganesha Glory (2009) was born of this 
experience. Throughout my time in India I became fascinated by repetitive 
narrative of many of the tourists I encountered. There was a recurrent 
theme of having been part of an ‘exotic’ cultural experience—meditating, 
visiting a Guru, living like a ‘local’ or having taken a specific tour—of which 
the cultural content was somehow more authentic and more real than 
anyone else’s experience.  
 
For a kitsch aficionado like myself, India is a treasure trove. Somehow 
seeing myself as being different to the ‘other’ travellers I encountered, I 
spent time seeking out the most kitsch ornaments I could find. After weeks 
of reconnaissance my mission for the final week of the trip was to go back 
and buy the best of the ornaments I had seen. After agonising over what to 
get, I bought a series of cheap copies of original ornaments of Hindu 
deities, of which Lord Ganesh was one. The shopkeeper carefully packaged 
the ornaments I had bought and I took them back to the hotel and placed 
them in my backpack. 
 
On returning to Australia, I proudly unpacked my bag, eager to show my 
family the fantastic ornaments I had found. As I unwrapped the ornaments 
there right before my eyes was a shiny gold and black oval shaped sticker 
that said, “Made in China”. To add insult to injury, later the same year I 
travelled to Singapore and visited Little India and saw hundreds of 
ornaments almost identical to the ones I had bought.  
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Ironically, as with most tourist kitsch, the ornaments I had bought were 
implicated in what Binkley (2000) would describe as the ‘emulative ploy of 
kitsch’: the authentic natural stone they were supposedly made of turned 
out to be cast resin and more closely aligned with the irony of what 
Olalquiaga (1998) would describe as second-degree kitsch (second-degree 
kitsch is discussed in detail in Section 5.2). Thus, if nothing else, I at least 
had “a trace of exotica to show off” (Binkley, p. 143) to my family and 
friends. 
 
 
3.4.2 Call Me Golden Sugar Britches 
 
 
 
Call Me Golden Sugar Britches (2009) 
Glass, stainless steel, water and various mixed media 
75cm x 50cm x 50cm 
 
Figure 29:  Call Me Golden Sugar Britches (2009) exhibited at The Moores 
Building and Gallery, Fremantle, Western Australia (2009) 
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The snow dome Call Me Golden Sugar Britches (2009) (Figure 29) was 
made in memorial of a friend’s late Golden Retriever named ‘Sugar 
Britches’ or ‘Sugar’ for short. This snow dome contains a cast resin figurine 
of a golden retriever dog, a cast resin butterfly and bird, a red plastic ball, 
shuttle cock and a rubber chicken leg, suspended in a solution of water and 
glycerine with blue and silver glitter snow. 
 
Sugar had died of old age several years prior to making this work and my 
friend had created an altar of sorts on a shelf that housed Sugar’s favourite 
things. He even wore a small pendant on a neck chain that contained one of 
the dog’s toenails and a clump of fur he had collected from Sugar’s brush. 
Amongst the things on the shelf were photographs of Sugar; bird and 
butterfly ornaments, as one of Sugar’s much-loved pastimes had been to 
bound around the backyard playing with any creatures that fluttered by; 
Sugar’s favoured red ball; and one of the shuttlecocks Sugar was notorious 
for chewing if ever they were left lying around. 
 
Unlike Ganesha Glory (2009), which explored my own experience, a part of 
my own lifeworld, Call Me Golden Sugar Britches (2009) encapsulates my 
own observation of a particularly personal aspect of someone else’s 
lifeworld. The rationale for developing Call Me Golden Sugar Britches 
(2009) was to explore the manner in which kitsch and sentimentality can 
offer a sense of reassurance, comfort and security by re-embedding the 
individual through emotional attachment.  
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3.5 Jesus 
 
 
 
Jesus (2010)  
Wood, plaster and mixed media 
95cm x 380cm x 195cm 
 
 
Figure 30:  Jesus (2010) exhibited at Wesley Church, Perth, Western Australia 
(2010) 
 
 
 
Jesus (2010) (Figure 30), was commissioned by Uniting Churches Australia, 
for the Stations of the Cross (2010) exhibition and was later purchased as 
part of their collection. The sculpture comprises a painted wooden cross that 
is 3.8 meters in length and 1.95 meters in width, to which a life-size sculpture 
of Jesus is attached. Jesus is constructed in fibreglass, plaster, aluminium 
and other mixed media, with a hand painted finish. The sculpture was 
exhibited inside Wesley Church, in Western Australia, suspend from the 
ceiling above the altar.  
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The Stations of the Cross are generally a series of 146 artistic 
representations of Christ’s path as he carried the cross to his crucifixion7. 
Christians traditionally understand Jesus' death on the cross to be for the 
atonement of humanity’s sins, a selfless act that made salvation possible for 
all. The stations are generally placed around the walls of the nave of a 
church. Parishioners commemorating the passion of Christ move from 
station to station to pray. Each station is designed for parishioners to engage 
with it with a sincere belief in the spiritual symbolism of that station. 
 
My presentation of Jesus (2010) is based on the ninth station of the cross, 
where Jesus falls for the third time. In the Stations of the Cross, when Jesus 
falls for the third time, it is acknowledged that mortality is a heavy burden, 
and that one can easily stumble or fall under its weight. Suspended in the 
nave of the church the sculpture was placed above the altar. By suspending 
the work I hoped to remind the viewer to look up, to look to a higher power, 
to know that if you fall you can bounce back, that through a higher power, or 
Christ, no burden is too great to bear. 
 
The opportunity to develop the sculpture of Jesus for Wesley Church was of 
particular interest, because a fundamental aspect of this research has been 
to examine how kitsch operates within everyday life and the lifeworld. It has 
therefore been a critical aspect of my research to show my work in a variety 
of different contexts—not only within an art gallery—but also in places where 
everyday people, participating in everyday activities, can view it. The 
communicative function of the sculpture through being displayed in the 
church, was significantly different to how I would expect Jesus (2010) to be 
received if exhibited in a gallery. While still considered an artwork when 
displayed in the church, because the sculpture was representative of an 
archetypal Western version of Jesus, it appeared to be considered as a 
decorative feature, as if ‘part of the place’, like the churches stained glass 
windows for example. This was in distinct contrast to the highly conceptual 
                                            
6 There are traditionally 14 Stations of the Cross although some contemporary 
interpretations include a fifteenth station that represents Christ’s resurrection. 
7  This ritual is generally performed in the Roman Catholic Church and can be undertaken at 
any time but is generally takes place during Lent or on Good Friday. 
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and abstract works also displayed that seemed less accessible to the 
parishioners. 
 
The most significant aspect of Jesus (2010) being displayed within the 
context of the church, for this research, was the way in which the main 
communicative function of the sculpture was one of religious purpose: 
prayed to by parishioners as if embodying the spirit of Christ; and as part of 
the Stations of the Cross Easter ritual. As is laid out in the following sections 
of this research I argue that contemporary kitsch plays a vital, and also 
positive role, in social and individual aesthetic life. From this viewpoint, I 
argue that the manner in which the parishioners connected with Jesus (2010) 
exemplifies the importance of aesthetic representation as an attribute of 
kitsch. I believe this to be directly related to the sensory affect of 
sentimentality, instilled within the experiences and material objects people 
yearn for or place in high regard. I argue that the subtle manner in which 
kitsch operated while the sculpture Jesus (2010) was exhibited in the church 
demonstrates the ability of kitsch to discreetly offer a way of the individuals 
remaining embedded, or re-embedding themselves. I argue that this was 
demonstrated by the manner in which the parishioners channelled their 
spiritual connection through the sculpture.  
 
 
 
4. Methods of Categorising Different Types of Kitsch  
 
As illustrated in Section 2, defining kitsch is problematic. Having been 
applied to a broad range of objects that make up the contemporary material 
world (Attfield, 2006), kitsch still manages to challenge traditional definitions 
of taste, culture and art. I concur with Olalquiaga who identifies an eminent 
feature of kitsch and late modernity as being “synchronised difference”, that 
is “for contemporary urban culture’s ability to circulate and support distinct, 
and often contradictory, discourses” (1992, p. 38) simultaneously. Instead of 
“erasing previous practices, kitsch enables and even seeks their 
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subsistence” (p. 42). The divergence of coexisting visions has created a 
“Byzantine struggle in which different iconographies fight for hegemony” (p. 
42). Given this, a single object can concurrently hold several different 
meanings, and with this in mind, some of the confusion as to what 
constitutes kitsch can be alleviated.  
 
This section of the exegesis outlines the theoretical foundation on which the 
remaining four chapters of my creative praxis are based. A summary 
contextualising the methods by which different kinds of kitsch can be 
categorised (Olalquiaga, 1992, 1998; Binkley, 2000) follows. These sections 
(5-8) demonstrate how objects designated to be ‘kitsch’ can simultaneously 
have different, but related meanings, and how these objects are utilised 
within my praxis. It highlights how “cultural specificity has given way to the 
internationalization of signs” that often lose “uniqueness” but gain “exposure 
and circulation” (Olalquiaga, p. 42). Finally, it helps to explain how the 
varying contexts at play when categorising an object impact whether or not it 
is considered to be kitsch.  
 
My criteria for categorising different types of kitsch is established using three 
key theories: Olalquiaga’s notion of ‘three degrees of kitsch’ from 
Megalopolis (1992), outlined in Sections 5 and 6, a system through which 
kitsch can be classified based on an objects means of production and 
cultural function; Binkley’s notion of ‘kitsch as a repetitive system’ (2000), 
examined in Section 7;  “establishes three distinct ways in which kitsch 
aestheticizes repetition” (2000, p. 142) which in turn address the modern 
condition of disembeddedness; and what I have called ‘Olalquiaga’s modes 
of perceiving experiences and kitsch’ from Olalquiaga’s critique on kitsch 
from The Artificial Kingdom (1998) examined in Section 8. Based largely on 
Walter Benjamin’s (1973) two types of memory, ‘Olalquiaga’s modes of 
perceiving experiences and kitsch’ examines the process by which differing 
memories, experiences and desires affect an individual’s emotional 
response to objects and to kitsch. 
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Both Olalquiaga’s and Binkley’s theories are related to my artwork in the 
following sections of this exegesis. However, in order to ensure a rigorous 
examination of how each theory operates within this praxis, and to avoid 
repetition, analysis of individual artworks are divided between each theory, 
although there is some overlap: The Aquarium (2009) and Jesus (2010) to 
Olalquiaga’s notion of ‘three degrees of kitsch’ (1992); Budgietopia 
(2009‒2013) and the Snow Domes and Dream Sphere’s developed in 
2009‒2010 to Binkley’s concept of kitsch as a repetitive system (2000); and 
Budgietopia (2009‒2013) to ‘Olalquiaga’s modes of perceiving experiences 
and kitsch’ (1998). Although the creative work developed incorporate 
aspects of Olalquiaga’s and Binkley’s theories, they are not a literal 
interpretation, but instead a coordinated grouping of theory and practice. My 
creative work therefore does embody aspects of Olalquiaga’s and Binkley’s 
philosophies, but is not rendered as a visual expression of their theories.  
The re-embedding nature of kitsch—and the method by which the sensory 
affect of sentimentality influences the connections to possessions and 
material objects that are shared across cultures and societies—is a vital 
aspect of my re-evaluation of kitsch. By expounding these inter-relationships, 
that is the embedding nature of kitsch and the sensory affect of 
sentimentality, the research aims to both clarify, and validate, the significant 
role kitsch plays in the everyday and “lifeworld” (Habermas, 1971). This has 
been demonstrated by drawing on texts, from not only the visual arts, but a 
broad range of examples including popular and social culture  
 
These examples include popular culture texts: Andersen’s and Disney’s 
versions of The Little Mermaid (1837; 1989); Louis Vuitton’s collaborative 
work with Murakami; tourist souvenirs; and colourful plastic sheeting from 
South East Asia, and social culture texts including: Janet Williams, the 
‘Royalty Lady’ (O’Brien, 2011); the significance of Easter eggs, toy eggs and 
eggs displayed as art; La Villa Hamster (Kaushik, 2012); decorative 
household objects; religious iconography and others. Also, the work of artist: 
Carl Andre, Jackson Pollock, Jeff Koons, Takashi Murakami and Allison 
Jackson. It is through these examples that I demonstrate my critical and 
reflexive praxis model and the communicative capacity of my artwork.  
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5. Olalquiaga’s Three-Degrees of Kitsch 
 
By locating the various different discourses that are in operation within an 
object Olalquiaga has identified ‘three degrees of kitsch’, that through 
synchronised difference, overlap in definition dependant on their means of 
production and cultural function. ‘First-degree kitsch’, pertains when 
“representation is based on an indexical referent . . .  [where] the difference 
between reality and representation is explicit and hierarchical, since only what 
is perceived as reality matters” (Olalquiaga, 1992, p. 42). In this context, the 
kitsch object acts as a substitute for whatever it is representing. ‘Second-
degree kitsch’, or ‘neo-kitsch’, in opposition to first-degree kitsch, collapses the 
difference between reality and representation, resulting in the representation 
of an object becoming the only possible point of reference (1992). Because 
‘neo’ or second-degree objects are generally inspired by first-degree kitsch, 
they become a new, second generation of kitsch that is without the devotion 
attributed to first-degree kitsch objects. As a result, second-degree objects are 
essentially empty icons as they are recognised for their quality as a sign rather 
than as a substitute (1992). Finally, third-degree kitsch is concerned with “the 
legitimisation of [kitsch’s] signifying and visual attributes by the institutionally 
authorised agency of artists” (pp. 46‒47). As a multi-faceted recycling process, 
third-degree kitsch is able to produce hybridised products that hold new, often 
foreign, meanings. 
 
After outlining in detail each of the three-degrees of kitsch, I give examples 
that illustrate the synchronised difference and overlapping of the definitions of 
each degree. These examples are from a broad field of discourse and include: 
my own art work—the sculpture Jesus (2010) and the installation and 
residency The Aquarium (2009); real life examples, like Janet Williams, the 
‘Royalty Lady’; popular culture, including Hans Christen Andersen’s (1837) 
and Disney’s (1989) versions of The Little Mermaid; the work of artists Carl 
Andre, Jackson Pollock and Jeff Koons. Although discussed as an example 
within the initial analysis of the three-degree’s of kitsch, as the main work 
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undertaken throughout this research, a full case study of how Olalquiaga’s 
three-degrees of kitsch operate within The Aquarium (2009) follows. 
 
 
5.1 Olalquiaga’s First-Degree Kitsch 
 
Of the three degrees, first-degree kitsch is the closest to traditional 
discussions of kitsch. It is where “the difference between reality and 
representation is explicit and hierarchical, since only what is perceived as 
reality matters. Acting as a mere substitute, the kitsch object has no validity in 
and of itself” (Olalquiaga, 1992, p. 42). These are commonly the objects that 
Binkley (2000) refers to as ‘ornamental statuary’; ‘chachkas’ (an inexpensive, 
showy trinket); and ‘manufactured sentimental knickknacks’. However, as 
objects of the first-degree their value is purely iconic. In this context, a hand-
painted egg for Easter, for those with a Christian ideological belief, would 
literally embody the spirit of Christ and new life, and would be purchased or 
decorated for its value as an auspicious icon—to exchange—with the genuine 
belief in its spiritual symbolism.  
 
                  
 
 
 
Hand painted Easter egg from the Ukraine. (n.d.). [Image]. Retrieved from 
http://www.tridenttreasures.com/ 
Chocolate Easter egg. (n.d.). [Image]. Retrieved from, 2008, from http://www.frieze 
Hand painted Easter egg. (n.d.). [Image]. Retrieved from 
http://moon.ouhsc.edu/jcollins/Images/Egg_Cross.jpg 
Exception to copyright: Section ss40, 103C, Exception, Research or Study. 
 
Figure 31:  Examples of first-degree kitsch: eggs for Easter 
Hand Painted Easter 
Egg from the 
Ukraine 
(Retrieved 2012) 
 
 
Hand Painted 
Easter Egg  
(Retrieved 2012) 
Chocolate Easter 
Egg 
(Retrieved 2012) 
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Additionally, in modernity, first-degree kitsch objects can become high art or 
have high status. An example of this is Peter Carl Fabergé’s handmade and 
individually decorated, precious metal, diamond and gemstone encrusted 
‘Fabergé eggs’ (Fabergé, Proler, Skurlov, 1997) (below). 
 
 
 
 
Jones, I, (2008). The ‘Cuckoo’ egg given by Tsar Nicholas II to his mother in 1900. [Medium: 
Photography]. Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/non_fictionreviews/3672041/A-
Faberge-egg-is-not-just-for-Easter.html 
Exception to copyright: Section ss40, 103C, Exception, Research or Study. 
 
Figure 32:  Example of Faberge Egg: first-degree kitsch  
 
Generally, however, first-degree objects are often characterised by a rawness 
and lack of sophistication in their execution, a characteristic that is often 
related to authenticity, low art and craft (Olalquiaga, 1992), although this is not 
always the case. Vietnamese refugee Cuc Lam’s red vinyl suitcase, for 
example, could be classified as first-degree kitsch. I argue that the suitcase 
acted as a metaphor for the life and possessions that Cuc Lam and her family 
had had to leave behind in Vietnam. The red suitcase represented the spirit of 
deep loss and sadness her family had experienced, and also the ‘good’ that 
life offers, hopes and dreams for the future. Remembering of course that the 
case Lam and her husband carried with them to Australia was virtually empty, I 
argue that the case was brought with the belief in its symbolism; as an object 
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that would carry the memories and goodness in their life, to their new home in 
Australia. 
 
 
5.1.1 First-Degree Kitsch and the Kitsch Aficionado 
 
First-degree objects are often collected by the ‘kitsch aficionado’ (Olalquiaga, 
1992). Closely associated with first-degree kitsch, the ‘aficionado’ is a 
character with whom I closely relate. While still a first-degree believer, the 
aficionado cherishes kitsch objects for the intense feelings of sentimentality 
and nostalgia they imbue, rather than placing importance on what the object 
represents. Paradoxically, the aficionado reproduces a connection to an 
object, comparable in magnitude to that of first-degree kitsch, only their 
attachment lies in a passion for all things kitsch, rather than the iconic value 
imbued by lovers of a particular first-degree kitsch item. It is through this 
paradox that both the aficionado and the true believer of “first-degree kitsch 
familiarize the ungraspable—eternity, goodness, evil—while tactically 
maintaining a hierarchical distinction between realities and representation” 
(Olalquiaga, 1992, pp. 44-45).  
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5.1.2 Jesus: First-Degree Kitsch and the Aficionado  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jesus (Rebotar) (2010)  
Wood, plaster and mixed media 
95cm x 380cm x 195cm 
 
Figure 33:  Jesus sculpture (2010) exhibited at Wesley Church, Perth, Western 
Australia 
 
The sculpture Jesus (2010) (Figure 33) fits perfectly with Olalquiaga’s (1998) 
notion of first-degree kitsch. It was designed specifically for its’ iconic value—
developed for a church with the specific intention of creating an artwork that 
parishioners could pray to as they partook in the religious ritual of the Stations 
of the Cross. Although the “difference between reality and representation” 
(Olalquiaga, 1998) of Jesus (2010) is obvious, the communicative function of 
the sculpture was to be viewed by parishioners as a substitute or embodiment 
of Christ at his crucifixion. For an object to be considered first degree-kitsch, 
the consumer, in this case the parishioner, must perceive the object, Jesus, 
(2010), to be real. Therefore, even though the parishioner knows that the 
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sculpture is not actually Jesus, it is considered to be real as a representation of 
the embodiment of Jesus himself.  
 
For the kitsch aficionado, by contrast, the relationship to the sculpture Jesus 
(2010) would primarily be for the kitschness of the work, rather than its 
religious significance. But if the aficionado was a Christian, the connection to 
the sculpture would likely be equally as intense as a true first-degree kitsch 
consumer. I would consider that the person responsible for the purchase of 
Jesus (2010) for the Uniting Church would likely fit the latter category. 
 
For the Stations of the Cross (2010) exhibition, contributing artists were each 
paid an artist’s fee. The fee is designed to contribute toward the cost of making 
the work and for it to be exhibited, but is usually much less than the actual 
value of the work itself. Since only a fee has been paid, ownership of the work 
usually remains with the artist. Because Jesus (2010) was a particularly large 
work (95cm x 380cm x 195cm) and the transportation, storage and care of the 
work had the potential to be costly I was eager for it to be sold.  
 
Although the church wanted to purchase the work, there were issues around 
storage. The woman brokering the purchase of Jesus (2010), who I suspected 
to be a kitsch aficionado, was determined to make sure the sale went through. 
However, due to storage limitations I was asked to cut the arm off the 
sculpture and install a screw-like mechanism so that the arm could easily be 
taken on and off as it was moved in and out of the storage area. As the artist 
and creator of the sculpture, and passionate lover of kitsch, who had spent 
months creating Jesus (2010), I was nothing short of horrified by the request. 
However, knowing the difficulties I would face with storing the work myself I 
acquiesced. The sculpture was purchased and I returned to the church with an 
angle grinder to remove the arm. 
 
About a week passed and I received a phone call from the exhibition’s curator. 
The reverend of the church where the sculpture was to be kept had contacted 
her to let her know that a large group of parishioners and church elders were 
extremely alarmed by the removal of Jesus’ arm, and by having learnt that a 
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new detachable version was being made. The iconic religious significance and 
genuine belief in the spiritual symbolism of the sculpture for these parishioners 
was one of true first-degree kitsch. The significance of the work was so great 
that for them, removing the arm from the sculpture was like cutting the arm off 
Jesus himself.  
 
After several weeks of negotiation, the armless sculpture was returned to my 
studio. Having in the eyes of parishioners ironically fallen from his iconic status 
as true first-degree kitsch, Jesus, it could be said had fallen for a fourth time 
and become a devalued, empty icon—the type of which Olalquiaga (1998) 
would likely refer to as second-degree kitsch. 
 
A reflexive analysis of the praxis relating to the sculpture Jesus (2010) 
undoubtedly identifies the power of art, and the artist, when considering the 
radical shift that occurred in the communicative function of Jesus (2010) once 
the arm had been severed: From an object of significance and religious 
purpose—that embodied the spirit of Jesus—to a devalued icon in which 
“meaning and its processes are contingent upon a cultural and social 
environment” (Crouch, 2007, p.114). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
83 
5.1.3 Janet Williams the Royalty Lady: A Case Study of First-
Degree Kitsch  
 
An archetypical example of first-degree kitsch I have identified is Janet 
Williams of Woonona in New South Wales, Australia, and her collection of 
British Royal Family memorabilia. Janet’s patriotic parents, who were post-war 
immigrants to Australia, “had a sentimental attachment to all things Brit and 
Royal” (O’Brien, 2011). To commemorate the “Queen's first visit to the 
Australian colony” in 1954, Janet's mother bought her a small commemorative 
cup. Over 60 years on, Janet, now known as the “Royalty Lady” (O’Brien, 
2011), has a “Royalty Collection” that takes up almost her entire home and is 
made up of over 12,000 pieces. The extensive collection incorporates ‘fine’ 
china (Figure 34, below), dioramas, statues and soft sculptures. 
 
O’Brien, S. (2012). Janet’s royalty room, first china cup. [Medium: Photography]. Retrieved from 
http://www.abc.net.au/local/stories/2011/10/25/3347822.htm 
Exception to copyright: Section ss40, 103C, Exception, Research or Study. 
Figure 34:  Janet Williams with her extensive royal china collection, which fills two 
rooms in her home, holding the commemorative cup given to her by her 
mother. 
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Pictured below, Janet, surrounded by her treasures, even has a soft sculpture 
of Queen Elizabeth II. The sculpture is clothed in a satin teddy bear print 
pyjama suit and Charles and Diana, Union Jack slippers. The traditional ‘Order 
of the Garter’ blue sash is draped over the sculpture’s torso. Propped up by a 
couple of Union Jack cushions, the Queen Elizabeth II sculpture is posed 
lounging back on Janet’s couch sipping a cup of tea with her hair in curlers. 
Janet appears at home in the image, and is pictured sitting on the couch with 
the Queen’s feet resting on her lap.  
 
O’Brien, S. (2012). Janet Williams in her royalty room relaxing with the Queen. [Medium: Photography]. 
Retrieved from http://www.abc.net.au/local/stories/2011/10/25/3347822.htm 
Exception to copyright: Section ss40, 103C, Exception, Research or Study. 
Figure 35:  Image of Janet Williams with the soft sculpture of Queen Elizabeth II 
putting her feet up—while wearing ‘Order of the Garter’ (blue sash), 
Prince Charles and Princess Diana slippers, a teddy bear dressing gown 
and having a cup of tea with hair in curlers. 
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O’Brien, S. (2012). Janet’s royalty room last goodbye. [Medium: Photography]. Retrieved from 
http://www.abc.net.au/local/stories/2011/10/25/3347822.htm 
Exception to copyright: Section ss40, 103C, Exception, Research or Study. 
Figure 36:  Soft sculptures of the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall, holding hands as 
they relax on Janet’s front porch 
 
Even the exterior of Janet’s modest suburban home, pictured above (Figure 
36), has been decorated with British Royal Family memorabilia: a soft 
sculpture of Charles, The Duke and Camilla, The Duchess of Cornwall; Union 
Jack bunting, and Beefeaters guarding the front porch. 
Until recently, Janet conducted regular guided tours of the collection during 
which she served Devonshire tea to her visitors. Highlighting the fascination of 
many for all things kitsch, the tours proved to be so successful that people 
began to arrive by the coach load. Unfortunately, due to noise complaints from 
neighbours, Janet has now had to minimise the number of tours she conducts. 
The iconic value intrinsic to first-degree kitsch and passion for all things kitsch 
felt by the aficionado are undoubtedly evident in the deep sentimental 
attachment and commitment Janet William’s has for her extensive royalty 
collection. Unlike the attachment and commitment evident in the examples of 
Janet Williams’ connection to-first degree kitsch, the opposite, however, can 
be said for second-degree kitsch. 
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5.2 Olalquiaga’s Second-Degree Kitsch 
 
Second-degree kitsch, also referred to as ‘neo-kitsch’, Olalquiaga (1992) 
identifies ‘representation’ as being the only possible referent. This means that 
the referent—the object itself—is the only possible signification. Since second-
degree kitsch is said to defamiliarise our understanding of reality as a direct 
result of its ability to represent itself, it effectively becomes the real, rather than 
a representation or copy (1992). Inspired by first-degree kitsch, neo-kitsch 
therefore becomes second generational. Actually sold as ‘kitsch’, these items, 
for example, include objects such as boxes of cheap painted eggs used as 
decorator items; a wind-up dancing egg toy (Figure 37), mass-produced in 
China and shipped to Christian countries for Easter, but which can also be 
bought all year round from a novelty shop. Unlike first degree-kitsch, the wind-
up dancing egg toy for example, would not symbolise the resurrection of 
Christ, or new life, or have any religious meaning. It doesn’t refer to anything 
other than itself, and its’ meaning is contingent upon the context in which it is 
consumed. 
 
 
 
 
 
Wind-up dancing egg toy, (n.d.). [Image]. Retrieved from http://nerdapproved.com/wp-
content/uploads/2008/08/chicken-vs-egg-wind-ups.jpg 
Exception to copyright: Section ss40, 103C, Exception, Research or Study. 
 
Figure 37:  Example of second-degree kitsch: wind-up dancing egg toy 
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It can be reasoned that neo-kitsch objects are effectively empty icons as they 
do not evoke the devotional or sentimental relationship that is attributed to 
first-degree kitsch, as was the case with the sculpture Jesus (2010) after his 
arm was removed. Neo-kitsch objects are valued specifically for their “iconicity 
and quality as a sign” (Olalquiaga, 1992, p. 45).  
 
I once saw a Buddha statue that provides a good example of neo-kitsch. 
Designed to be placed near the front door, the Buddha sits on a traditional 
lotus flower pedestal, appearing to hold both the religious sentiment and iconic 
value to which it is normally attributed. However, when switched on—amidst a 
plume of smoke and flashing coloured lights—this ‘Lord Buddha’, complete 
with a motion sensor, wolf-whistled at passers-by. Created and sold purely for 
joke value (1992) or impulse spending, second-degree kitsch objects, like the 
‘Lord Buddha’, are never connected with the intense level of attachment 
associated with the aficionado or lover of kitsch in the first-degree (1992). 
“Second-degree kitsch exists only for transaction, to pass from hand to hand, 
and in this lack of possessing subject lies its ultimate alienation and 
perishability” (Olalquiaga, 1992, p. 45).   
 
Where first-degree kitsch might be found in a variety store or in places that sell 
items for everyday and domestic use (Olalquiaga, 1992), second-degree 
kitsch is generally found in a gift store or souvenir stand. Mass-produced, 
manufactured and marketed, second-degree kitsch replaces the low 
technology, handmade homeliness of first-degree kitsch. Designed as a 
commodity to exchange, second-degree kitsch is stripped of the signifying 
value and meaningfulness associated with first-degree kitsch (1992). It is 
important to note, however, that second-degree kitsch still remains as 
authentic as first-degree kitsch. To denounce “its predigested character would 
be contradictory, since kitsch is by definition [is in some way] predigested. The 
difference lies in how intentional or self-conscious, this predigestion is” (p. 46). 
 
Mass-marketing of imagery or icons as kitsch, like the wind-up dancing egg 
toy pictured above (Figure 37) is not possible unless “the icon has been 
 
 
 
 
88 
stripped of its signifying value” (Olalquiaga, 1992, p. 46). To use the analogy 
of an iceberg, as second-degree kitsch the exposed tip of the iceberg would 
represent the wind-up dancing egg toy. The mass of ice hidden beneath the 
water represents first-degree kitsch and in this case the traditional Easter egg 
steeped in religious history and significance. As a second-degree kitsch object 
the tip of the iceberg is all that exists. The mass of ice beneath the water has 
broken free, taking with it the history of first-degree kitsch, or in this case the 
significance of a traditional Easter egg. Therefore all that exists is the tip of the 
iceberg, no complex history, but a second-degree kitsch icon recognisable 
simply as a funny dancing toy egg.  
 
As an icon, the value of second-degree, can be measured by its traits: “the 
formal, technical aspects like narrative, colour and texture” (p. 46). Because 
the icon has been emptied of its signifying value, these traits according to 
Olalquiaga (1992) can be “easily isolated and fragmented” (p. 46), as they 
become interchangeable and easily substituted. Consider for instance the 
result of attaching a pair of cute plastic legs and a wind up function to various 
different objects—Mick Jagger’s lips, or a set of false teeth for example—that 
would most likely result in the object becoming the type of second-degree 
kitsch Olalquiaga describes. Like the tip of the iceberg, as “floating signs” 
(Olalquiaga, 1992, p, 46), these traits can adhere to almost any object, and 
convey onto it their full value as authentic meaning, turning the object into 
‘kitsch’ (1992). This is not unlike what had happened to the Buddha ornament 
discussed earlier, that amidst plumes of smoke and flashing lights wolf-
whistled at passers, qualities that for a devout Buddhist would demonstrate 
disrespect of such an auspicious icon. I argue that the lack of specificity 
associated with second-degree kitsch objects, combined with the aptness with 
which second-degree kitsch randomly and unashamedly consumes 
iconography, demonstrates its ability to adhere to almost any object.  
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5.2.1 Jesus and Second-Degree Kitsch 
 
I could not have predicted the ironic fall from the status of first-degree kitsch to 
the lesser-valued second-degree kitsch bestowed on Jesus (2010) with the 
loss of its arm. From my perspective, the signifying and use value associated 
with first-degree kitsch (Olalquiaga, 1992) was removed from the work at the 
moment in which function took precedence over form—when easy storage 
became more important than the form of the actual sculpture. Literally stripped 
of its first-degree significance, as a second-degree construct, instead of being 
prayed to, Jesus (2010) had become the subject of tense negotiation. I could 
not have known just how pertinent Olalquiaga’s statement that “second-
degree kitsch exists only for transaction, to pass from hand to hand, and in 
this lack of possessing subject lies its ultimate alienation and perishability” 
(Olalquiaga, 1992, p. 45) would become. 
 
Eventually Jesus (2010) made its way to my mother’s backyard and had a 
piece of plastic ivy poked into the hole where the forearm use to be. After a 
couple of years it made its way to the annual bulk rubbish collection and was 
put on the side of the road for pickup. Over the next few days my mother 
watched as someone driving by stopped and pulled the head off. By the 
following morning the other arm and a foot were also missing. Thankfully over 
time, my sensitivity to the situation had dissipated and I was relieved to see it 
go. I do wonder what the new owners did with their roadside finds. I am 
guessing that the foot and arm would probably have been the butt of 
someone’s joke and maintained their status as second-degree kitsch, if only 
for a short while. Strangely, I find myself hoping that the head of Jesus (2010) 
was somehow elevated back to its status of first-degree kitsch, if not for its 
religious significance, at the very least, for its appeal as a work of art. 
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5.2.2 The Value of Second-Degree Kitsch as a Tool for the 
Artist 
 
As an artist-researcher, bound by the constraints of academic analysis, the 
simplicity of second-degree kitsch, for me, comes with a great sense of light 
relief. It is, in fact, a crucial aspect of how I intend my work to be received. I 
have always held a great appreciation of art as a powerful communication tool.  
I recognised early on in my career that I greatly appreciated the power of ugly, 
gruesome, grotesque or sombre portrayals in other artists’ work, but that I 
struggled to engage with highly negative portrayals of subject matter within my 
practice. This by no means implies that I refuse or find myself unable to work 
in this capacity. Through reflexively understanding my praxis I have developed 
a style in which if required I am able to use beauty, colour, humour and kitsch 
as alternative inroads to dark subject matter. This is demonstrated in the 
sculpture Jesus (2010) (Section 5.2.1). It is in part about finding the silver 
lining in every cloud—beauty in emotionally tough, negative or painful subject 
matter—but also palatable ways of communicating negative emotion without 
diluting the underlying message. Although a life experience and not part of my 
work, the funeral of a recently deceased family friend who had lost a fast and 
harrowing battle with an aggressive form of cancer—leaving behind an adoring 
family and grandchildren—is a noble example of this. 
 
Having reached the crematorium, the congregation burst into a chorus of 
heartbroken sobbing combined with uncontainable laughter and smiles as a 
glossy white coffin emerged from the hearse emblazoned with the strap line 
‘shop-till-you-drop’ and a pair of cherry red high heels. Surrounded by a 
magnificent array of brightly coloured flowers, on top of the coffin was the most 
glamorous of handbags—gold, encrusted with hundred of diamantes. After the 
service, puffy eyed and red faced, the congregation were still highly emotional, 
sobbing with great sadness at their loss, yet laughing at the humour and irony 
of the funeral service and the joy that their loved one had brought them. 
Weeks on, and those close to me who attended, still appear to be experiencing 
the same intense, mixed, emotional response as they discussed the funeral.  
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There are many ways in which a funeral can play out, but it is certainly not 
difficult to imagine the opposite depiction of this scenario—a black coffin; no 
flowers; no accessories; no laughter and a morose, dark mood—and the likely 
after-effects on those who attended. The ‘shop-till-you-drop’ funeral to me 
seems a perfect example of how humour and kitsch, and more specifically 
second-degree kitsch, can be a positive and powerful communication tool. It is 
the power of second-degree kitsch to communicate which I place great value 
on within my work. 
 
To further explain why I value kitsch as such a fundamental aspect of the 
visual aesthetic of my work, I look to some of my experiences when viewing 
the work of other artists. Few people would be alone in having come across an 
artwork so heavily burdened with complex theory that it is inaccessible to the 
viewer. Unless you are formally trained or prepared to research the philosophy 
behind these works, they often remain incomprehensible. Oftentimes the artist 
simply expects too much of an audience, to the degree that the audience 
refuses to accept the work. A well-known example of this is American artist 
Carl Andre’s sculpture Equivalent VIII (1966) purchased by the Tate in 1972.  
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Equivalent VIII (1966) 
Firebricks, 120-unit rectangular solid  
12.8 x 68.5 x 229 
by Carl Andre 
 
Tate Archive. (2003). Equivalent VIII, Installation view. [Medium; Photograph]. Retrieved from 
http://www2.tate.org.uk/archivejourneys/historyhtml/people_public.htm 
Exception to copyright: Section ss40, 103C, Exception, Research or Study. 
 
Figure 38:  Equivalent VIII (1966) by Carl Andre 
 
Commonly and critically referred to as the ‘The Bricks’ (Figure 38), the 
sculpture, made from “120 firebricks arranged in a rectangular formation” (Tate 
Archive, 2003, para. 3) became “one of the great modern-art furors” 
(Sivasathan, 2011, n.p.) in Britain in the 1970s. Intense ridicule surrounded the 
work and, more ferociously, the Tate was strongly criticised for “being conned 
into buying a ‘pile of bricks’” (Tate Archive, 200, para. 5.) (Fiqure 39).  
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Evening Post, Luton. (1976). What a load of . . . art work Bob. [Press cutting]. Retrieved from 
http://www3.tate.org.uk/research/researchservices/archive/showcase/item.jsp?item=1580 
Exception to copyright: Section ss40, 103C, Exception, Research or Study. 
 
Figure 39:  Newspaper article demonstrating controversy caused by ‘The Bricks’ 
 
Andre is said to have described the sculpture as conveying the sensation of  
“wading in bricks” and of being like “stepping from water of one depth to water 
of another depth” (para. 4). But the general public could not achieve his 
perception and failed to see any creativity in Equivalent VIII (1966), some 
believing that anyone with access to bricks could have made the sculpture 
themselves and pocketed the 2000 plus pounds the Tate paid for the work 
(Sivasathan, 2011). The purchase of the Minimalist work, however, was 
defended by others who recognised Andre “as an important artist… arguing 
that the Tate ha[d] to be adventurous in order to remain a major player in the 
international contemporary art world” (Tate Archive, 2003, para. 5). Equivalent 
VIII (1966), has since “become one of the best-known pieces of modern art in 
[the Tate’s] collection” (Sivasathan, 2011, para. 11), mostly because of its 
reputation.  
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A similar example, closer to home, was the purchase of Jackson Pollock’s 
Blue Poles: Number 11 (1952) (Figure 40). Purchased by the National Gallery 
of Australia in 1973, the “monumental abstract painting” acquired by then 
Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, was purchased for the record price of 1.3 
million Australian dollars (Heanue, 2012). The high price paid for what 
appeared to be a whole lot of paint splatters, and rumours that the work was 
developed “as a drunken collaboration between Pollock and other artists” 
(White, n.d., para. 3) fuelled public outrage, which led to a political and media 
scandal. Thankfully, the purchase has paid off as the painting has become one 
of Pollock’s most famous works and is considered to be one of the Australian 
National Gallery’s most major and valued paintings. 
 
 
 
 
Blue poles, Number 11 (1952) 
Jackson Pollock 
oil, enamel, aluminium paint, glass on canvas 
212.1 h x 488.9 w cm   
 
Pollock, J. (1952). Blue poles, Number 11. [Medium: Painting] Retrieved from 
http://www.ngv.vic.gov.au/whats-on/exhibitions/exhibitions/jackson-pollock 
Exception to copyright: Section ss40, 103C, Exception, Research or Study. 
 
Figure 40:  Blue Poles, Number 11 (1952) by Jackson Pollock 
 
 
However, in an ironic twist there is now a tendency amongst some critics to 
devalue works that are deemed kitsch—for some traditionalists a pile of bricks 
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like Andre’s (1966) and paint splatters similar to Pollock’s (1952) would in fact 
be considered a higher form of art than an intricate kitsch counterpart. 
Certainly when compared to other forms of art and even first-degree kitsch, 
second-degree kitsch works could easily be mistaken for a devalued icon—
particularly as second-degree kitsch is more often than not accompanied by a 
high level of irony or humour. Thankfully, it would appear, that most critics of 
modern contemporary art are these days familiar with kitsch aesthetics, even if 
they are unfamiliar with contemporary theories on kitsch. For these critics, a 
second-degree kitsch reading of a work by no means demotes a work of art to 
‘less than’ or ‘low art’ when compared to traditional forms of ‘high art’ and 
other forms of kitsch.  
 
I argue that because of the homeliness and easy visual recognition associated 
with the context, construction and articulation of the communicative capacity of 
kitsch, particularly second-degree kitsch—an audience is easily able relate to 
kitsch works of art. This has been demonstrated in the examples of Koons’ 
Celebration exhibition (1994‒2008) (Section 2), Murakami’s bags for Louis 
Vuitton (Section 5) and my works Snow Domes and Dream Spheres (2009), 
The Aquarium (2009), Budgietopia (2009‒2013) and Jesus (2010). The snow 
domes (Figures 27, 28 and 29) for example encapsulated a variety of different 
objects, some of which were inexpensive second-degree kitsch trinkets and 
knick-knacks, and others, which were quite valuable first degree-kitsch. Yet, 
once housed within a glass dome, the value of the objects seemed to shift. 
Constructed as part of a snow dome, the worth of the objects appeared to level 
and take on a unanimous second-degree value. Surrounded by floating glitter 
the communicative capacity of the objects, now within the domes, also shifted 
making the objects more easily accessible to the audience. The dome 
developed as a memorial to the Golden Retriever ‘Sugar’ for example, for most 
viewers was simply a cute dog in a bubble, instead of holding the first-degree 
altar like status the objects represented to Sugar’s owner. 
 
This is a view supported by Binkley (2000) who argues that kitsch “preserves a 
unique aesthetic sensibility that spurns creativity per se while it endorses a 
repetition of the familiar and a grounding in an affirmation of the everyday” (p. 
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134). I agree with Binkley that the affirmative grounding of kitsch within the 
everyday is analogous to the “taste of necessity”, described by Pierre Bourdieu 
(1984) as “an aesthetic expression that endorses the sense of conventionality, 
rhythm and meter of aesthetic forms, and their embeddedness in daily life” (p. 
371). I contend that kitsch art is much less likely to be met with the type of 
criticism that surrounded works like Equivalent VIII (Andre, 1966) and Blue 
Poles, Number 11 (Pollock, 1952) because it can be developed in a manner 
that is easier for an audience to digest. For kitsch as Binkley (2000) has 
observed, “reduces the complexity, desperation and paradox of human 
experience to simple sentiment, replacing the novelty of a revealed deeper 
meaning” (p. 145).  
 
It must, however, be stressed that the creative freedom second-degree kitsch 
affords the artist by no means ‘dumbs down’, or excludes, a complex 
theoretical underpinning to a work. The works developed throughout this 
research—including The Aquarium (2009), which is critically examined below 
through the lens of Olalquiaga’s three-degrees of kitsch—are highly 
theoretical. It simply means that by acknowledging the presence of second-
degree kitsch within the communicative function of my artworks, I am 
recognising the connection to sentiment, which creates the lightness and 
accessibility to a work of art within a second-degree kitsch construct. Second-
degree kitsch, unlike first and third-degree kitsch, and other frameworks for 
assessing art, offers an audience an uncomplicated entry point. By connecting 
with an audience through sentiment, a work of art like The Aquarium (2009) for 
example, can be freed of the complex analysis of academic art and over-
ambitious artists, even if just for a brief moment in time. It allows the viewer the 
option, even if only initially, to put aside the signifying and/or use value 
associated with other analyses of art, and also kitsch, and simply enjoy (or not) 
the work.  
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5.3 Olalquiaga’s Third-Degree Kitsch 
 
Third-degree kitsch has a different cultural place. As a visual artist and self-
confessed kitsch aficionado of the first-degree, my praxis is fundamentally 
linked to Olalquiaga’s notion of third-degree kitsch. Creating an outlet for the 
artist, third-degree kitsch allows great scope to explore the dynamics of 
everyday life and develop new artworks. According to Olalquiaga, the key role 
of third-degree kitsch is the “legitimisation of [kitsch’s] signifying and visual 
attributes by the institutionally authorised agency of artists” (pp. 46-47). 
Legitimisation is therefore achieved by the artist through appropriation and 
combining first and second-degree kitsch to create hybrid works of art that can 
create new or simulated experiences (Olalquiaga, 1992). 
 
 
 
The Guardian. (2006). Jeff Koons with Cracked Egg (Blue) [Photograph]. (Photographer Eamonn 
McCabe). Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2006/nov/11/art.art 
Exception to copyright: Section ss40, 103C, Exception, Research or Study. 
 
Figure 41:  Example of third-degree kitsch: Jeff Koons with Cracked Egg (Blue) 
(2006) 
 
 
The American artist Jeff Koons has been nicknamed “The King of Kitsch” 
(Saad, 2010; Jones, 2009) and his work fits well with the notion of third-degree 
kitsch. Cracked Egg (1994‒2006) (Figure 41) from Koons’ body of work, 
Celebration (1994‒2008) “is about Easter, birth and rebirth, in art-historical 
terms the Botticelli Venus”, Koons stated in an interview with art critic Gordon 
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Burns for the Guardian UK newspaper (2006, para. 10). Burns quotes Koons 
as saying that he wanted the works from Celebration to be “a support system 
for people to feel good about themselves, to have their life be as enriching as 
possible, to make them feel secure” (2006, para. 9). Although Koons ironically 
denies that his work is kitsch, his quote, in my view, is an almost perfect 
assessment of how kitsch works.  
 
Cracked Egg (1994‒2006) meets the criteria of third-degree kitsch, recycling 
the egg through the various degrees of kitsch. From a first-degree reading as 
an icon of spiritual symbolism, the egg as Koons stated is about “Easter, birth 
and rebirth” (2006, para. 10). However, there is a charming, yet sad irony here. 
The Celebration series (1994‒2008), of which Cracked Egg (1994‒2006) is a 
part, was initially inspired by the simple shapes of Koon’s first child, Ludwig’s, 
toys. Koons had set out to make art to which a small child could relate (Jones, 
2009). However, after the breakdown of his marriage and the custody battle 
that ensued over his now-estranged teenage son, Koons was making art about 
his own personal pain. In an interview with journalist Jonathon Jones, Koons, 
spoke of this commenting: 
 
I was trying to make art that my son could look to in the future and 
would realise I was thinking about him very much during these times… 
that he can look and see my dad’s thinking about me, but to also embed 
in these things something that is bigger than all of us. (Jones, 2009,  
p. 4) 
 
I am not certain as to what Koons meant when remarking that he hoped to 
have embedded ‘something bigger than us all’ in the works developed for 
Celebration (1994‒2008)—perhaps his comment about Cracked Egg 
(1994‒2006) being about “Easter, birth and rebirth” alludes to God or a higher 
power of some kind. I would however, assert that within an analysis of 
contemporary kitsch, Cracked Egg (1994‒2006) exposed a softer, more 
vulnerable part of Koons that had not yet been publicly seen in his work, 
revealing one of the unique ways that kitsch operates.  
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As a second-degree reading, the normally fragile egg is recreated in shiny blue 
stainless steel in which you can see your reflection and those of others 
passing by. The perfect form of the egg is cracked and broken, the top of the 
egg lying on the ground. Broken, the egg is much more than a devalued icon. 
While the work could have been about rebirth, it is about the very opposite: 
Celebration (1994‒2008), and Cracked Egg (1994‒2006) were “joyous 
lamentations; broken mirrors to a world losing touch with its loved ones” 
(Jones, 2009). Koons’ Cracked Egg (1994‒2006) is a symbol with its own 
iconic meanings, which relate to first and second-degree kitsch, but as an 
artwork, this egg is attached to new and very personal ideas. As a third-degree 
object, the egg has been recycled by Koons, reinvested with new sets of 
meanings, resulting in a work of art that hybridises the three degrees of kitsch.  
 
 
5.4 Summary of Olalquiaga’s Three-Degrees of Kitsch  
 
To summarise the three-degrees of kitsch, it can be argued that each degree 
addresses the confusion in defining kitsch objects in various ways: first-degree 
kitsch and the aficionado relate to the collection and possession of objects that 
still maintain their use value; second-degree kitsch, through the consumption 
of commodified goods; and third-degree kitsch, by appropriating and 
combining first and second-degree kitsch to create hybrid works of art that can 
create new, or simulated experiences (Olalquiaga, 1992). I would suggest that 
through an understanding of the system of three degrees, it becomes easier to 
establish the type of things that constitute kitsch. This, in turn, can help to 
develop a clearer understanding of the context of kitsch interpreted throughout 
this exegesis and how it relates to my practice.  
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6. An Analysis of The Aquarium Within a Framework of 
Olalquiaga’s Three-Degrees of Kitsch  
 
 
 
 
 
The Aquarium (2009) 
(Video Still) 
Glass, steel, wood, hot pink gravel, and mixed media 
3.5 x 2.5 x 2.4 
 
Figure 42:  The Aquarium (2009) exhibited at Spectrum (2009) 
 
 
 
This reflexive analysis of The Aquarium (2009) (Figure 42 above, also 
Appendix 1: The Aquarium and Appendix 2, Section 2), the major work 
undertaken during my doctoral research, demonstrates how I have utilised the 
visual and signifying attributes of Olalquiaga’s (1992) three-degrees of kitsch 
within my creative praxis. Particular attention is paid to third-degree kitsch 
(1992), which is concerned with “the legitimization of [kitsch’s] signifying and 
visual attributes by the institutionally authorized agency of artists” (pp. 46‒47). 
As already mentioned, there are multiple classifications of kitsch at play in all 
of the works developed throughout this research, beyond Olalquiaga’s three-
degree’s of kitsch. So as to establish a rigorous examination of each theory, 
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within this praxis, various different aspects of each theory have been applied to 
the assessment of the individual art works. The Aquarium (2009) is therefore 
by no means a literal expression of Olalquiaga’s three-degrees of kitsch, 
though it is an artwork in which these degrees of kitsch are highly prevalent. 
 
  
6.1 The Aquarium and Olalquiaga’s Three-Degrees of Kitsch 
 
According to Olalquiaga, third-degree kitsch as expressed by an artist is able 
to legitimise kitsch through a process of appropriation and also by combining 
first and second-degree kitsch to create hybridised works of art. I concur with 
Olalquiaga that through this process the artist is able to create new and/or 
simulated experiences (1992) within their work. It is in this way that third-
degree kitsch is enmeshed in my creative praxis, as I consider the hybrid 
aspects of third-degree kitsch to be fundamental characteristics within it. By 
incorporating the various degrees of kitsch within a third-degree construct I am 
able to create new and simulated experiences, in which a creative work moves 
beyond being just an illustrated idea to a reflexive amalgam of the theories 
examined within this research; The Aquarium (2009) as third-degree kitsch 
examines the central focus of this research. That is, how the sensory affect of 
sentimentality imbued on the kitsch experiences, possessions and material 
objects that people covet and collect, offers a way of the individual moving 
from disembeddedness to a state of being re-embedded. “How people make 
sense of the world through artefacts” (Attfield, 2006, p. 201) and everyday 
objects, and how the sensory affect of sentimentality on connections to 
possessions that are kitsch function within the lifeworld. 
 
The analysis that follows details the attributes of first and second-degree kitsch 
evident in The Aquarium (2009), after which the work is examined within a 
third-degree construct.  
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6.2 The Aquarium as a First-Degree Construct 
 
The Aquarium (2009) (Figure 43 and Appendix 2, Section 2) as a first-degree 
construct privileges the perception of reality, meaning that what The Aquarium 
(2009) represents for the viewer, is privileged above the kitschness of the work 
alone. From this perspective, although obviously an artificially constructed 
environment that has “no validity in and of itself” (Olalquiaga, 1992, p. 42), The 
Aquarium (2009), and my role as the mermaid, are considered to “embody the 
spirits” (p. 42) represented—that is the spirit of a ‘real’ mermaid with ‘real’ 
mermaid paraphernalia, inhabiting a ‘real’ mermaid world. The Aquarium 
(2009) as a first-degree kitsch construct, the relationship between the ‘object’ 
(the aquarium and mermaid) and ‘user’ (the viewer or audience), “is 
immediate, one of genuine belief” (p. 42). From this perspective, the difference 
between reality and representation in this installation, although obvious is 
effectively collapsed (Olalquiaga, 1992), because as a first-degree construct, 
The Aquarium (2009) installation finds its validity as a substitute for the real 
thing and not just for its kitschness.  
 
The manner in which The Aquarium (2009), and my role as a mermaid, were 
perceived as a substitute for a real mermaid could not have been more 
apparent than in the actions of several of the children who returned several 
times to visit the work. One small girl returned with a mermaid doll, which she 
showed me through the glass. She then held a mermaid picture she had drawn 
against the aquarium wall before asking her mother to place it in a bottle and 
deposit it in the tank. Another, in a mermaid costume, brought along a gift of 
green jelly that had been set in a mermaid shaped mould and displayed on a 
tray. There were also two other small children that I recognised as having 
visited at least half a dozen times each throughout the residency. During their 
visits, they would sit and watch my every move, delighting in any small gesture 
I made. I remember one of them visiting on a day when I was taking a nap on 
the aquarium’s pink gravel floor. The expression on his face was one of 
obvious disappointment when I was at first unresponsive to his attempts at 
gaining my attention. His reaction seemed to be similar to the emotions that 
 
 
 
 
103 
one would experience if they went to visit Father Christmas only to find he 
wasn’t really interested in knowing what you wanted for Christmas present. 
 
I would argue that for these children, “the relationship between object and user 
[was] immediate, one of genuine belief” (Olalquiaga, 1992, p. 42). For the 
children The Aquarium (2009) and my role as the mermaid strongly, if not 
completely, “embod[ied] the spirit [ . . . ]” (p.42) of the mermaid I was 
representing. For these children there seemed to be no doubt that I was a 
‘real’ mermaid with ‘real’ mermaid paraphernalia, inhabiting a ‘real’ mermaid 
world. I argue that, for these children, the difference between representation 
and reality that Olalquiaga (1992) describes as the dominant features of first-
degrees kitsch seemed clear. The Aquarium (2009) and my role as a mermaid 
had validity as a substitute for the real thing, rather than just for its kitschness, 
and for what it represented to the children. The manner in which these children 
interacted with The Aquarium (2009) in my view validated how kitsch operates 
within a first-degree kitsch construct.  
 
 
6.3 First-Degree Objects within The Aquarium 
 
The types of first-degree objects, things that Binkley (2000) would likely refer 
to as ‘ornamental statuary’; ‘chachkas’ (an inexpensive, showy trinket); and 
‘manufactured sentimental knickknacks’, are bountiful within The Aquarium 
(2009). The more obvious included: a replica bust of Michelangelo’s David; 
toppled Grecian style pillars styled as if to be straight from the lost city of 
Atlantis; ornate furniture; snow domes; golden seashells; crystal bottles and 
vases; silverware; pearls, diamonds and other jewels. Objects of the first-
degree also featured, those that could be best described as modern 
consumerist kitsch including my ‘shell’ phone; a shell-incrusted laptop; 
opalescent glazed ornaments (Figure 43, below); cosmetics and other beauty 
products. There was also a collection of shell- 
encrusted objects: dolls; picture frames; jewellery boxes; and other 
knickknacks that I would decorate each day as part of my performance. 
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Figure 43:  First-degree kitsch objects in The Aquarium (2009) 
 
It could, however, be argued that from Olalquiaga’s (1992) perspective these 
objects would acquire a more intense level of sentimentality than Binkley 
(2000) would ascribe. For Olalquiaga (1992), as first-degree objects, the 
kitschness of these items alone would be secondary to what the objects 
themselves represented. From this perspective, the interactions of the children 
with The Aquarium (2009), which appeared “immediate” and of “genuine 
belief” (Olalquiaga, 1992, p. 42.), illustrated that the items placed within the 
aquarium were transformed from mere kitsch objects into ‘iconic’ mermaid 
treasure and paraphernalia.  
 
I assert that analysed within a first-degree kitsch framework, there is a 
fascinating parallel between the mythical character of Disney’s The Little 
Mermaid (1989), Ariel, with her collection of deep-sea treasures and the real 
life example of Janet Williams and her collection of British Royal Family 
paraphernalia (Section 5.1.3, Figures 34, 35 and 36 above) that relates to how 
I aimed to communicate kitsch to audiences of The Aquarium (2009).  
 
Not only are Ariel and Janet Williams’ collections—and interactions with these 
collections—both archetypal examples of how first-degree kitsch operates in 
contemporary life, they both utilise first-degree kitsch as a tool to either remain 
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or become ‘re-embedded’ (Giddens, 1991; Binkley, 2000). Where Ariel from 
The Little Mermaid (1989) collects her treasures through a deep-seated 
fascination for life on land and later as she laments the loss of her beloved 
prince1 (Disney, 1989), Janet’s “sentimental attachment to all things Brit and 
Royal” (O’Brien, 2011) expounds her passionate connection to her British 
roots. The sensory affect displayed by these examples is precisely this level of 
intense fascination, sentimental attachment, passion and connection to kitsch 
that I aimed to communicate in The Aquarium (2009) installation and 
residency. 
 
In my view, Ariel and Janet’s collections of kitsch highlight a deep-seated 
connection to “symbolic value statements” and “sentimentality” (Olalquiaga, 
1992; Binkley, 2000) that help people to reinforce their identity—how they 
communicate their passions and beliefs and remain embedded within a world 
that communicates to their own unique emotional needs. By surrounding 
themselves with objects to which they affix intense sentimental attachments, 
The Little Mermaid (2009) and Janet Williams exemplify the embedding nature 
of kitsch in contemporary life. I sought to emulate these qualities within The 
Aquarium (2009) by filling it with an abundant collection of ornaments and 
mermaid paraphernalia that I continued to add to. I kept a treasure chest within 
the tank laden with seashells and other knickknacks and trinkets.  
 
Performatively (as demonstrated in the accompanying DVD, titled Appendix 1: 
The Aquarium), I spent several hours throughout each day decorating, and 
redecorating, the aquarium with objects from the trunk. I continually 
rearranged, polished, admired and acted adoringly toward the treasures. I did 
this in a manner in which I imagined The Little Mermaid (1989) and Janet 
Williams might interact with their collections if alone in their homes (or 
underwater cave). As I interacted with each item, I worked at showing a range 
of emotions—intense happiness, great sorrow, love, worry, serenity or 
contentment for example. I held some of the objects as though they were my 
most precious and fragile possessions and others light-heartedly. As I did not 
                                            
1 Unlike the original story of The Little Mermaid by Andersen (1837) the Disney (1989) version 
of The Little Mermaid sees her marry Prince Eric. 
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speak to the audience, I was able to communicate with them through these 
acts.  
 
The archetypal example of first-degree kitsch exhibited in Disney’s version of 
The Little Mermaid (1989) and Janet Williams’ collection of British Royalty 
accoutrements are undoubtedly more extreme examples of first-degree kitsch. 
As with The Aquarium (2009) the excessive affective investments kitsch 
invites, as is the case with these examples, are what makes them so 
accessible to an audience. A viewer is likely to be able to relate to one, if not 
several, of the objects as being like their own, or as being similar to a relative 
or friend’s possession. This kind of accessibility, that is the everyday, mass-
produced nature of the objects—their ubiquity—is in my view an invaluable tool 
within my praxis. 
 
 
6.4 The Aquarium, the Kitsch Aficionado and First-Degree 
Kitsch 
 
For some viewers of The Aquarium (2009), the iconic validity of first-degree 
kitsch may be less accessible. For these spectators the work is more likely to 
be seen through the lens of the “kitsch aficionado” (Olalquiaga, 1992). As an 
aficionado, a viewer of the work would place greater importance on the 
feelings of sentimentality and nostalgia evoked by the work than on what the 
kitsch objects represented. An aficionado might, for example, adore the work 
for it excess and garishness. They might indulge in the fantasy world of The 
Aquarium (2009) and of being a mermaid, but would not go as far as a true 
first-degree believer—as for a true first-degree believer of kitsch The 
Aquarium (2009) would have to embody the spirit of a real mermaid world. 
 
The intensity of connection an aficionado could have to The Aquarium (2009), 
for example, should not be underestimated. The aficionado’s passion for first-
degree kitsch is comparable in magnitude to that of true lovers of kitsch in the 
first-degree. However, an aficionado’s attachment to The Aquarium (2009) 
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would come from their delight in the kitschness of the work, rather than an 
investment in the iconic values of the mermaid or of the treasures within The 
Aquarium (2009). Although there is an obvious difference between the 
aficionado and a true believer of kitsch in the first-degree, despite their 
differences, I concur with Olalquiaga (1992) that they both “familiarize the 
ungraspable—eternity, goodness, evil” and do so while “tactically maintaining” 
intense but varying levels of “hierarchical distinction between realities and 
representation” (pp. 44‒45). Because of this commonality, it is difficult as the 
artist-researcher to differentiate between the responses of a true first-degree 
believer and an aficionado within an audience—particularly as I was confined 
within the walls of the aquarium. Additionally, to communicate verbally with the 
audience would have meant breaking character and therefore shattering the 
kitsch experience.  
 
One of the methods by which I was able to tell a kitsch aficionado from a true 
follower of first-degree kitsch was by discreetly watching as people purchased 
items from the collection of The Aquarium (2009) giftware and commemorative 
memorabilia for sale in the gallery shop. The objects on sale included some 
traditionally mass-produced objects like postcards, snow domes and key 
chains that incorporated a series of photos of the installation and of myself in 
different mermaid suits. There were also more unique, hand-made objects for 
sale that included shell-encrusted mermaid dolls, photo frames and trinket 
dishes that I would decorate whilst in the aquarium each day. There were also 
limited edition commemorative plates, coffee cups and prints available.  
 
From my perspective, it appeared that a follower of first-degree kitsch would 
be most likely to purchase, even ‘invest’, in the more unique, handmade 
objects as well as the limited edition commemorative objects that were on 
sale. Several of these followers made requests that the work be signed so to 
add to its authenticity. The aficionado, alternatively, appeared generally to 
favour the mass-produced style of objects on sale over the unique and 
handmade items (unless of course they ‘just loved’ something for its 
kitschness). I assert that this was most likely because the aficionado wanted 
to maintain a memory or sentimental attachment that they associated with the 
 
 
 
 
108 
work, a requirement most easily fulfilled by a souvenir. Thus, what the work 
more broadly represented, that is its iconic value, was less important to them.  
 
Described in the following section are the types of viewers who visited the gift 
shop and appeared closely aligned to kitsch within a second-degree 
construct—loving the work for its ‘quirkiness’ and ironic, rather than iconic, 
value. The following story illustrates my affiliation to first-degree kitsch: I can 
still feel the teeth-clenching shock, on hearing a shriek from a woman who had 
been skylarking in the gallery with one of the most ornate and beautiful 
mermaid dolls I had decorated. I can still hear the sound of smashing shells as 
I watched my treasured creation slip from her hands, slam onto the concrete 
floor, and shatter into hundreds of tiny pieces. This was followed by raucous 
laughter as the woman exclaimed, “Oh my God, that doll, was like, insane”. 
Thankfully, it had already been paid for. 
 
 
6.5 The Aquarium as a Second-Degree Construct 
 
Within a second-degree or ‘neo-kitsch’ reading of The Aquarium (2009) 
analysis is focused solely on what the work represents. This is in contrast to 
first-degree kitsch where there is “a hierarchical distinction between reality and 
representation” (Olalquiaga, 1992, p. 45). Because of second-degree kitsch’s 
ability to represent itself, it is said to defamiliarise our understanding of reality. 
Therefore, an object is said to be ‘real’ in and of itself, and is not considered to 
be a copy. Focus is placed on what the object, or in this case The Aquarium 
(2009), represents and it is not considered to be a stand-in or representation of 
anything else. My role as a mermaid, for example, would not be considered to 
represent Ariel (Andersen, 1837; Disney, 1989), or the incarnation of any other 
mermaid. Within a second-degree reading, I am simply a mermaid. Second-
degree kitsch is what it is, and it is kitsch for the sake of being kitsch. Freed of 
the sentimental baggage and emotional intensity of a first-degree reading, a 
neo-kitsch analysis of The Aquarium (2009) sees the kitsch object valued 
specifically for its “iconicity and quality as a sign” (Olalquiaga, 1992, p. 45). 
 
 
 
 
109 
 
Without oversimplifying a complex theory, or invoking obvious links to 
consumerism and commodification, within the parameters of a second-degree 
construct the viewer of The Aquarium (2009) can take in the work without 
being bogged down by the complexities of academic analysis. As second-
degree kitsch, The Aquarium (2009) can be loved, or hated, for the fun it 
represents, its quirkiness, its pinkness, its kitchness, even irony—there is, after 
all, a great deal of humour and irony in this work. The reality of a woman, 
spending a month inside a glass box in a lycra mermaid suit, surrounded by a 
swathe of pink gravel in the name of research could easily be viewed as 
bizarre or humorous. Second-degree kitsch allows works of art like The 
Aquarium (2009) not be taken too seriously, to be loved, or hated, just for what 
they are.  
 
However from the second-degree kitsch perspective The Aquarium (2009) is 
rarely, if ever, associated with the intense attachment felt by lovers of first-
degree kitsch or the kitsch aficionado. Thus, as a second-degree kitsch 
construct, The Aquarium (2009) is more likely to be appreciated on a 
superficial level. Olalquiaga states, “second-degree kitsch exists only for 
transaction, to pass from hand to hand, and in this lack of possessing subject 
lies its ultimate alienation and perishability” (1992, p. 45). This was the case in 
the example of the woman who had been skylarking in the gallery with the 
mermaid doll she had purchased. The doll appeared to have been bought as a 
perishable commodity—for fun, for its quirkiness. From my perspective, the 
mermaid doll was a work of art, a first-degree object, to be treasured and 
handled with great care. But my observation of the woman’s interaction with 
the mermaid doll demonstrated an extreme example of a relationship to 
second-degree kitsch. The doll was a commodified good, a toy of minimal 
importance to her and of little, if any, sentimental significance. It was 
perishable, to be consumed and then discarded. 
 
Second-degree kitsch can be a positive and powerful communication tool for 
the artist, a tool that I place great value within my praxis, as demonstrated in 
The Aquarium (2009) installation. Through reflexive analysis it is apparent that 
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The Aquarium (2009) can be enjoyed in a more relaxed manner within the 
parameters of a second-degree reading. It can be, and was, enjoyed by its 
audience simply for the colourful, cheery, humorous and ironic scenario it 
presented. Although viewers did have mixed experiences and relationships to 
the work, it was not necessary for them to have a philosophical or technical 
understanding of art to engage with The Aquarium (2009). As demonstrated 
through the viewers’ responses, engaging with the work generally made 
people feel good, an outcome that I assert is largely connected to the open, 
simple and honest attributes that second-degree kitsch offers an audience. 
The sense of freedom to create that second-degree kitsch affords the artist, is 
a valuable communication tool.  
 
 
6.6 The Aquarium as a Third-Degree Kitsch Construct 
 
Third-degree kitsch has proved to be an exciting paradigm to explore within my 
praxis. As discussed in Section 5.3, Olalquiaga describes the fundamental role 
of third-degree kitsch to be the “legitimisation of [kitsch’s] signifying and visual 
attributes by the institutionally authorised agency of artists” (pp. 46‒47). As my 
role as a mermaid and much of the imagery that makes up The Aquarium 
(2009) installation demonstrate, “a new social place” was developed, in which 
“revaluation takes place through the multifarious recycling of iconography” (p. 
47). Through this lens, a work like The Aquarium (2009) is legitimised firstly 
through ‘appropriation’ or borrowing, and secondly by the manner in which first 
and second-degree kitsch are combined to create ‘new’, or ‘hybridised’, 
‘simulated experiences’ and ‘products’ (Olalquiaga, 1992). 
 
From the outset of this research, my aim was to examine the ways in which 
kitsch can create experiences that re-embed the viewer and how to facilitate 
the re-embedding nature of kitsch within my artwork. As my research 
progressed, and my understanding of kitsch grew, I was continually looking for 
ways to reflexively apply my findings within my creative work. Drawing on 
examples of kitsch from wide-reaching fields of discourse and popular culture 
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was a conscious decision and is an important aspect of this research. As 
discussed in detail in Section 2, I have challenged traditional classifications of 
kitsch as low class and bad taste (Greenberg, 1961; Adorno & Horkheimer, 
1991; Calinescu, 1987; Broch, 1955; Dorfles, 1969), in favour of a holistic view 
of kitsch (as demonstrated in Section 2.3-2.8) as native to ‘all’ levels of society, 
and possible to analyse as both good and/or bad taste (Binkley, 2000; Attfield, 
2006; Olalquiaga, 1992, 1998).  
 
With my new classification of kitsch came a new creative challenge as I aimed 
to ensure that my work used iconography that reflected kitsch in a holistic 
manner, which did not favour or discriminate against specific groups or classes 
within society (i.e., specific hierarchy, taste group, high or low for example).  
I had little difficulty identifying first and second-degree kitsch objects and 
scenarios to incorporate in my work but finding a way to present contemporary 
kitsch that would not discriminate or glorify any particular taste, group or 
hierarchy was a challenge. I was excited to discover Disney’s version of The 
Little Mermaid (2009), as I realised that by taking on a non-human role, I would 
be able to avoid many of these pitfalls.  
 
Philosophically, rather than aesthetically, the most obvious example of 
“appropriation” or borrowing—that Olalquiaga describes as a feature of third-
degree kitsch—evident in The Aquarium (2009), is the influence of Disney’s 
version of The Little Mermaid (1989). The signifying attributes that I drew on 
from this example include: the mermaid as an easily recognisable and 
unintimidating icon; The Little Mermaid’s (1989) sentimental attachment 
(nostalgic and/or melancholic) and symbolic connection to, and consumption 
of, commodified goods; and the ‘embedding’ nature of kitsch (Binkley, 2000). 
On completion of the work there were visual echoes that related to Disney’s 
version of The Little Mermaid (2009). These included some of my treasure—
silverware, crystal, and fine china for example, and also some of the 
behaviours acted out in my performances. However, through the reflexive 
process of developing The Aquarium (2009), and from having combined so 
many aspects of first and second-degree kitsch in the work, traces of The Little 
Mermaid (2009) were barely visible once the work had been made. Thus, 
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undoubtedly, the ‘new’, attributes to ‘hybridised’, ‘simulated experiences’ and 
‘products’ (1992) that Olalquiaga attributes to the artist who produces a third-
degree kitsch construct, were revealed. 
 
Judy Attfield’s (2006) statement that “kitsch presents a particularly intriguing 
group of physical objects with which to explore how people make sense of the 
world through artifacts” (p. 201), and Jeff Koons’ assertion that he wanted 
Celebration (1994‒2008) to be “a support system for people to feel good about 
themselves, to have their life be as enriching as possible, to make them feel 
secure” (Burns, 2006, para. 9) are important references, as combined, they 
encapsulate how I consider kitsch operates and how I desire my work to be 
received. Attfield and Koons’ statements place emphasis on the effect of art 
and kitsch rather than on the aesthetic alone.  
 
The ambition of my artwork has been to demonstrate how sentimental 
attachment to kitsch objects helps to give people a sense of who they are and 
who they value being—how they made sense of their own worlds, as Attfield’s 
statement suggests that kitsch does. Koons, “The King of Kitsch[‘s]” (Saad, 
2010; Jones, 2009), statement about celebration reinforces Attfield’s position, 
highlighting the way in which humans are able to find a sense of comfort 
through possessions and recognisable, familiar icons, like those used by 
Koons in Celebration (1994‒2008). By incorporating familiar objects and 
iconography in The Aquarium (2009) installation and residency—in an 
obviously simulated or artificial environment—I created experiences for the 
audience that demonstrated the workings of kitsch, and that were familiar and 
therefore easily recognisable and accessible: and that engendered comfort 
and safety, melancholy and nostalgia, memory, fantasy and irony. Through the 
reflexive process undertaken within my creative praxis, and the multi-faceted 
recycling process that leads to third-degree kitsch evident in The Aquarium 
(2009), I aimed to demonstrate that the sensory affect of sentimentality on 
connections to possessions and material objects that contemporary kitsch 
offers is shared across cultures and societies. 
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7. Binkley and the Repetitive Features of Kitsch  
 
 
My definitions of classifying kitsch, as mentioned earlier, are established using 
Olalquiaga’s notion of ‘three-degrees of kitsch’ (1992) and Binkley’s concept of 
‘kitsch as a repetitive system’ (2000). These two systems of understanding 
kitsch are best considered as operating alongside each other, in parallel rather 
than in tandem. 
 
Binkley (2000) argues “for a uniquely kitsch aesthetic that employs the 
thematics of repetition, imitation and emulation as a distinct aesthetic style” 
(p.131). As discussed, Binkley (2000) identifies the repetitive qualities of kitsch 
as addressing the problem of disembeddedness, felt in modernity, by working 
to re-embed consumers and shore up stocks of ontological security, a view 
that this research strongly supports.  
 
I argue that embeddedness is a fundamental aspect of theories of kitsch, a 
view that is drawn from Binkley’s argument. This is due to kitsch’s rhythm of 
“repetition, imitation and emulation” (Binkley, p. 131), which broadly represents 
the nature of pre-modern societies, before time and space were distanciated 
from place (Giddens, 1991). In other words, kitsch’s repetition represents a 
way of life in which “existential questions and a sense of freedom and 
creativity of human action” were “bracketed by reassuring traditions and 
habits” (p.135). Kitsch is a system that, in distinct contrast to disembedded 
autonomy and singularity, is able to emulate distinct modes of aesthetic 
repetition and imitation. The repetitive qualities of kitsch can therefore be used 
as a means of examining the disembeddedness (Giddens, 1991) that is 
characteristic of modern life.  
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7.1 The Three Features of the Repetitive Quality of Kitsch 
 
Binkley (2000) has identified three distinctive ways “in which kitsch 
aestheticizes repetition” (p. 142). First, is “kitsch’s emulation of other cultural 
products” (p. 142). This kind of kitsch “often copies the signs of class status” 
(p. 142), although it can also be observed emulating “the rustic qualities of 
vanishing folk traditions or the exotic products of non western cultures” (p. 
142). Second, is kitsch as a ‘decorative feature’ associated with places like the 
home or the office. As a decorative feature kitsch achieves “an aestheticization 
of the everyday, and the repetitive, imitative habits this implies” (p. 142). I 
agree with Binkley that this type of kitsch taste is generally seen in numerous 
“home-bound objects of mundane pleasure” (2000, p. 142). Such objects, by 
offering “contrived modesty”, provide “comfort” capable of deflecting “any 
significance that might disturb the tranquillity of the patterns and habits, the 
repetitive schemes themselves that constitute the fabric of daily life” (p. 142). 
Third, and most important, is “kitsch’s love for all things sentimental” (Binkley, 
2000, p. 142). This type of sentimental kitsch expresses “a joy in feeling itself” 
whether these feelings are of “elation, sorrow, or fondness” (p. 142), or as 
Binkley describes, a “feeling for feeling” (p. 142). Kitsch sentiment, for Binkley 
“elevates imitation itself to a universal value, emulating in a hackneyed 
fashion, the universal aesthetics of high culture” (p. 142). 
 
In each of the three aspects of kitsch recognised by Binkley (2000) a common 
structure has been identified. That is, kitsch “repeats and imitates what has 
gone before”; “it transforms its proclivity for imitation into frankness and 
sincerity”; and “it fabricates a web of familiarity and comfort” (p. 142). Binkley 
extends his hypothesis to assert that the repetitive style of kitsch “reaches out 
to a humanity whose fundamental essence is imitative”, a view that I do not 
fully support. I contest Binkley’s view of authenticity in relation to the imitative 
nature of kitsch, positing instead a kitsch aesthetic that is often imitative but 
that can also be original. Furthermore, I argue the imitative nature of kitsch 
can be reinvigorated by the individual. Once invested with the individual’s own 
signature and placed within a new context, an original and authentic meaning 
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is formed. Differences aside, I concur with Binkley that kitsch “expresses an 
attitude toward daily life” that invites us to “affirm our true human essence . . .  
taking our place in the rhythm and cadence of familiar time and familiar forms” 
(p. 142). For as Binkley states, “kitsch tucks us in”, at home “in the repetitive 
fabric” of imitative [and in my view also non-imitative] cultural objects, 
producing a sense of belonging in a rhythmic pattern of routinized experience” 
(p. 142). 
  
In the sections that follow, each of the repetitive qualities of kitsch are 
discussed in greater detail. Binkley’s taxonomy is applied to analysis of my 
works; the snow domes Ganesha Glory (2009) and Call Me Golden Sugar 
Britches (2009), Budgietopia (2009‒2013) and The Lotus Pond (2008). 
Additionally, popular culture and real life case studies are discussed, including 
the French rodent-themed hotel La Villa Hamster, Queen Elizabeth II and the 
artist Allison Jackson. 
 
 
7.2 Feature One: Kitsch Emulating Other Cultural Products 
 
The ‘emulation of other cultural products’, according to Binkley (2000) typically 
involves replicating, often clumsily, the most obvious indicators of privilege. 
The types of objects produced under this guise are what Calinescu (1987, p. 
236) would likely describe as having, “formal qualities (material, shape, size, 
etc.)” that “were inappropriate in relation to their cultural content or intention”. 
Examples could be an elaborate garden statue, an ornate water feature or 
Grecian pillars supporting the veranda of a modest suburban home (Figure 
44); a sexy portrait of a scantily clad ‘lady of the house’ posing as a lingerie 
model; a stainless-steel home kitchen designed to look as if it belongs in a 
restaurant; basic cars ‘hotted up’ with spoilers, mag wheels and loud engines 
so that they look and sound like a racing car (Figure 45); volumes of leather-
look bound books displayed but never read; glass cabinets displaying 
collections of crystal and fine china; or a gilt framed Picasso fake in the 
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entrance hall; and certainly Janet Williams, the ‘Royalty Lady’, lounging on her 
sofa with ‘the Queen’s feet’ on her lap.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 44:  Suburban home with Grecian pillars as an example of kitsch emulating 
other cultural products 
 
 
Performance Drive. (2011) Past blast: 1996 VS HSV GTR-S. [Photograph]. Retrieved from 
http://performancedrive.com.au/past-blast-1996-vs-hsv-gts-r/ 
Exception to copyright: Section ss40, 103C, Exception, Research or Study. 
 
Figure 45:  ‘Hotted-up’ car as example of kitsch emulating other cultural products 
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These objects can be categorised as the type of kitsch that emulates other 
cultural products because they faithfully imitate with the “belief that the 
reproduction of an elite style will convey an aesthetic response and 
identification of class equal to that of the original” (Binkley, 2000): preparing 
meals in a commercial look kitchen in a family home will make your food taste 
better; a home with Roman pillars, statues and water features “could actually 
enrich the next family barbeque in the same way that Classical statuary 
enriched the houses of the ancients” (Binkley, p. 143).  
 
Kitsch’s emulation, however, is not limited to levels of high class and status 
alone (Binkley, 2000). It embraces the desire for the ‘exotic’: faux fur throws; it 
also imitates cultural experiences elaborate experience based holidays spent 
living like a ‘local’ for example. The kitsch emulation of other cultural products 
can also be extended to cover ‘tourist kitsch’ (Binkley, 2000) “tourist tat” and 
“modern classics” like a “cooking apron depicting the naked torso of 
Michelangelo” or even underpants with a provocative Leaning Tower of Pisa 
design (Barkham, 2011, para. 7) (Figure 46). 
 
 
 
The Guardian. (2011). A load of pants ... Pisa is clamping down on the trashy side of the tourist trade. 
[Photographer: Fabio Muzzi]. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/travel/2011/aug/31/holiday-
souvenirs-tacky-gifts 
Exception to copyright: Section ss40, 103C, Exception, Research or Study. 
 
Figure 46:  Examples of tourist kitsch 
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Allposters. (n.d.) Figurine of Ayers Rock in a Snow Globe. [Photograph] retrieved from 
http://www.allposters.com.au/-sp/Close-Up-of-a-Figurine-of-Ayers-Rock-in-a-Snow-Globe-
posters_i7146353_.htm 
Xiamen Rising Chance co., Ltd. (n.d.). Sydney Opera House building souvenir. [Photograph]. Retrieved 
from http://xmrc.en.alibaba.com/product/1344237878-
215351374/3d_Sydney_Opera_House_building_souvenir.html 
Exception to copyright: Section ss40, 103C, Exception, Research or Study. 
 
Figure 47:  Examples of kitsch souvenirs of Uluru and the Sydney Opera House 
 
Tourist kitsch also includes souvenirs that preserve traces of exotica as proof 
of an experience. These types of object include miniature figurines of famous 
landmarks like Sydney’s Harbour Bridge and Opera House or Uluru (Figure 47) 
or the Eiffel Tower, and of course, snow domes and dream spheres such as 
those that I developed as part of this research. 
 
 
7.2.1 Ganesha Glory as an Example of Tourist Kitsch and 
Kitsch Emulating Other Cultural Products 
 
Snow domes and dream spheres such as those developed during this 
research are a classic example of tourist kitsch and kitsch “emulating other 
cultural products” (Binkley, 2000). The snow dome Ganesha Glory (2009) for 
example explores the idea of the cultural tourist who collects souvenirs as 
proof of an experience or exotic memory or as Binkley (2000) states, to 
preserve “a trace of exotica to show off to one’s friends” (p. 143). Although 
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the Ganesha ornament was cheap, it was hand painted, and I considered it to 
be more authentic than many of the other souvenirs I had seen. 
 
 
Figure 48:  Ganesha Glory (2009) exhibited at The Moores Building and Gallery, 
Fremantle, Western Australia (2009) 
 
 
Both Binkley (2000) and Callinescu (1997) argue that the erroneous belief 
that emulation betrays is the naive conviction that the aesthetic value of 
exceptional art (and in my view, also experiences, and objects) can be merely 
“injected into cheap copies” (ornaments like Ganesha or package holidays for 
example) and into “the routines of everyday life” (Binkley, p. 143). The 
emulation of other cultural products, as Calinescu (1997) suggests, intends 
that the cultural content and aesthetic value of a copy—like the cheap 
ornaments from India discussed earlier—will be similar, even equal in value 
(in my view this could be sentimental, emotional or financial value) to that of 
the original.  
 
At this point Olalquiaga’s notion of ‘first and second-degree kitsch’ (1992) and 
Binkley’s ‘emulation of other cultural products’ (2000) converge. Common to 
both theories is what Olalquiaga describes as “the difference between reality 
and representation [being] explicit and hierarchical as only what is perceived 
as reality matters” (Olalquiaga, 1992). Therefore, sitting in your apartment 
anywhere in the world, gazing at the kitsch Ganesha ornament now 
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encapsulated in the snow dome, you could be transported to my Indian 
experience and in some way feel the same sense of adventure and delight 
that I had without leaving your armchair.  
 
However, the cultural meaning of an object is often lost once the object is 
placed in a different context. As ‘an emulated cultural product’, the 
significance of the Ganesha Glory (2009) snow dome could be aligned with 
Olalquiaga’s “second-degree kitsch” (1992), as a mass-produced object and 
ironic representation of the real thing. For the person upon whose 
mantelpiece Ganesha Glory (2009) sits, the object would likely retain its “first-
degree” (1992) significance where the difference between reality and 
representation becomes irrelevant as only what is perceived really matters. In 
this example, Ganesha Glory (2009) would be seen as a direct substitute for 
the ‘real thing’ or for the experiences that have been associated with it.  
 
 
7.2.2 Aspects of Kitsch Emulating Other Cultural Products in 
Budgietopia and La Villa Hamster  
 
The category of kitsch emulating other cultural products also undoubtedly 
includes the humble budgie ornaments and Budgietopia (2009‒2013). 
Adorned with an abundance of artificial flowers and greenery, and a 
seemingly endless array of trinkets and knickknacks to ‘feather’ the small 
creatures nests, the scenarios portrayed in Budgietopia (2009‒2013) are of 
budgies emulating human scenarios. Figure 48 displays two budgies relaxing 
in a boudoir style setting during the City in Bloom exhibition (2010), Racing in 
a convertible at the Budgietopia Super Rally (2010) (Figure 49) and offering 
lamingtons to passers by at The Evening Commuter Cake Off  (2010) (Figure 
50) exhibited at Spectrum Project Space during a pop-up exhibition. 
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Figure 49:  Examples of budgies in boudoir-style setting from Budgietopia (2010) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 50:  Budgies racing convertibles at The Budgietopia Super Rally (2010) at 
Spectrum 
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Figure 51:  Budgies sharing lamingtons to passers-by at The Evening Commuter 
Cake Off (2010) 
 
 
I came across a rather fascinating real-world example of the emulation of other 
cultural products that to me drew remarkable parallels to Budgietopia 
(2009‒2013), the hotel La Villa Hamster in France. In uncanny comparison to 
the utopian bird world, but in a strange inversion of the human/animal habitus 
the, La Villa Hamster is renowned for offering “guests the ‘unique’ opportunity 
to live the life of a rodent” (Kaushik, 2012, para. 1), more specifically, a 
hamster. 
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Amusing Planet. (2012). Live like a hamster at La Villa Hamster hotel 
 [Photographer: Stephane Mahe] Retrieved from http://www.amusingplanet.com/2012/03/live-
like-hamster-at-la-villa-hamster.html 
Exception to copyright: Section ss40, 103C, Exception, Research or Study. 
 
Figure 52:   Image of proprietor riding hamster wheel at La Villa Hamster  
 
 
Providing “all basic amenities essential for a rodent” (Kaushik, 2012, para. 1), 
La Villa Hamster provides its human guests with: “containers of organic grain; 
a metal water spigot activated by pushing a giant lever with your foot; and a 
double bed accessible only by a step ladder and a crawl space” (Kaushik, 
2012, para. 1). If that’s not enough, the bathroom comes equipped “with a 
giant vat of wood chips, a giant tro[ugh] for a sink” (para. 1) and a there is also 
a fully functional human-sized hamster wheel in every suite (2012) (Figures 51 
and 52). In case you haven’t your own, hamster suits are also provided—
guests are said to “don hamster hats and sometimes run around the rooms on 
all fours” (Davis, 2012). Interviewed in their hamster masks, the proprietors 
described how they had “wanted to create a place that was a real gîte [self-
catering holiday accommodation]—a place where you could sleep and be 
comfortable—but also where you could have a real experience" (Kaushik, 
2012, para. 2). 
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Amusing Planet. (2012). Live like a hamster at La Villa Hamster hotel 
 [Photographer: Stephane Mahe] Retrieved from http://www.amusingplanet.com/2012/03/live-
like-hamster-at-la-villa-hamster.html 
Exception to copyright: Section ss40, 103C, Exception, Research or Study. 
 
Figure 53:   View of stepladder, hamster wheel and masks taken from upper crawl 
space  
 
 
Having spent several years reflexively engaging with Budgietopia (2009‒2013) 
within my praxis, I couldn’t help but be reminded of Oscar Wilde’s famous 
quote: “life imitates art far more than art imitates life” (Brainyquote, n.p.)  
 
Illustrating in curious parallel the kitsch emulation of other cultural products 
(Binkley, 2000), Budgietopia (2009‒2013) and La Villa Hamster were a 
particularly fascinating and bizarre twist on the balance between life and art I 
have been examining throughout this research. There were even strong 
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echoes of my experience in The Aquarium (2009) and a relationship to 
Olalquiaga’s notion of ‘first and second-degree kitsch’ (1992). It would appear 
that the proprietors of La Villa Hamster have designed the accommodation 
with the honest intention to emulate the cultural content of rodent life to a 
degree that invites guests to partake in an experience where reality and 
representation merge. I would be fascinated to know the degree to which 
guests at La Villa Hamster sucking on a spigot, munching wood chips from a 
vat, or gazing at their very own hamster wheel are engaged with the romance 
of hamster life. As ‘an emulated cultural product’ La Villa Hamster could 
undoubtedly be aligned with Olalquiaga’s “second-degree kitsch” (1992), an 
ironic representation of the real thing, the life of a real hamster. For the guest 
energetically spinning around on the hamster wheel in their hamster suit, the 
experience would likely retain a “first-degree” (1992) significance where the 
difference between reality and representation is beside the point as within this 
context only what they perceive as real matters.  
 
La Villa Hamster, in my view, demonstrates the ironic power of kitsch for the 
artist working in a “third-degree” (Olalquiaga, 1992) sense; the power to 
explore the space between what people think is happening and what may be 
happening. This becomes an interesting juxtaposition of global modernity and 
local traditions, as is the case with Budgietopia (2009‒2013) where the exotic 
and the banality of everyday experiences intersect. It is at these interstices—
where the exotic and banality of everyday meet—I assert, there is a space for 
experiencing the possibilities of Olalquiaga’s “third-degree kitsch” (1992) and 
Binkley’s class of “emulation of other cultural products” (2000) as valuable and 
fascinating tools for the artist. 
 
 
7.3 Feature Two: Kitsch as a Decorative Feature 
 
Kitsch as a ‘decorative feature’ is common to places like the home or work 
environments. Kitsch provides an almost mundane sense of pleasure, “as an 
aestheticization of the everyday, and the repetitive, imitative habits this 
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implies” (Binkley, 2000, p. 142). I propose this is perhaps why kitsch appears 
so often in the spaces we inhabit everyday: the bus, the cafeteria, the waiting 
room, or at your next-door neighbour’s house. As a decorative feature, this 
category of kitsch is linked to Olalquiaga’s ‘second-degree or neo-kitsch’ 
(1992) where the object is effectively an empty icon. In both Olalquiaga’s 
second-degree kitsch and Binkley’s kitsch as a repetitive feature, the object is 
recognised for its “iconicity and quality as a sign” (Olalquiaga, 1992, p. 45). 
 
 
7.3.1 Budgietopia and the Decorative Features of Kitsch  
 
The decorative features of Budgietopia (2009‒2013) were developed with the 
idea of expressing what Binkley (2000) describes as a “sentimentally idealized 
image of the quotidian” (p. 143). The quotidian includes the kinds of everyday 
objects that can be found in most homes—if not your own, they would 
probably be found in the home of someone you know. However, in 
Budgietopia (2009‒2013), because it exists as a utopian kitsch world, there is a 
rich and excessive array of these types of kitsch items and artefacts: artificial 
flowers; plated silverware, candlesticks, sugar bowls, trays and cutlery; plastic 
crystal-look vases and glassware; faux fur and silk; reproductions and copies 
of fine china like cups and saucers; ornaments including figurines, clocks and 
souvenirs; and, of course, the budgie ornaments, just to name a few.  
 
These are the types of objects that, by the idealised sentimentality imbued on 
them by their owners, are elevated within the banal quotidian of everyday to 
significance and cultural importance. Consider, for example, one of the 
scenarios played out in the Budgietopia (2009‒2013) installation, developed for 
City in Bloom (2010) (Figure 53), in which over a thousand budgies partook in 
an afternoon tea party on the rooftop of the city’s tourist information office.  
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Figure 54:  Budgietopia installation, exhibited for City in Bloom (2010), Murray 
Street Mall, Perth, Western Australia (2010) 
 
 
The budgies played out a variety of scenarios: sipping cups of tea while 
indulging in cakes, biscuits and gossip, some riding through the field of flowers 
bareback upon ponies, while others admired the sparkling crystal, china and 
ornaments. Not unlike Binkley’s (2000) observation of a kitsch painting by 
Norman Rockwell, Budgietopia (2009‒2013) for me displays the “fawning 
affection for everyday human weakness” through an: 
 
unmistakable valuation of the trivial as the single most enduring of 
human qualities. Everyday curiosities, desires, jealousies and 
indulgences are . . . the common stuff of human nature, the point to 
which we all inevitably return, despite our pretension to do otherwise. 
(Binkley, 2000, p. 143) 
 
The budgies in the City in Bloom (2010) exhibition are involved in the trivialities 
of everyday, and they are doing so, surrounded by the warmth and familiarity 
offered by the decorative features of kitsch.  
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I concur with Binkley (2000) that it is precisely this kind of human weakness (in 
this case, exhibited by budgies) and the “adherence to repetitive codes” 
apparent in everyday behaviours that “brings us all together” (p. 144). 
Furthermore, it is undoubtedly the image of an everyday “infinitely forgiving of 
human folly” that, I assert, “typifies kitsch’s ultimate triumph over comedy, 
tragedy and cosmic aspiration” in which just about “everything comes back to 
the repetitive fabric of daily life” (p. 144).  
The scenarios played out in Budgietopia (2009‒2013) endeavour to recreate 
scenarios and human idiosyncrasies that are a part of daily life. They pay 
tribute, even celebrate, the mundane—at home, work or play, the places that 
are part of our everyday—with its “rhythms, routines and imitative patterns” (p. 
144). The repetitive nature of decorative kitsch in Budgietopia (2009‒2013) 
demonstrates how “the existential security of a closed cosmology of cultural 
objects” (Binkley, p. 145) offers comfort and a sense of safety in modern life. 
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7.3.2 The Lotus Pond and Lotus Flowers: An Example of 
Kitsch as a Decorative Feature 
 
 
 
The Lotus Pond (2008)  
Installation 
Plastic, vinyl, wood on rubber inner-tubes and water 
.80m x 8m x 14m (Variable) 
 
Figure 55:  Lotus Pond (2008) exhibited at Perth Institute of Contemporary Arts, 
(PICA), Western Australia (2008) 
 
 
The vinyl sheeting that I used to make the lotus flowers for the installation The 
Lotus Pond (2007, 2008) (Figure 54), developed during my honours research, 
are a good example of kitsch as a decorative feature. The designs on the 
sheeting are so divorced from their original cultural context that they hardly 
refer back to that context. Consequently tartan, for example, used in the work, 
exists as just a decorative pattern, not a complex Scottish system of clan 
identification. 
 
The designs on the vinyls I bought in South East Asia evolved through several 
cycles of repetition and kitsch. Their motifs and materials, seemingly taken at 
 
 
 
 
130 
random, were appropriated regardless of their original context, with no 
acknowledgement of their original source. This is a characteristic typical of 
kitsch, an attribute which Attfield (2006) suspects is to do with kitsch’s ability to 
operate “indiscriminately stealing and appropriating references from every 
cultural genre and reworking them into familiar accessible forms and inserting 
them into everyday life, so that they become imbedded in contemporary 
culture” (p. 208). The designs shown in the lotus flowers (Figure 55) are a 
combination of vivid country-style check and tartan tablecloths, lace doilies, 
60s psychedelic pop art, and garish flowers.  
 
 
 
 
Lotus Flowers (2007)  
Plastic, vinyl, wood 
Diameters: 120cm, 100cm, 60cm, Depths: 10-30cm 
 
Figure 56:  Lotus Flowers (2007)  
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These plastics are endemic in Vietnam where they were purchased: adorning 
restaurant tables, lining cyclo (a type of bicycle) roofs and bedecking market 
stalls and displays as a tool of trade and item of exchange. They are a part of 
the everyday experience in Vietnam, reproductions of table linen that have 
been placed in the construct of everyday life as colourful, strong, durable 
material with seemingly endless applications. The combination of images on 
these plastics homogenises Eastern and Western symbols, and while distinctly 
Vietnamese, these plastics are somehow common to all places. A cultural 
cacophony of visual styles they reference Scottish, Japanese, French, 
American, Chinese and other cultures. For me they offered a sense of comfort; 
a feeling that while I was in Vietnam, I could also be at my grandmother’s 
house in Australia, or someone else’s almost anywhere in the world. Binkley 
(2000) describes the sense of familiarity in kitsch, reminding us that: 
 
One of kitsch’s most noted techniques, the combination of high culture 
imagery with everyday functional objects . . . images socially marked 
as unique and . . . exceptional for their aesthetic uniqueness and their 
propensity to speak to human uniqueness are subordinated to the 
practical everyday problems of the household. (Binkley, 2000, p.145) 
 
As a decorative feature, the plastics become encoded by the personal 
contexts in which they were used or experienced, a code that is without set 
rules and is often unreadable by foreign. The code is often unreadable by 
foreign eyes as the personal contexts in which kitsch as a decorative feature, 
and the plastics, are experienced are unique to the individual and the 
particular context in which they were experienced (used as a table cloth in a 
family home, the plastic sheeting would be encoded with different meaning 
than if it were lining the roof of a cyclo in Vietnam). 
 
From examples of the plastic sheeting used to make the lotus flowers to the 
trinkets and treasures that make up Budgietopia (2009‒2013), kitsch as a 
‘decorative feature’ revels in the routine sense of pleasure it provides. Through 
its easy recognition as part of everyday experiences the decorative quality of 
kitsch has proved to be a valuable creative device within my praxis. 
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7.4 Feature Three: Kitsch’s Love of All Things Sentimental 
 
The third aesthetic feature of kitsch identified by Binkley (2000) is 
‘sentimentality’. Binkley (2000) argues that sentimentality is the most important 
aesthetic feature of kitsch, a view supported by Olalquiaga in The Artificial 
Kingdom (1998). Binkley, not unlike Olalquiaga, relates the sentimentality of 
kitsch to a range of affects that vary in intensity from the warm-hearted, 
sorrowful or sympathetic. I concur with Binkley, that kitsch’s sentimentality 
operates by creating emotional attachment to objects and re-embedding 
consumers, offering them a sense of cosmic coherence in an unpredictable 
world of challenge, innovation and creativity (2000). It does so by 
“sweeten[ing] raw human feeling with melancholy and nostalgia” (p.145) where 
kitsch and sentimentality give a sense of reassurance and security.  
 
 
7.4.1 Call Me Golden Sugar Britches and Sentimental Kitsch 
 
An example of how kitsch and sentimentality can offer a sense of reassurance 
and security is demonstrated in the snow dome Call Me Golden Sugar 
Britches (2009) (Figure 56). This sculpture was made in memorial to a friend’s 
late Golden Retriever, ‘Sugar Britches’ or ‘Sugar” for short. The sentiment 
associated with this work deals with warmth, heartbreak and sympathy 
associated with loss. On a side note, the type of dissembeddeness caused by 
loss, and in this case the death of a pet, is different to the type of 
disembeddedness described by Giddens (1991) as the lifting out of social 
relations from local contexts and their rearticulation “across different tracts of 
time and space” (1991, p.18). However, in the example of the loss of Sugar 
Britches, I argue that Binkley’s description of disembeddedness as “the 
undermining of personal horizons of social and cosmic security” (2000, p. 
131), which does still relate to Giddens (1991) can be applied. I argue that the 
repetitive qualities of kitsch defined by Binkley (2000) can address the type of 
disembeddedness experienced by Sugar’s owner.  
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Call Me Golden Sugar Britches (2009)  
Glass, stainless steel, water, resin, rubber and mixed media 
50cm x 40cm x 40cm 
 
Figure 57:  Call Me Golden Sugar Britches (2009), exhibited at The Moores Building 
and Gallery, Fremantle, Western Australia (2009) 
 
 
By constructing the snow dome in Sugar’s honour I hoped to create the kind of 
sentimental kitsch that would operate through emotional attachment and work 
to re-embed Sugar’s loving owner, offering him the sense of ‘cosmic 
coherence’ described by Binkley (2000). Such attachments sweeten the 
rawness and melancholy one feels through loss and offers a feeling of 
nostalgia, reassurance and security (p.145) as the sentimentality associated 
with kitsch does so well. 
 
It is precisely the kind of sentimentality associated with kitsch that enables it to 
reduce the “complexity, desperation and paradox of human experience to 
simple sentiment” (p. 145). Because of this reduction, or simplification, the 
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sentiment associated with kitsch takes us “back to our common roots”, to the 
“practical wisdom of daily life” (Binkley, 2000, p. 145).  
 
The simplification of raw emotion sentimental kitsch offers is not only linked to 
melancholic experiences like the loss of Sugar. The cute smiley faces on 
Murakami’s ‘Cosmic Blossom’ range for Louis Vuitton (discussed in Section 2) 
offer an illustration of another kind of kitsch sentiment. The sentimentality 
associated with the cosmic blossom, in my view, nostalgically “calls out to our 
forgotten love and wonderment in all things wholesome [and] simple” (p. 145). 
As with most smiley face icons, I assert that kitsch offers a smile, a sense of 
comfort and warmth, and a metaphorical hug to those in its presence. 
 
 
7.4.2 Budgietopia and Sentimental Kitsch  
 
The scenarios played out by the flock of over 3 000 lifelike budgies that inhabit 
the utopian world of Budgietopia (2009‒2013) for me illustrated the repetitive, 
especially sentimental and universal values of kitsch identified by Binkley 
(2000). I argue that the sentimental kitsch demonstrated in Budgietopia 
(2009‒2013) “raises up its image of happiness to an absolute universal value” 
(p. 145)—a characteristic ability of sentimental kitsch identified by Binkley. 
Claims of the universality of kitsch may prove challenging for some critics of 
kitsch. It must therefore be clarified that it is the sensory affect of sentimentality 
on connections to experiences, possessions and material objects offered by 
kitsch—that is shared across cultures and societies—that is universal. Claims 
of universality of kitsch therefore do not relate to objects themselves. This is 
because the labelling of an experience or object as kitsch is subjective and 
variable dependant on the context in which the experience or object is placed 
and by whom the assessment of kitsch is being made. 
 
One of the strongest examples demonstrating the universality of the 
sentimental affect of kitsch, is Kundera’s insightful proclamation on kitsch and 
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sentimentality from The Unbearable Lightnness of Being (1984), discussed 
earlier. Kundera’s text describes the sentimental affect of kitsch by stating:  
 
Kitsch causes two tears to flow in quick succession. The first tear says: 
How nice to see children running on the grass!  
The second tear says: How nice to be moved, together with all 
mankind, by children running on the grass!  
It is the second tear that makes kitsch kitsch. (Kundera,1984, p. 244) 
 
 
Binkley (2000) who also critiques Kundera’s statement in his analysis of kitsch, 
relates the sentiment portrayed in the text to a universal fellowship described 
as “kitsch joy” (p. 145). I agree with Binkley that kitsch joy is a sentiment that 
“has room for anyone and everyone . . . as the most fundamental form of 
happiness that enlivens us all” (p. 145). For many this is hard to admit, quite 
possibly because kitsch so often discreetly and humbly goes about its 
business unnoticed and wanting nothing in return. I strongly support Binkley’s 
view that “kitsch happiness expresses a universal human fellowship” a desire 
that is “so inclusive and so fundamental as to be undeniable” (p. 145). 
Although I extend Binkley’s view to include a broad reaching range of emotions 
and sensory affects, including but not limited to, joy and happiness, but also 
affects like melancholy, nostalgia and sorrow for example. Through the notion 
of universal fellowship the various strands of the sentimental affects of kitsch 
including the “kitsch joy” and happiness, described by Binkley (2000) are 
woven together to create “a reassuring cosmic web” (p. 146) which no one is 
outside.  
 
It is this kind of sentimental affect that Budgietopia (2009‒2013) aims to 
engender. The different scenarios played out by the budgies in Budgietopia 
(2009‒2013) as they play and frolic in their grass-covered world replicate the 
“kitsch joy” Binkley (2000, p. 145) describes creating a vast system that is 
undeniably all-inclusive, yet at its core simple. It involves a system that 
because of its ability to restore confidence in humankind through its reassuring 
cosmic web, has created a loyal and enduring universal fellowship shared 
across cultures and societies. 
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7.4.3 Universal Beauty and Sentimental Ordinariness 
 
 
From the ability of kitsch to raise images of happiness “to an absolute 
universal value”, kitsch joy, or what I describe as the sentimental affect of 
kitsch, according to Binkley (2000), “is the most fundamental form of human 
happiness”. The “reassuring cosmic web” that sentimental affects of kitsch 
weave, “elevate the unique charm of the commonplace to a value of universal 
significance” (Binkley, 2000, p.146). I concur with Binkley that, “in this gesture 
kitsch combines the elements of status emulation (imitating the appeal to a 
universal quality of beauty implied by the taste for high art) with a celebration 
of the quotidian” (2000, p. 146). In so doing, as it relishes in its’ everydayness, 
the sentimental affect of kitsch produces a gushing passion for “sentimental 
ordinariness” (Binkley, 2000, p. 146). Binkley observed that Kant (1987) and 
later Bourdieu (1984) identified “that it is a quality of aristocratic taste to 
pretend to speak of universal properties of the beautiful” (p. 146). Thus, for 
Kant and Bourdieu the predilection for what is considered universally beautiful 
is essential to a so called “emancipated, autonomous and disembedded 
aesthetic disposition”, unhindered by the “‘interests’ of politics, status and daily 
life” (p. 146). Binkley surmises that the apparent lack of interest evident in the 
“sophisticated aesthetic gaze” is dependent on the “universality of its aesthetic 
values” (p. 146). Such values are realised “through a disengagement from 
everyday interests and traditions” (p. 146) and the patronage of a so-called 
“pure, disinterested appreciation of beauty” (p. 146). 
The ‘disembedded, disinterested freedom’ associated with universal qualities 
of beauty and high art portrayed by Kant (1987) and Bourdieu (1984), are 
particularly troubling for me as they are obviously entangled with an obsolete 
view of how art and kitsch operate. Yet it is precisely this unfortunate and 
dated view of high art, still adhered to by many, that as Binkley states, “make it 
necessary that kitsch produces its own universalistic claim” (p. 146). As a 
result, instead of the apathy engendered by aristocratic taste, kitsch affirms, 
even relishes, “the petty interest, the everyday folly, the failure to escape 
interest and the failure to be autonomous” even, as Binkley would attest, the 
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failure to be original—a failure which defines the true stuff of common 
humanity” (p. 146).  
I concur with Binkley (2000) that the manner in which kitsch emulates “is not 
intended to operate with the success of a forgery” (p.146). Un-like the 
“emancipated, autonomous and disembedded aesthetic disposition” of the so-
called “sophisticated aesthetic gaze” (Kant, 1987; Bourdieu, 1984; Binkley, 
2000). Kitsch is deeply embedded in social interests and the intricacies of daily 
life, and in so doing, offers “a gesture of ‘antielitist availability’”, and of honest, 
“human sincerity” (Binkley, 2000, p. 146). I agree with Binkley (2000) that it is 
the forgiving and inclusive manner in which kitsch operates that sees “the 
second tear that makes kitsch kitsch”, described by Kundera (1984, p. 244) 
express: 
 
. . . the self-satisfying moment by which kitsch rejoices in its own 
feeling, and closes and completes its own system: kitsch wants to 
see itself participating in a universal happiness, not of high noble 
accomplishments, but a real universality of modest origins, of 
common fellowships between all people, of love for that which is 
commonly, undeniably and obviously lovable. (Binkley, 2000, p.146) 
 
The “universal happiness” (Binkley, 2000) and sentimental affect of 
contemporary kitsch I contend undoubtedly holds its position in society as a 
universally applicable aesthetic who’s sentimental affect is all inclusive and 
responsible for having created unique and valuable fellowship between all 
people, regardless of their status, that is shared across cultures and societies. 
Even the British Monarchy, headed by Queen Elizabeth II has been observed 
indulging in everyday comforts and the sentimentality, warmth and cosiness of 
kitsch. I recall reading a newspaper article in which Queen Elizabeth II was 
said to spend time “using a small cottage on the Sandringham Estate as a 
place where she could ‘play ordinary’” (Church, 2012, para. 57). It detailed how 
sometimes she spends a full day at the cottage “tidying up, watching The 
Jeremy Kyle Show and organising an ‘ordinary’ dinner-party for close friends” 
(Church, 2012, para. 58). Her Majesty is also said to be particularly fond of 
“the Australian favourite the Lamington—sponge squares dipped in chocolate 
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and rolled in desiccated coconut” (Church, 2012, para. 49)—which, thanks to 
Dame Edna Everidge (Figure 57) (the comic character played by Barry 
Humphries), is perhaps the most iconic kitsch cake in Australia.  
 
 
Contacts Photography. (2012). Zahn Pithers for Jenny Craig. [Photographer; Zahn Pithers]. Retrieved 
from http://contactsphotography.blogspot.com.au/2012/07/zahn-pithers-for-jenny-craig.html 
Exception to copyright: Section ss40, 103C, Exception, Research or Study. 
 
Figure 58:  Actor Barry Humphries as Dame Edna Everidge with lamington pyramid 
 
The Royal Family, and particularly Queen Elizabeth II, are also known for their 
great sentimental attachment to corgis. British artist, Allison Jackson, famous 
for creating images that are ultimately “depicting our suspicions” of what we 
imagine the rich and famous do behind closed doors (Jackson cited in 
Garfield, 2007) created the image of Queen Elizabeth II (Figure 58) kneeling 
on a cushion with one of her beloved corgis in a Christmas hat.  
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Jackson, A. (n.d.) The Queens quiet Christmas. [Medium: Photography]. Retrieved from 
http://www.alisonjackson.com/queen-quiet-christmas-exclusive-photos-show-monarch-chatting-to-corgis-
and-doing-the-washing-up/queen-corgi/ 
Exception to copyright: Section ss40, 103C, Exception, Research or Study. 
 
Figure 59:  Artist Allison Jackson’s depiction of Queen Elizabeth II playing with her 
corgi 
Or the photograph (Figure 59) of Queen Elizabeth II, during a visit to 
Sherborne Abbey, as a part of her Jubilee Tour of England, (Gerstein, 2012) 
as she stops to say hello to some rather cute corgis wearing British themed 
frilly garlands around their necks—one of the cute pooches being lucky 
enough to receive a gentle caress. 
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Gerstein, J. (2012). The luckiest corgis in the world. The Frisky [Photograph] Retrieved from 
http://www.thefrisky.com/tag/queen-elizabeth/ 
Exception to copyright: Section ss40, 103C, Exception, Research or Study. 
 
Figure 60:  Queen Elizabeth II stops to pat cute corgis 
 
For as Binkley states, “who could deny the cuddliness of a cute little dog” (p. 
146). Clearly even Queen Elizabeth II could not refuse “the simple love for 
simple things” (Binkley, 2000, p.147) of life; a pleasure as simple and ordinary 
as stopping to pat a cute dog. I argue, that the universal beauty and 
sentimental ordinariness that kitsch engenders, demonstrates “the sentimental 
appeal to the tautological (and repetitive) love of the lovable” kitsch provides 
(Binkley, 2000, p. 147); a universal fellowship that is shared across cultures 
and societies regardless of how grand or humble they may be.  
Yet as Binkley (2000), and Calinescu (1987), attest, the manner in which kitsch 
copies and emulates is not fraudulent. Rather, kitsch attempts to share the 
sentimental affect, a deep emotional response that is comparable in magnitude 
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to the sentimental affect an individual would feel if they were to experience an 
original object, an artwork for example, first hand. As feeling for the kitsch 
objects intensifies, so too does the connection and attachment between the 
object and user. This phenomenon was deeply apparent within Budgietopia 
(2009‒2013) in which I observed a range of fascinating interactions between 
viewers of the work and the budgie ornaments, such as people chatting to the 
small resin creatures for example. Various photos and even a hand-sketched 
portrait of one of the adopted budgies were made or taken. Another adoptee 
even bought birdseed for their budgie (Figures 60 and 61). 
 
 
Exception to copyright: Section ss40, 103C, Exception, Research or Study. 
Figure 61:  ‘Violet Sparkles’ with adoptee Yvonne Doherty—photograph courtesy of 
Yvonne Doherty (2012) 
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Exception to copyright: Section ss40, 103C, Exception, Research or Study. 
Figure 62:  Water colour and pencil on paper sketch of budgie by adoptee Patrick 
Tofts (2012) 
 
7.5 Summary of the Repetitive Qualities of Kitsch  
 
For Binkley (2000), kitsch challenges aesthetic sensibilities by emulating 
cultural products and decorative features that appeal to sentiment and, in 
effect, re-embed those who see it. This quality of kitsch is a powerful tool that 
can, if subverted by the artist practising Olalquiaga’s third-degree kitsch 
(1992), be channelled to show just how disembedded, disconnected and 
alienating most of modernity is in contrast. This is a place from which to define 
and then challenge the everyday and the assumptions that we make. The 
notion of kitsch as a repetitive system uncovered by Binkley (2000) has 
highlighted the manner in which the multiple positive aspects of kitsch and its 
“taste for repetition achieves a transmutation of the conventional aesthetic 
values” (p. 149). This kind of originality, creativity and as Binkley states “power 
to induce existential reflection on the nature of one’s being, outside of time and 
place” is greatly valued, particularly in affluent Western societies. 
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8. Olalquiaga’s Modes of Perceiving Experiences and Kitsch 
 
 
What I have called ‘Olalquiaga’s modes of perceiving experiences and kitsch’ 
is an analysis of Olalquiaga’s study of kitsch from The Artificial Kingdom 
(1998). Olalquiaga’s theory draws on Walter Benjamin’s (1973) two types of 
memory: conscious and unconscious memory. This theory examines the 
process by which differing memories, experiences and desires affect an 
individual’s emotional response to objects and to kitsch. Olalquiaga’s notions 
of ‘the souvenir’ and the ‘cultural fossil’ from The Artificial Kingdom (1998) play 
a valuable role in expanding upon Binkley’s (2000) concept of sentimental 
kitsch. Additionally, Olalquiaga’s model can be used to demonstrate how 
kitsch has addressed the sense of disembeddedness (Giddens, 1991), 
discussed earlier, that has created the still lingering sense of ‘loss’ that 
occurred as we entered modernity (Giddens, 1991; Binkley, 2000). It is my 
assertion that kitsch has not only addressed this sense of loss, but has 
become so assiduously rooted, embedded, in our lifeworlds that it has become 
an irreplaceable constituent of everyday life.  
 
Olalquiaga demonstrates how kitsch objects allow us to recreate experiences 
that exist between “an irretrievable past and a fragmented present” (1998, p. 
68), and the fluid boundaries of memories and fantasies. Objects allow us to 
capture or repossess the intensity or immediacy of loss through lost 
experiences (1998). In describing the process of recreating experiences, 
Olalquiaga’s theory demonstrates how kitsch is torn between attempting to 
possess and repossess fantasies and memories, and the embodiment of lived 
experiences, fantasies and loss. In doing so, kitsch can fulfil our dreams and 
aspirations or sometimes the “peculiar sadness of broken or even half-
forgotten dreams” (p. 162). It is through such processes that, I believe, we are 
able to re-embed ourselves, and again find a sense of comfort in the world. 
These functions are crucial to understanding the role of kitsch in modern life 
and are imperative as the basis of my art practice. 
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8.1 The Process of Recreating Experiences  
 
 
 
Illustration of the modes of perceiving experiences and Kitsch (Olalquiaga, 1998, p. 75) 
Exception to copyright: Section ss40, 103C, Exception, Research or Study. 
 
Figure 63:  Olalquiaga’s ‘modes of perceiving experiences and kitsch’ 
 
 
The process of recreating experiences (Figure 62) begins by dividing 
sentimentality into both ‘melancholy’ and ‘nostalgia’ the unconscious mode of 
remembrance proper, and the conscious mode that leads to reminiscence 
(Benjamin, 1998). These concepts are applied to Olalquiaga’s (p. 75) theories 
of ‘the souvenir’, which becomes lost in ‘melancholic kitsch’ and ‘unconscious 
memories’ (remembrance), and ‘the cultural fossil’ which, according to 
Olalquiaga, is imbued with ‘nostalgic kitsch’ and is linked to the ‘conscious 
memory’ (reminiscence). For Olalquiaga (1998) memories of the unconscious 
are linked by “sacrificing the continuity of time for the intensity of experience” 
(p. 292), which produce a fragmented remembrance that, when commodified, 
becomes the souvenir. The souvenir, as a result of its mass reproducibility, is 
disassociated from remembrance and subjected to the interpretations of the 
consumer. Through this process Olalquiaga (1998) suggests the souvenir or 
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object’s melancholia intensifies, which in turn engenders a new degree of loss, 
triggering the unconscious desire to recover what is gone. Again this 
understanding of kitsch provides the artist with powerful tools when creating 
art—a context in which I choose to work.  
 
If the final product of the process of remembrance (focus on the feeling of loss 
caused by death) is melancholic kitsch, then reminiscence, the alternative form 
of memory, according to Olalquiaga (1998), sacrifices the intensity of an 
experience for a fabricated sense of conscious that generates ‘nostalgic 
kitsch’. Nostalgic kitsch, according to Olalquiaga (p. 292), is “more limited in its 
cultural impact and scope”. Incapable of tolerating the intensity of the moment, 
reminiscence (disregard for the obvious demise of an object) privileges and 
consolidates parts of an event into a perceived complete memory. In doing so, 
it rejects any recollection of the mythic load that gave the original experience 
its intensity. This restructured experience becomes a frozen emblem of itself, 
or what Olalquiaga (1998) calls a cultural fossil.  
 
The idea of the cultural fossil as the shell of a supposedly founding experience 
becomes fetishised. Its presence “[serves] to evoke and legitimise an origin 
whose imaginary autonomy acquires utopian overtones” (p. 292). Budgietopia 
(2009‒2013) is a useful example here. The life of the budgies is contingent 
upon the brief moment that they were appropriated, recreated in resin and 
placed within the gallery paradigm. Whether as part of my installation, in their 
adoption from an exhibition to a viewer’s home, to the communications from 
adoptees, the budgie becomes a frozen emblem of itself and is now a 
fetishised “cultural fossil” (Olalquiaga, 1998, p. 292).  
 
For me, kitsch raises questions about the type of experience in which the 
viewer indulges, and of their own predominant narrative, when interacting with 
or simply viewing Budgietopia (2009‒2013). The sweet budgie ornaments, 
trinkets and masses of vivid artificial flowers, although static, somehow 
becomes alive as people interact with the work, smelling the flowers and 
patting the little budgie ornaments. As people meander through the utopian 
bird world, past the budgie tea parties, dances, and rows of pretty budgie 
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homes, the illusion created in my view, fulfils the wish image’s fetishistic 
potential. Simultaneously, as a metaphor for the lifeworlds in which we live, 
Budgietopia (2009‒2013) offers an intense and flagrant taste of a utopian 
reality. 
 
The experiences people have had with Budgietopia (2009‒2013) could be 
seen to represent the leftover human desire to collect, and the status of the 
utopian bird world, as a cultural fossil, underlines the failure of our attempts. 
For as Olalquiaga states we exist “as participants in a culture that does not 
accept death and seeks to capture life at whatever cost, even that of sacrificing 
real life for the sake of a fleeting imagery perception” (1998, p. 68).  
 
Returning to Benjamin’s “two basic ways of perceiving events in modern time” 
(cited in Olalquiaga, 1998, pp. 68-69) is important: the conscious mode, 
leading to reminiscence; and the unconscious mode of remembrance proper 
(Benjamin, 1973). As a conscious memory for instance, the perception of 
Budgietopia (2009‒2013) automatically disregards an awareness of mortality. 
It instead concentrates on the life of the bird world, not dissimilar to that of the 
gallery or museum vitrine where, Olalquiaga suggests, exhibits or ‘fossils’ can 
be resurrected in the imagination by aesthetic cues that are presented within 
the image or display. Similarly, Olalquiaga (1998), suggests “the cultural fossil 
recalls an immaculate memory, [that is] continuously regenerating [into] an 
ahistorical purity without the distortions brought about by . . . time” (p. 70). 
 
By contrast, unconscious perception occurs without the erasure of an actual 
experience. Olalquiaga (1998) describes unconscious perception as being a 
perceptual process that eventually leads to kitsch as intensity of the lived 
moment, as an outdated unconscious perception that focuses on the 
“distressing sensations that consciousness cannot afford to indulge” (p.71). It 
is this moment that Budgietopia (2009-2013) becomes a remembrance, a 
fragmented recollection “that can direct perception to the hidden archives of 
individual memories, where experiences are stored as atemporal myth[s]” 
(p.71).  
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Olalquiaga (1998) distinguishes between subjective mythical time relating to 
remembrance and the mystification of the perception of an experience (that 
never really happened) associated with the cultural fossil. Rather than being 
simply frozen in time, Budgietopia (2009‒2013) can be seen as a moment in 
time whose artificial preservation is a reminder of mortality (1998). It is in this 
moment in time, through remembrance that, “is obsessed by the transitoriness 
of lived moments and [is] constituted by what ceases to be” (p. 74). 
 
Once commodified, the cultural fossil “leads to a nostalgic kitsch that craves an 
experience based on a desire for a perfect memory of something that never 
really happened” (Olalquiaga, 1998, p. 293). Budgietopia (2009‒2013), as a 
central aspect of this research, is a valuable illustration of nostalgic kitsch, as it 
traces the transformation of a natural fossil (the budgie ornaments and artificial 
flowers) into a cultural one. Instead of referring to a lived moment and the full 
recognition of its death, the utopian bird world erases this death and 
substitutes it for an impossible scenario where the biological qualities of the 
display endear the work to the audience by alluding to an organic garden 
scene or display. The utopian qualities of the scene created by Budgietopia 
(2009‒2013) are rendered as a formal, static display reflecting a lost moment 
in time. 
 
It is in this way that kitsch can be seen as rigid and particularly limited as its 
strength relies on recreating something that was either never there in the first 
place or that has been glorified beyond recognition. If one were to imagine, for 
example, a version of Budgietopia (2009‒2013) in which a ‘dystopia’ of sorts 
was depicted, the viewer immersed in a less welcoming environment designed 
to place them out of their comfort zone, unsure if they are welcome, the 
experience would be quite different. The only reassurance is the kitsch beauty 
of the sweet budgie ornaments, comforting rather than threatening. However in 
the more welcoming version of Budgietopia (2009‒2013) that has been 
depicted, the viewer could complacently enjoy and engage with a vibrant and 
welcoming scene where little negotiation or reassurance is required. Within the 
differing contexts, as I have asserted, Budgietopia (2009‒2013) arguably could 
be associated with the cultural fossil. 
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Conclusion  
 
This exegesis has examined the theoretical concept of contemporary kitsch 
within my creative practice that incorporates sculptural and installation art. I 
have investigated and challenged the traditional framework of hierarchical and 
class-based analysis through which kitsch has typically been understood 
(Greenberg, 1961; Adorno & Horkheimer, 1991; Calinescu, 1987; Dorfles, 
1969), arguing in favour of recent re-conceptualisations of kitsch (Olalquiaga, 
1992, 1998; Binkley, 2000). Throughout this investigation, the aim was to 
demonstrate how kitsch has become an irreplaceable, fundamental 
constituent—that is assiduously rooted—embedded in our lifeworld’s and in 
the multiple levels of everyday life: an aesthetic that reveals “how people make 
sense of the world through artefacts” (Attfield, 2006, p. 201) and everyday 
objects.  
 
Arguing in line with Binkley (2000) I have demonstrated how “the repetitive 
qualities of kitsch address a general problem of modernity” (p. 131), which 
Giddens has referred to as “disembeddedness” (1991), or “the undermining of 
personal horizons of social and cosmic security” (Binkley, p. 131).  
 
I have examined my praxis in relation to the artworks developed throughout 
my doctoral candidature: The Aquarium (2009), Budgietopia (2009‒2013), 
Jesus (2010), Snow Domes and Dream Sphere (2009‒2010) and my earlier 
work The Lotus Pond (2007, 2008). The research has explored the role that 
kitsch has played within my praxis, relating various aspects of Olalquiaga’s 
‘three degrees of kitsch’ (1992), to what I have called ‘Olalquiaga’s modes of 
perceiving experiences and kitsch’ (1998) and Binkley’s notion of ‘kitsch as a 
repetitive system’ (2000) to aspects of my artworks. These works were used 
as illustrative case studies to demonstrate the significance of kitsch in this 
praxis. The studies spanned the process of creating these works and 
demonstrated the various aspects of kitsch apparent in both the process and 
production of this work. 
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After an examination of the social and historical development of the term 
‘kitsch’, I challenged the traditional notions of taste, culture and status 
associated with kitsch. It has been demonstrated how the role of taste in 
definitions of kitsch is inextricably linked to popular taste, but not limited to the 
notion of taste hierarchies in the traditional view. Concurring with Attfield 
(2006) it has been demonstrated how “kitsch cannot be reduced to a single 
stylistic genre and can only be recognised from within a consciously critical 
context that has something to say about taste” (p. 201). I have asserted that 
popular taste plays a particularly positive role in contextualising the social and 
historical development of kitsch. In doing so, I have supported Attfield’s (2006) 
notion that: 
 
. . . positioning kitsch within a social context of popular 
taste recognises popular culture as a more inclusive field 
of inquiry, it acknowledges the aestheticisation of 
everyday life as a positive aspect of culture and allows 
the consideration of taste as part of the habitus, the 
material culture of everyday life. (Attfield, 2006, p. 207) 
 
The results of this research support the hypothesis that, ‘popular taste’ and 
kitsch can be found in ‘all’ levels of society, and can be subjectively analysed 
as both good and/or bad taste. It is therefore asserted that while certain 
objects may be more common to specific groups or classes within society, 
popular taste and kitsch cannot be segregated to any one specific hierarchy, 
taste group, or class.  
 
I have shown how the re-evaluation of taste and kitsch as popular, but cutting 
across status, is evident in aspects of the visual arts and popular culture. This 
has been demonstrated tthrough a study of kitsch iconography that I identified 
in the work of Japanese artist Takashi Murakami (2008). I contrasted this with 
the dialogue used by the television chef Nigella Lawson (2001). Specifically 
chosen as diverse choices, they illustrated how the meaning of the term kitsch 
has evolved within contemporary popular culture as popular taste, and how 
kitsch has in some cases—such as Murakami’s bags for Louis Vuitton—
flattened the traditional notions of kitsch. In particular the notions that were 
based in taste hierarchies. I have shown how through this levelling we are now 
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able to literally purchase sentiment and happiness in the form of kitsch. 
Through an analysis of the dialogue in Lawson’s (2001) television cooking 
show, I have exposed how kitsch is often misunderstood or stretched beyond 
reasonable means and definitions within popular culture. This has been shown 
to be due to the outdated connection between my notion of popular taste, 
which I have aligned to Binkley’s (2000) notion of taste habits, and class 
identities. 
 
I therefore have concurred with Binkley that taste habits and preferences are 
no longer easily aligned with class identities (2000). That kitsch “is not the 
property of a distinctive strata . . . but a general corrective to a general modern 
problem, that of existential disembeddedness, loss of assurance in the 
community of life and ones place in the world” (p. 149). Still in line with Binkley, 
I see the repetitive qualities of kitsch as playing a vital role in addressing the 
general problem of modernity known as disembeddedness (2000) through its 
ability to re-embed individuals and societies. This has been demonstrated 
through examining the experiences of Cuc Lam, a refugee of the Vietnam War, 
and also a woman I observed on the evening news, escaping sever 
floodwaters in Queensland. It has been shown how through the objects they 
saved—of which many were kitsch—they were able to maintain a sense of 
comfort, safety and connection under extreme circumstances, that inturn, 
assisted their process of becoming re-embedded. 
 
Extending Binkley’s view I have argued on similar grounds to Attfield (2006) 
and have stressed that, “it is no longer acceptable to limit [kitsch] to the crude 
elitist critique that categorizes it as bad taste and as a cynical manifestation of 
consumerism” (p. 201). I assert that this in turn allows the consideration of 
taste as part of the material culture of everyday life, but not as a vital 
constituent of analyses of kitsch (2006).  
 
I have demonstrated that the aestheticisation of the everyday is an authentic, 
positive feature of both culture and of kitsch (Attfield, 2006). Taken together, 
these results support my conclusion that ‘popular’ should no longer be equated 
with low class and status, bad taste, and impoverished art. I contend that the 
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tenuous traditional leap from class to taste is an inadequate description of how 
our society works. I further stressed the importance of this view due to the ever 
increasing strands of mass culture that continue to weave through most 
aspects of our society now being consumed within the everyday, where high 
and low cultures inhabit the same contexts. 
 
I have vehemently challenged the aspect of traditional conceptualisations of 
kitsch and authenticity that consider kitsch as fake, and challenge the recent 
re-conceptualisations of kitsch like Binkley’s (2000) that still adhere to this 
view. This is a position I believe is still carrying the baggage of a lingering 
class consciousness, something to which Binkley (2000) had claimed to 
strongly oppose. I have challenged how Binkley can purport to see kitsch as 
having “re-embedded its consumers at the ‘deepest’ personal level” (p.135) as 
part of the everyday, and yet still views kitsch as a ‘faker’ or less authentic 
reality, and not simply ‘another’ form of reality. I subscribe to Olalquiaga’s 
valuation (1998) that “kitsch responds to a wider need for an engagement with 
authenticity” (p. 207). This research has identified several questions that are in 
need of further investigation, particularly when relating kitsch to the lifeworld. 
These questions relate to the perception of authenticity in analyses of kitsch 
and how authenticity and kitsch operate within modern life. 
 
It is therefore asserted that Olalquiaga’s (1992) three degrees of kitsch, when 
applied to my creative praxis, have addressed the desire for intensity in 
varying ways. In the first-degree as “an osmotic process resulting from the 
collection and possession of objects still infused with use value” (1992, p. 54). 
In the second-degree as “the consumption of commodified nostalgia” (p. 54) 
and finally in the third-degree, by combining both the first and second-degrees, 
recycling them into a hybrid product that allows for simulation of lost and new 
experiences (Olalquiaga, 1992). While the three degrees of kitsch are usually 
produced at varying moments, they cohabit the same contemporary space.  
 
The research has highlighted the ironic power of kitsch for the artist working in 
a “third-degree” (Olalquiaga, 1992) sense; the power to explore the space 
between what people think is happening and what may be happening. This I 
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assert becomes a fascinating juxtaposition of global modernity and local 
traditions, as has been demonstrated in Budgietopia (2009‒2013) where the 
exotic and the banality of everyday experiences intersect. It is at these 
interstices of the exotic and the banal that I argue, there is a space for 
experiencing the possibilities of Olalquiaga’s ‘third-degree kitsch’ (1992) and 
Binkley’s class of ‘emulation of other cultural products’ (2000) as extremely 
valuable and fascinating tools for the artist. 
 
One of the more significant findings to emerge from this study is the crucial 
role that sentimentality plays in definitions of kitsch. “Sweeten[ing] raw human 
feeling with melancholy and nostalgia” (Binkley, 2000, p.145), kitsch and 
sentimentality provide a sense of reassurance and security. I have therefore 
argued that due to its embedded system of rhythm, kitsch is an aesthetic that 
gives back some of the security, certainty, familiarity and reassurance of the 
unchanging, of the everyday; a reassurance that people had lost as they 
entered modernity. 
 
This research has demonstrated that kitsch is a powerful tool that, if subverted 
by the artist, can be channelled to show just how disembedding, disconnecting 
and alienating modernity can be. This is a place I would suggest, from which 
we can define and challenge the everyday and the assumptions that we make. 
Olalquiaga’s (1992) and Binkley’s (2000) notions can be used to demonstrate 
how kitsch has addressed the sense of disembeddedness (Giddens, 1991), 
that brought about the, still lingering, sense of ‘loss’ that came as we entered 
modernity (Giddens, 1991; Binkley, 2000). It is my assertion that kitsch has 
not only addressed the sense of loss, but has become so assiduously rooted 
in our lifeworlds, that it has become an irreplaceable constituent in everyday 
life.  
 
Through a reflexive analysis of my praxis—the various exhibitions held 
throughout candidature, a broad cross section of examples from popular and 
contemporary culture and the theories of Olalquiaga (1992, 1998), Binkley 
(2000), and Attfield (2006)—it has been demonstrated that kitsch in 
contemporary life has become firmly rooted in our “lifeworlds” (Habermas, 
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1971), as an aesthetic that reveals “how people make sense of the world 
through artefacts” (Attfield, 2006, p. 201) and everyday objects; that the 
sensory affect of sentimentality on connections to possessions and material 
objects that contemporary kitsch offers is shared across cultures and societies. 
 
I have demonstrated how kitsch is torn between attempting to possess and 
repossess fantasies and memories, and the embodiment of lived experiences, 
fantasies and loss. In so doing kitsch can fulfil our dreams and aspirations or 
sometimes the “peculiar sadness of broken or even half-forgotten dreams 
(Olalquiaga, 1998, p. 162). It is through this process that I assert we are able 
to re-embed ourselves, and in so doing find a sense of comfort in the world. 
These qualities are imperative for my creative praxis. Furthermore, if 
strategically applied by other creative practitioners and researchers, the 
positive attributes of contemporary kitsch can be used as a valuable 
communication tool to enhance an audience’s engagement and emotional 
connection to a work of art. 
 
 
 
 
 
154 
References 
 
 
 
Adams, L. (2008). The indeterminate precision of narrative (Unpublished 
doctoral dissertation). Southern Cross University, NSW. Retrieved from 
http://lyndalladams.com/2007/phd/phd-content.html 
 
Adorno, T. (2001). The culture industry: Selected essays on mass culture. 
(J.M. Bernstein, Trans.). (3rd ed.). London, Great Britain: Routledge. 
 
Allposters. (n.d.) Figurine of Ayers Rock in a snow globe. [Photograph] 
retrieved from http://www.allposters.com.au/-sp/Close-Up-of-a-Figurine-
of-Ayers-Rock-in-a-Snow-Globe-posters_i7146353_.htm 
 
Amusing Planet. (2012). Live like a hamster at La Villa Hamster hotel 
[Photographer: Stephane Mahe] Retrieved from 
http://www.amusingplanet.com/2012/03/live-like-hamster-at-la-villa-
hamster.html 
 
Attfield, J. (2006). Redefining kitsch: The politics of design. Home Cultures, 3, 
201-212.  
 
Barkham, P. (2011, August 31). Tourist tat. What’s the tackiest holiday 
souvenir you’ve bought? The Guardian. Retrieved from 
http://www.theguardian.com/travel/2011/aug/31/holiday-souvenirs-
tacky-gifts 
 
Benjamin, W. (1973). Illuminations (H. Zohn, Trans.). London, Great Britain: 
Fontana.  
 
Benjamin, W. (2008) The work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction. 
London, Great Britain: Penguin. 
Binkley, S. (2000). Kitsch as a repetitive system: A problem for the theory of 
taste and hierarchy. Journal of Material Culture, 5(2), 131-152. 
 
Bloomfield, J. (2004). Cuc Lams suitcase [Photograph] Retrieved from 
http://www.cv.vic.gov.au/data/1469/mn008557.jpg 
 
Bloomfield, J. (2004). Cuc Lams suitcase [Photograph] Retrieved from 
http://www.cv.vic.gov.au/data/1470/mn008560.jpg 
 
Bonami, F. (Ed.). (2008). Jeff Koons. New Haven, CT and London, Great 
Britain: Yale University Press. 
 
Bourdieu, P. (1984). Distinction: A social critic of the judgement of taste (R. 
Nice, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
 
 
 
 
 
155 
Broch, H. (1975). Notes on the problem of kitsch. In G. Dorfles (Ed.), Kitsch: 
The world of bad taste (4th ed., pp. 49-67). London, Great Britain: Studio 
Vista. 
 
Broch, H. (1975). Kitsch and art-with-a-message. In G. Dorfles (Ed.), Kitsch: 
The world of bad taste (pp. 68-70). London, Great Britain: Studio Vista. 
 
Burns. G. (2006, November 11). The showman. The Guardian. Retrieved from 
http://guardian.co.uk/artanddesign/2006/nov/11/art.art 
 
Calinescu, M. (1987). Five faces of modernity: Modernism, avant-garde, 
decadence, kitsch, postmodernism. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
 
Chocolate Easter egg. (n.d.). [Image]. Retrieved from http://www.frieze.com 
 
Crouch, C. (2007). Praxis and the reflexive creative practitioner. Journal of 
Visual Art Practice, 6(2), pp.105-114.  
 
Davis, L. (2012, April 21). Hamster hotel lets you live like a giant rodent. [Blog 
post]. Retrieved from http://io9.com/5903930/hamster-hotel-lets-you-
live-like-a-giant-rodent 
 
Dorfles, G. (Ed.). (1975). Kitsch: The world of bad taste. London, Great Britain: 
Studio Vista. 
 
Enrique, B. (2011, October 29). Louis Vuitton friends of the house: Takashi 
Murakami. Ilvoelv. Retrieved from http://www.ilvoelv.com/2011/10/friends-
of-the-house-takashi-murakami.html 
 
Fabergé, T., Proler, L.G. & Skurlov, V.V. (1997) The Fabergé imperialEaster 
eggs. London, Great Britain: Thames Hudson. 
 
Gans, H.J. (1974). Popular culture and high culture: An analysis and 
evaluation of taste.  New York, NY: Basic Books. 
 
Garfield, S. (2007, June 17). The real Tony uncovered [Review of photography 
exhibition by Alison Jackson].Retrieved from: 
http://observer.theguardian.com/ 
 
Gerstein, J. (2012, May 1). The luckiest corgis in the world. The Frisky. 
Retrieved from http://the frisky.com/tag/queen-elizabeth/ 
 
Gerstein, J. (2012, May 1). The luckiest corgis in the world. The Frisky. 
[Photograph]. Retrieved from http://the frisky.com/tag/queen-elizabeth/ 
 
Giddens, A. (1990). The consequences of modernity. Cambridge, Great 
Britain: Polity Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
156 
Giddens, A. (1990). Classical modernity and late modernity. Retrieved from 
http://modernsocieties.wordpress.com/2007/10/29/seminar-two-classical-
modernity-late-modernity/ 
 
Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and self-identity: Self and society in the late 
modern age. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.   
 
Gray, C. and Pirie, I. (1995). A wider context: Paradigms of inquiry, “artistic” 
research procedure: Research at the edge of chaos. Retrieved from: 
https://design.osu.edu/carlson/id785/ead.pdf 
 
Greenberg, C. (1975). The avant-garde and kitsch. In G. Dorfles (Ed.), Kitsch: 
The world of bad taste (pp. 116-126). London, Great Britain: Studio Vista. 
 
Gritz, A. (2008, January 18). Takashi Murakami: MOCA, Los Angeles, USA. 
Frieze Magazine. Retrieved from 
http://www.frieze.com/shows/review/takashi_murakami/ 
 
Habermas, J. (1971). The theory of communicative action: Reason and the 
rationalisation of the lifeworld. Cambridge, Great Britain: Polity Press. 
 
Habermas, J. (1987). The theory of communicative action: The critique of 
functionalist reason. Cambridge, Great Britain: Polity Press. 
 
Hand painted Easter egg [Image]. (n.d.). Retrieved from 
http://moon.ouhsc.edu/jcollins/Images/Egg_Cross.jpg 
 
Hand painted Easter egg from the Ukraine [Image]. (n.d.). Retrieved from 
http://www.tridenttreasures.com/ 
 
Heanue, S. (29 August 2012). Stroke of genius: the legacy of Blue Poles. ABC 
News (Australia). Retrieved from http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-08-
28/stroke-of-genius-the-legacy-of-blue-poles/4228672 
  
Jackson, A. (n.d.) The Queens quiet Christmas. [Photograph]. Retrieved from 
http://www.alisonjackson.com/queen-quiet-christmas-exclusive-photos-
show-monarch-chatting-to-corgis-and-doing-the-washing-up/queen-
corgi/ 
 
Jones, I, (2008). The ‘Cuckoo’ egg given by Tsar Nicholas II to his mother in 
1900. [Photograph]. Retrieved from 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/non_fictionreviews/3672041/A-
Faberge-egg-is-not-just-for-Easter.html 
 
Jones, J. (2009, June 30). Jeff Koons: Not just the king of kitsch. The 
Guardian. Retrieved from 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/artanddesign/2009/jun/30/jeff-koons-exhibition-
serpentine 
 
 
 
 
 
157 
Kaushik. (2012, March 28). Live like a hamster at La Villa Hamster Hotel [Web 
log post]. Retrieved from http://www.amusingplanet.com/2012/03/live-
like-hamster-at-la-villa-hamster.html 
 
Keehn, L. F. (n.d.). Takashi Murakami. [Electronic version]. Swindle Magazine. 
Retrieved from http://www.swindlemagazine.com/issueicons2/takashi-
murakami/  
 
Koons, J. (Artist). (1991). Bourgeois Bust—Jeff and Ilona  [Image]. Retrieved 
September 9, 2011, from http://www.jeffkoons.com/site/index.html 
 
Kulka, T. (1996) On kitsch and art. Pennsylvania, PA: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press. 
 
Kundera, M. (1984). The unbearable lightness of being. London: Faber & 
Faber. 
 
Lam, C. (2006) Cuc Lam: Interview (S. Boord. Interviewer) [Video Transcript]. 
Retrieved from http://www.cv.vic.gov.au/stories/cuc-lam/6267/cuc-lam/ 
 
Lawson, N. (2001). Nigella bites. London, Great Britain: Chatto & Windus. 
 
Live Like a Hamster at La Villa Hamster Hotel [Image]. (March 29, 2012) 
Retrieved from http://www.amusingplanet.com/2012/03/live-like-
hamster-at-la-villa-hamster.html 
 
Litman, M. (2011, May 15). Louis Vuitton + Murakami reinvent the QR code. 
[Web log post]. http://www.litmanlive.co.uk/blog/2011/05/louis-vuitton-
murakami-reinvent-the-qr-code/ 
 
Louis Vuitton Cosmic Blossom so colourful with Murakami. (2011, September 
4). Retrieved from http://www.koreanartistnews.com/louis-vuitton-cosmic-
blossom-so-colorful-with-takashi-murakami.html 
 
Maton, K. (2003). Reflexivity, relationism and research: Pierre Bourdieu and 
the epistemic conditions of social scientific knowledge. Space & Culture, 
6(1): 52-65.  
 
McCabe, E. (2006). Jeff Koons with Cracked Egg (Blue) [Photograph].  
Retrieved from 
http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2006/nov/11/art.art  
 
McCabe, E. (2006). The pimples on Ilona’s ass [Blog post]. Retrieved from 
http://zeroinfluence.wordpress.com/2006/11/12/the-pimples-on-ilonas-
ass/  
 
Murakami, T. (2009). Louis Vuitton QR code. [Image]. Retrieved from 
http://adage.com/article/behind-the-work/designer-barcodes/136346/ 
 
 
 
 
158 
 
Murakami, T. (2011). Louis Vuitton cosmic blossom collection by Takashi 
Murakami. [Advertisement]. Retrieved from 
http://www.koreanartistnews.com/louis-vuitton-cosmic-blossom-so-
colorful-with-takashi-murakami.html 
 
Notes on Habermas: Lifeworld and system. (n.d.) Retrieved from University of 
Calgary: http://www.ucalgary.ca/~frank/habermas.html 
 
O’Brien, S. (2012). Janet’s royalty room, first china cup. [Photograph]. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.abc.net.au/local/stories/2011/10/25/3347822.htm 
 
O’Brien, S. (2012). Janet Williams in her royalty room relaxing with the Queen. 
[Photograph]. Retrieved from 
http://www.abc.net.au/local/stories/2011/10/25/3347822.htm 
 
O’Brien, S. (2012). Janet’s royalty room last goodbye. [Photograph]. Retrieved 
from http://www.abc.net.au/local/stories/2011/10/25/3347822.htm 
 
Olalquiaga, C. (1992). Megalopolis: Contemporary cultural sensibilities. 
Minneapolis, MA: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Olalquiaga, C. (1992). The dark side of modernity’s moon. Agenda, 28. 22-25. 
 
Olalquiaga, C. (1998). The artificial kingdom: A treasury of the kitsch 
experience. New York, NY: Pantheon Books. 
Performance Drive. (2011) Past blast: 1996 VS HSV GTR-S. [Photograph]. 
Retrieved from http://performancedrive.com.au/past-blast-1996-vs-hsv-
gts-r/ 
Pearsall, J. and Trumble, B. (1996). The Oxford English reference dictionary, 
(2nd rev ed.). Oxford, Great Britain: Oxford University Press.   
 
Perez, M. (2006). The AI interview: Takashi Murakami. [Electronic Version]. 
Artinfo. Retrieved from http://www.artinfo.com/news/story/17056/takashi-
marakami/?printer_friendly=1  
 
Pithers, Z. (2012). Zahn Pithers for Jenny Craig. [Photograph] Retrieved from 
http://contactsphotography.blogspot.com.au/2012/07/zahn-pithers-for-
jenny-craig.html  
 
Pollock, J. (1952). Blue poles, Number 11. [Medium: Painting] Retrieved from 
http://www.ngv.vic.gov.au/whats-on/exhibitions/exhibitions/jackson-
pollock 
 
Potts, T. (2007). “Walking the line”: Kitsch, class and the morphing subject of 
value. [Electronic Version]. Nottingham Modern Languages Publication 
Archive. Retrieved 7 September, 2008, from The University of 
 
 
 
 
159 
Nottingham: 
http://mlpa.nottingham.ac.uk/archieve/00000071/01/NMLP_Potts_Walkin
g_the_Line.pdf 
Pursepage. (n.d.) Selection of Murakami handbags for Louis Vuitton. [Image]. 
Retrieved from http://www.pursepage.com/wp-
content/uploads/2008/02/louis-vuitton-moca-line.jpg  
 
Rudd, P. (Writer), Thomason, M. (Writer), & Thomason, M. (Director). (2004.) 
Cuc Lam’s suitcase. [Television series episode]. In Mark Hamlyn 
(Executive Producer), National Treasures. Retrieved from 
http://dl.nfsa.gov.au/module/1425/#about 
 
Saad, J. (2010, July 4). Jeff Koons: The king of kitsch. Forbes. Retrieved from 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/face-to-face/2010/04/07/jeff-koons-the-king-
of-kitsch/ 
 
Simmel, G. (1978). The philosophy of money. London: Routledge. 
 
Skeggs, B. (2003). Class, self, culture. London, Great Britain: Routledge. 
 
Stewart, S. (2008). Kitsch and contemporary creative practice.  Edith Cowan 
University, Perth, Western Australia. 
 
Tate Archive. (2003). Equivalent VIII, installation view. [Photograph]. Retrieved 
from 
http://www2.tate.org.uk/archivejourneys/historyhtml/people_public.htm 
 
Wakaba. (n.d.) Selection of Murakami figurines. [Image]. Retrieved from 
http://art.wakaba.net/imagesKKKK/sfm10.jpg 
 
Walt Disney Pictures. (1989). The Little Mermaid [DVD]. Available from 
http://www.disney.com.au 
 
Walt Disney Pictures. (1989). The Little Mermaid [DVD]. [Still]. Available from 
http://www.disney.com.au  
 
What a load of . . . art work, Bob. (1976)  Evening Post, Luton. . [Press 
cutting]. Retrieved from 
http://www3.tate.org.uk/research/researchservices/archive/showcase/ite
m.jsp?item=1580 
 
What is a QR code. (2012). Retrieved from http://www.whatisaqrcode.co.uk/ 
 
Wind-up dancing egg toy, (n.d.). [Image]. Retrieved from 
http://nerdapproved.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/chicken-vs-egg-
wind-ups.jpg 
 
Wingfield, J. (2009, June 30). Let them eat Manga: How Takashi Murakami 
introduced Japanese kitsch to the Palace of Versailles. The Independent. 
Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-
 
 
 
 
160 
entertainment/art/features/let-them-eat-manga-how-takashi-murakami-
introduced-japanese-kitsch-to-the-palace-of-versailles-2105842.html 
 
Xiamen Rising Chance co., Ltd. (n.d.). Sydney Opera House building souvenir. 
[Photograph]. Retrieved from 
http://xmrc.en.alibaba.com/product/1344237878-
215351374/3d_Sydney_Opera_House_building_souvenir.html 
 
Yabolinkski, L. (2008, February 13) Eli Broads Museum openings with Geoff 
Glitter, Dark Andy: Review. Bloomberg.com. Retrieved September 23, 
2008, from 
http://bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchieve&sid=a.CqO05rnQ7c 
 
# 32 Glamour photography [Blog post]. (2009). Retrieved from 
http://thingsboganslike.com/2009/11/24/32-glamour-photography/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
161 
Bibliography 
 
 
Adams, L. (2008). The indeterminate precision of narrative (Unpublished 
doctoral dissertation). Southern Cross University, NSW. Retrieved from 
http://lyndalladams.com/2007/phd/phd-content.html 
 
Adorno, T. (2001). The culture industry: Selected essays on mass culture. 
(J.M. Bernstein, Trans.). (3rd ed.). London, Great Britain: Routledge. 
 
Amusing Planet. (2012). Live like a hamster at La Villa Hamster hotel 
[Photographer: Stephane Mahe] Retrieved from 
http://www.amusingplanet.com/2012/03/live-like-hamster-at-la-villa-
hamster.html 
 
Atkinson, D. (2007). Kitsch geographies and the everyday space of social 
memory. Environment and Planning A, 39(3), 521-540. 
doi:10.1068/a3866  
 
Attfield, J. (2006). Redefining kitsch: The politics of design. Home Cultures, 3, 
201-212.  
 
Bandai (2011). Tamagotchi iD L March 19 sale! [Press release]. Retrieved 
June 3, 2012 from http://www.bandai.co.jp/press/images/3/60294.pdf.  
 
Barkham, P. (2011, August 31). Tourist tat. What’s the tackiest holiday 
souvenir you’ve bought? The Guardian. Retrieved from 
http://www.theguardian.com/travel/2011/aug/31/holiday-souvenirs-
tacky-gifts 
 
Barlass, T. (2012, March 25). Retail magic: No undressing in the virtual 
changing room. The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved from 
http://www.smh.com.au/lifestyle/shopping/retail-magic-no-undressing-in-
the-virtual-changing-room-20120324-1vqvv.html 
 
Bauman, Z. (1998). Globalization: The human consequences. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
 
Bauman, Z. (1999) Culture as praxis. London, Great Britain: Sage. 
 
Bauman, Z. (1999). Liquid modernity. Cambridge, Great Britain: Polity.  
 
Bauman, Z. (2000). Liquid modernity. Cambridge, Great Britain: Polity.  
 
Benjamin, W. (1973). Illuminations (H. Zohn, Trans.). London, Great Britain: 
Fontana.  
 
Benjamin, W. (2008) The work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction. 
London, Great Britain: Penguin. 
 
 
 
 
162 
Bennett, T. (1996). The birth of the museum. London, Great Britain: Routledge.  
 
Berg, M. and Hudson, P. (1992). Rehabilitating the industrial revolution. The 
Economic History Review, 45(1), 24 
 
Binkley, S. (2000). Kitsch as a repetitive system: A problem for the theory of 
taste and hierarchy. Journal of Material Culture, 5(2), 131-152. 
 
Binkley, S, (2002). Kitsch. In St. James Encyclopaedia of Pop Culture. 
Retrieved from http://findarticles.com  
 
Bolt, K. (2008). Zen garden history and defining characteristics. Retrieved from 
http://feelingsandflowers.com/255/zen-garden-history-and-defining-
characteristics/ 
 
Bonami, F. (Ed.). (2008). Jeff Koons. New Haven, CT and London, Great 
Britain: Yale University Press. 
 
Bourdieu, P. (1984). Distinction: A social critic of the judgement of taste (R. 
Nice, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
 
Boyd, H and Levy, S. (1963). Chapter 3 experience Boyd, Harper W., Jr. and 
Sidney J. Levy (1963), New Dimensions in Consumer Analysis, Harvard 
Business Review, 41(November-December),129-140. 
 
Broch, H. (1975). Notes on the problem of kitsch. In G. Dorfles (Ed.), Kitsch: 
The world of bad taste (4th ed., pp. 49-67). London, Great Britain: Studio 
Vista. 
 
Broch, H. (1975). Kitsch and art-with-a-message. In G. Dorfles (Ed.), Kitsch: 
The world of bad taste (pp. 68-70). London, Great Britain: Studio Vista. 
 
Broch, H. (2003). Geist and Zeitgeist: The spirit in an unspiritual age. New 
York, NY: Counterpoint Press.  
 
Buck-Morss, S. (1989). The dialect of seeing: Walter Benjamin and the 
arcades project. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
 
Burns. G. (2006, November 11). The showman. The Guardian. Retrieved from 
http://guardian.co.uk/artanddesign/2006/nov/11/art.art 
 
Calinescu, M. (1987). Five faces of modernity: Modernism, avant-garde, 
decadence, kitsch, postmodernism. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
 
Crouch, C. (2007). Praxis and the reflexive creative practitioner. Journal of 
Visual Art Practice, 6(2), pp.105-114.  
 
Davenport, T. H. & Beck, J. C. (2001). The Attention Economy: Understanding 
the new currency of business. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School 
Press. 
 
 
 
 
163 
Davis, G. (2005, December). Indicators of poverty and hunger. Presentation to 
Expert Group Meeting on Youth Development Indicators United Nations 
Headquarters, New York.Retrieved from 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unyin/documents/ydiDavidGordon_poverty.
pdf 
 
Davis, L. (2012, April 21). Hamster hotel lets you live like a giant rodent. [Blog 
post]. Retrieved from http://io9.com/5903930/hamster-hotel-lets-you-
live-like-a-giant-rodent 
 
De Botton, A. (2005) Status anxiety. London, Great Britain: Penguin. 
 
De Certeau, M. (1984). The practice of everyday life. Berkley, CA: University of 
California Press. 
Dorfles, G. (Ed.). (1975). Kitsch: The world of bad taste. London, Great Britain: 
Studio Vista. 
 
Drucker, P. (1969). The age of discontinuity: Guidelines to our changing 
society. New York, NY: Harper and Row. 
 
Economics discovers its feelings. (2006, December 23) The Economist. 
Retrieved from http://www.economist.com/node/8401269 
 
Elias, N. (1998). The kitsch style and the age of kitsch. In J. Gouldblom and S. 
Mennell (Eds.) The Norbert Elias reader. Oxford, Great Britain: Blackwell. 
 
Enrique, B. (2011, October 29). Louis Vuitton friends of the house: Takashi 
Murakami. Ilvoelv. Retrieved from http://www.ilvoelv.com/2011/10/friends-
of-the-house-takashi-murakami.html 
 
Fabergé, T., Proler, L.G. & Skurlov, V.V. (1997) The Fabergé imperialEaster 
eggs. London, Great Britain: Thames Hudson. 
 
Florida, R. (2003) The rise of the creative class. North Melbourne, Australia: 
Pluto Press Australia. 
 
Fogel, R.W. (2004). The escape from hunger and premature death, 1700-
2100. London, Great Britain: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Freud, S. (1917). Mourning and melancholia (J. Riviere, Trans.). New York, 
NY: Basic Books. 
 
Gans, H.J. (1974). Popular culture and high culture: An analysis and 
evaluation of taste.  New York, NY: Basic Books. 
 
Garfield, S. (2007, June 17). The real Tony uncovered [Review of photography 
exhibition by Alison Jackson].Retrieved from: 
http://observer.theguardian.com/ 
 
 
 
 
 
164 
Gerstein, J. (2012, May 1). The luckiest corgis in the world. The Frisky. 
Retrieved from http://the frisky.com/tag/queen-elizabeth/ 
 
Gerstein, J. (2012, May 1). The luckiest corgis in the world. The Frisky. 
[Photograph]. Retrieved from http://the frisky.com/tag/queen-elizabeth/ 
 
Gibson, P. (2009, March). Beastly tales. Vogue Australia, 112-113. 
 
Giddens, A. (1990). The consequences of modernity. Cambridge, Great 
Britain: Polity Press. 
 
Giddens, A. (1990). Classical modernity and late modernity. Retrieved from 
http://modernsocieties.wordpress.com/2007/10/29/seminar-two-classical-
modernity-late-modernity/ 
 
Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and self-identity: Self and society in the late 
modern age. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.   
 
Gilmore, James (1998). Welcome to the experience economy. Harvard 
Business Review. 76 (4), p. 97 
 
Gray, C. and Pirie, I. (1995). A wider context: Paradigms of inquiry, “artistic” 
research procedure: Research at the edge of chaos. Retrieved from: 
https://design.osu.edu/carlson/id785/ead.pdf 
 
Greenberg, C. (1975). The avant-garde and kitsch. In G. Dorfles (Ed.), Kitsch: 
The world of bad taste (pp. 116-126). London, Great Britain: Studio Vista. 
 
Gritz, A. (2008, January 18). Takashi Murakami: MOCA, Los Angeles, USA. 
Frieze Magazine. Retrieved from 
http://www.frieze.com/shows/review/takashi_murakami/ 
 
Habermas, J. (1971). The theory of communicative action: Reason and the 
rationalisation of the lifeworld. Cambridge, Great Britain: Polity Press. 
 
Habermas, J. (1987). The theory of communicative action: The critique of 
functionalist reason. Cambridge, Great Britain: Polity Press. 
 
Heanue, S. (29 August 2012). Stroke of genius: the legacy of Blue Poles. ABC 
News (Australia). Retrieved from http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-08-
28/stroke-of-genius-the-legacy-of-blue-poles/4228672 
 
Hilgard, E. (1962). Impulsive versus realistic thinking: An examination of the 
distinction between primary and secondary processes in thought. 
Psychological Bulletin, 59 (6), 447–488. 
 
Holbrook, M., & Hirschman, E. (1982). The experiential aspects of 
consumption: Consumer fantasies, feelings and fun. The Journal of 
Consumer Research, 9(2), 132-140. 
 
 
 
 
 
165 
Holtorf, C. (2006). Experiencing archaeology in the dream society. In I. Russell 
(Ed.), Images, representations and heritage: moving beyond modern 
approaches to archaeology. (pp. 161). New York, NY: Springer Science 
and Business Media. 
 
Hvenegaard Rasmussen, C., Jochumsen, H., & Skot-Hansen, D. (2008) 
Learning from experience economy—the Danish way. Copenhagen, 
Denmark: The Royal School of Library and Information Science, Centre 
for Cultural Policy Studies. 
 
Jackson, A. (n.d.) The Queens quiet Christmas. [Photograph]. Retrieved from 
http://www.alisonjackson.com/queen-quiet-christmas-exclusive-photos-
show-monarch-chatting-to-corgis-and-doing-the-washing-up/queen-
corgi/ 
 
Jensen, R. (1999). The Dream Society. New York, NY: Mc-Graw Hill 
 
Jones, I, (2008). The ‘Cuckoo’ egg given by Tsar Nicholas II to his mother in 
1900. [Photograph]. Retrieved from 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/non_fictionreviews/3672041/A-
Faberge-egg-is-not-just-for-Easter.html 
 
Jones, J. (2009, June 30). Jeff Koons: Not just the king of kitsch. The 
Guardian. Retrieved from 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/artanddesign/2009/jun/30/jeff-koons-exhibition-
serpentine 
 
Jones, L. (1980). Great Expectations: America and the Baby Boom 
Generation. New York, NY: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan 
 
Kaushik. (2012, March 28). Live like a hamster at La Villa Hamster Hotel [Web 
log post]. Retrieved from http://www.amusingplanet.com/2012/03/live-
like-hamster-at-la-villa-hamster.html 
 
Keehn, L. F. (n.d.). Takashi Murakami. [Electronic version]. Swindle Magazine. 
Retrieved from http://www.swindlemagazine.com/issueicons2/takashi-
murakami/ 
 
Kroeber-Riel, W. (1979). Activation research: Psychobiological approaches in 
consumer research. Journal of Consumer Research. 5, pp. 477-488. 
 
Krugman, H. (1965). The impact of television advertising: Learning without 
involvement. Public Opinion Quarterly, 29, pp. 349-356. 
 
Kulka, T. (1996) On kitsch and art. Pennsylvania, PA: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press. 
 
Kundera, M. (1984). The unbearable lightness of being. London: Faber & 
Faber. 
 
 
 
 
 
166 
Lam, C. (2006) Cuc Lam: Interview (S. Boord. Interviewer) [Video Transcript]. 
Retrieved from http://www.cv.vic.gov.au/stories/cuc-lam/6267/cuc-lam/ 
 
Lash, S. and Urry, J. (1994) Economies of Signs and Space. London, Great 
Britain: Sage  
 
Lawson, N. (2001). Nigella bites. London, Great Britain: Chatto & Windus. 
 
Litman, M. (2011, May 15). Louis Vuitton + Murakami reinvent the QR code. 
[Web log post]. http://www.litmanlive.co.uk/blog/2011/05/louis-vuitton-
murakami-reinvent-the-qr-code/  
 
Live Like a Hamster at La Villa Hamster Hotel [Image]. (March 29, 2012) 
Retrieved from http://www.amusingplanet.com/2012/03/live-like-
hamster-at-la-villa-hamster.html 
 
Louis Vuitton Cosmic Blossom so colourful with Murakami. (2011, September 
4). Retrieved from http://www.koreanartistnews.com/louis-vuitton-cosmic-
blossom-so-colorful-with-takashi-murakami.html 
 
Loveday, S. (2012, May 23). Bandai signs Sync for Tamagotchi’s US return 
[Blog post]. Retrieved from http://www.licensing.biz/news/9081/Bandai-
signs-Sync-for-Tamagotchis-US-return#after_ad 
 
Maton, K. (2003). Reflexivity, relationism and research: Pierre Bourdieu and 
the epistemic conditions of social scientific knowledge. Space & Culture, 
6(1): 52-65. 
 
McCabe, E. (2006). Jeff Koons with Cracked Egg (Blue) [Photograph].  
Retrieved from 
http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2006/nov/11/art.art 
 
McCabe, E. (2006). The pimples on Ilona’s ass [Blog post]. Retrieved from 
http://zeroinfluence.wordpress.com/2006/11/12/the-pimples-on-ilonas-
ass/  
 
McFann, K. (2011, April 11). ‘Rock the pavillion’ with Disney’s fairy tale 
weddings and honeymoons [Blog post]. Retrieved from 
http://marciodisney.blogspot.com.au/2009/11/disneys-weddings-and-
proposals.html 
 
Mukhopadhyay, B. (2008).  Dream kitsch—Folk art, indigenous media and 
`9/11'. Journal of Material Culture,13, 5‒34.  Retrieved from 
http://mcu.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/13/1/5 
 
Murakami, T. (2009). Louis Vuitton QR code. Retrieved from 
http://adage.com/article/behind-the-work/designer-barcodes/136346/ 
 
Murakami, T. (2011). Louis Vuitton cosmic blossom collection by Takashi 
Murakami. [Advertisement]. Retrieved from 
 
 
 
 
167 
http://www.koreanartistnews.com/louis-vuitton-cosmic-blossom-so-
colorful-with-takashi-murakami.html 
 
Notes on Habermas: Lifeworld and system. (n.d.) Retrieved from University of 
Calgary: http://www.ucalgary.ca/~frank/habermas.html 
 
O'Brien, M. (April 19, 2011) Have an ethical Easter. The Sydney Morning 
Herald. Retrieved from http://www.smh.com.au  
 
O’Brien, S. (2012). Janet’s royalty room, first china cup. [Photograph]. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.abc.net.au/local/stories/2011/10/25/3347822.htm 
 
O’Brien, S. (2012). Janet Williams in her royalty room relaxing with the Queen. 
[Photograph]. Retrieved from 
http://www.abc.net.au/local/stories/2011/10/25/3347822.htm 
 
O’Brien, S. (2012). Janet’s royalty room last goodbye. [Photograph]. Retrieved 
from http://www.abc.net.au/local/stories/2011/10/25/3347822.htm 
 
Olalquiaga, C. (1992). Megalopolis: Contemporary cultural sensibilities. 
Minneapolis, MA: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Olalquiaga, C. (1992). The dark side of modernity’s moon. Agenda, 28. 22-25. 
 
Olalquiaga, C. (1998). The artificial kingdom: A treasury of the kitsch 
experience. New York, NY: Pantheon Books. 
Olalquiaga, C. (n.d.). The dark side of modernity's moon. Retrieved from 
http://www.celesteolalquiaga.com/moon.html 
Perez, M. (2006). The AI interview: Takashi Murakami. [Electronic Version]. 
Artinfo. Retrieved from http://www.artinfo.com/news/story/17056/takashi-
marakami/?printer_friendly=1 
 
Perfect match Dog lovers dating. (n.d.). Retrieved from 
www.perfectmatch.com/onlinedating/Dog-lovers-Dating 
Performance Drive. (2011) Past blast: 1996 VS HSV GTR-S. Retrieved from 
http://performancedrive.com.au/past-blast-1996-vs-hsv-gts-r/ 
Pets passion. Dating and social networking for animal lovers. (n.d.). Retrieved 
from http://www.petspassions.com/ 
 
Philip, B. (2011). Consumer republic: Using brands to get what you want, 
make corporations behave, and maybe even save the world. Victoria: 
Australia. 
 
Pine II, B.J., & Gilmore, J.H.  (1998). Welcome to the experience economy. 
Harvard Business Review, 97‒105.  
 
 
 
 
168 
Pine II, B.J. and Gilmore, J.H. (1999). The experience economy: Work is 
theatre & every business is a stage: goods and services are no longer 
enough. Boston, MAS: Harvard Business School Press.  
 
Pine II, B.J. and Gilmore, J.H. (2011). The experience economy: (Rev. ed.). 
Boston, MAS: Harvard Business School Publishing.  
 
Pine II, B.J. and Gilmore, J.H. (2007). Authenticity: What consumers really 
want. Boston, MAS: Harvard Business School Press. 
 
Pithers, Z. (2012). Zahn Pithers for Jenny Craig. Retrieved from 
http://contactsphotography.blogspot.com.au/2012/07/zahn-pithers-for-
jenny-craig.html  
 
Potts, T. (2007). “Walking the line”: Kitsch, class and the morphing subject of 
value. [Electronic Version]. Nottingham Modern Languages Publication 
Archive. Retrieved 7 September, 2008, from The University of 
Nottingham: 
http://mlpa.nottingham.ac.uk/archieve/00000071/01/NMLP_Potts_Walkin
g_the_Line.pdf 
 
Rudd, P. (Writer), Thomason, M. (Writer), & Thomason, M. (Director). (2004.) 
Cuc Lam’s suitcase. [Television series episode]. In Mark Hamlyn 
(Executive Producer), National Treasures. Retrieved from 
http://dl.nfsa.gov.au/module/1425/#about 
 
Saad, J. (2010, July 4). Jeff Koons: The king of kitsch. Forbes. Retrieved from 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/face-to-face/2010/04/07/jeff-koons-the-king-
of-kitsch/ 
 
Seitz, W. C. (1984). Claude Monet. London, Great Britain: Thames Hudson. 
 
Simmel, G. (1978). The philosophy of money. London: Routledge. 
 
Skeggs, B. (2003). Class, self, culture. London, Great Britain: Routledge. 
 
Snell, T. (2008, May 3‒4). State of play. The Weekend Australian, Review, pp. 
18‒19. 
 
Solomon, R. (1991). On kitsch and sentimentality.  The Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism, 49 (1), 1-14. 
 
 
Stevenson, M. (2011). An optimists tour of the future: One curious man sets 
out to answer ‘Whats next? London, Great Britain: Profile Books. 
 
Stewart, S. (2008). Kitsch and contemporary creative practice.  Edith Cowan 
University, Perth, Western Australia. 
 
 
 
 
 
169 
Sturkin, M. (2007). Tourists of history: Memory, kitsch, and consumerism from 
Okalahoma City to Ground Zero. Durham, NC: Duke University Press  
 
The giant waterlily. (n.d.) Royal botanical gardens, Kew. Retrieved October 23, 
2008, from http://kew.org/gis/projects/virtual tour/waterlily.html 
 
The gigantic water-lily (Victoria Regia), in flower at Chatsworth. (1849, 
November 17). The illustrated London news, p.328. 
 
Toffler, A. (1971). Future Shock. London, Great Britain: Pan Book.  
 
Twitter Engineering Division. (2011, May 31). Re: The engineering behind 
Twitter’s new search experience [Tweet]. Retrieved from 
http://engineering.twitter.com/2011/05/engineering-behind-twitters-new-
search.html 
 
Walt Disney Pictures. (1989). The Little Mermaid [DVD]. Available from 
http://www.disney.com.au  
 
What a load of . . . art work, Bob. (1976)  Evening Post, Luton. . [Press 
cutting]. Retrieved from 
http://www3.tate.org.uk/research/researchservices/archive/showcase/ite
m.jsp?item=1580 
 
What is a QR code. (2012). Retrieved from http://www.whatisaqrcode.co.uk/ 
 
Wingfield, J. (2009, June 30). Let them eat Manga: How Takashi Murakami 
introduced Japanese kitsch to the Palace of Versailles. The Independent. 
Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-
entertainment/art/features/let-them-eat-manga-how-takashi-murakami-
introduced-japanese-kitsch-to-the-palace-of-versailles-2105842.html 
 
Xiamen Rising Chance co., Ltd. (n.d.). Sydney Opera House building souvenir. 
[Photograph]. Retrieved from 
http://xmrc.en.alibaba.com/product/1344237878-
215351374/3d_Sydney_Opera_House_building_souvenir.html 
 
Yabolinkski, L. (2008, February 13) Eli Broads Museum openings with Geoff 
Glitter, Dark Andy: Review. Bloomberg.com. Retrieved September 23, 
2008, from 
http://bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchieve&sid=a.CqO05rnQ7c 
 
# 32 Glamour photography [Blog post]. (2009). Retrieved from 
http://thingsboganslike.com/2009/11/24/32-glamour-photography/ 
APPENDIX 2: 
Additional Images of Art Work 
Section1: 
The Lotus Pond (2007, 2008) 
Plastic, vinyl, wood on rubber 
Figure 1.1: Lotus Flowers (2007) 
The Lotus Pond (2007). Installation, Plastic, vinyl, wood on rubber inner-tubes and water, .80m x 8m x 14m (Variable) 
Figure 1.2: The Lotus Pond (2007) exhibited at Spectrum Project Space, (Spectrum Northbridge, Western Australia, for the Exhibition White Monkey Holding Peach 
(2007) 
The Lotus Pond.(2008). Installation. Plastic, vinyl, wood on rubber inner-tubes and water. .70m x 4m x 9m  (Photographer: Michael Gray) 
Figure 1.3: The Lotus Pond (2008). Exhibited at Perth Institute of Contemporary Arts, (PICA), Western Australia (2008) 
The Lotus Pond.(2008). Installation. Plastic, vinyl, wood on rubber inner-tubes and water. .70m x 4m x 9m (Photographer: Bohdan Warchomij) 
Figure 1.4: The Lotus Pond (2008) (Detail) exhibited at Perth Institute of Contemporary Arts, (PICA), Western Australia (2008) 
The Lotus Pond (2008). Installation (detail). Perth Institute of Contemporary Art. Plastic, vinyl, wood on rubber inner-tubes and water. .70m x 4m x 9m 
Ashby, T. (2010) Top Shots [Medium: Photography]. Retrieved from https://au.news.yahoo.com/thewest/a/7960037/top-shots/ 
(Exception to copyright: Section ss40, 103C, Exception, Research or Study). 
Figure 1.5: The Lotus Pond (2008) exhibited at entrance to The Art Gallery of Western Australia (2010) 
   
Section 2: 
The Aquarium (2009) 
The Aquarium (2009) Glass, steel, wood, hot pink gravel, and mixed media 3.5 x 2.5 x 2.4 
Figure 2.1: The Aquarium installation (2009) (Video still) exhibited at Spectrum (2009) 
Figure 2.2:  In character within The Aquarium (2009) exhibited at Spectrum (2009)  
Figure 2.3: The Aquarium installation (2009) (Detail of residency) exhibited at Spectrum (2009) 
The Aquarium (2009) Glass, steel, wood, hot pink gravel, and mixed media 3.5 x 2.5 x 2.4 
Figure 2.4: The Aquarium installation (2009) exhibited at Spectrum (2009) 
Figure 2.5: The Aquarium installation (2009) (Details of Mermaid’s paraphernalia) exhibited at Spectrum (2009) 
Figure 2.6:  Messages in bottles left by exhibition visitors at Spectrum (2009)   
Figure 2.7:  Examples of the messages in bottles left by exhibition visitors at Spectrum  
Section 3: 
Budgietopia (2009-2013) 
3.1 The Budgietopia Everest 
Reunion (2009) 
Figure 3.1.1: Image Budgietopia Everest Reunion (2009) 
Figure 3.1.2: Image Budgietopia Everest Reunion (2009) exhibited at Spectrum (2009) 
Figure 3.1.3: Image Budgietopia Everest Reunion (2009) (Detail) exhibited at Spectrum (2009) 
Figure 3.1.4: Image Budgietopia Everest Reunion (2009) (Detail) exhibited at Spectrum (2009) 
3.2 The Budgietopia 
Super Rally (2010) 
Figure 3.2.1: Hillview Descent, The Budgietopia Super Rally (2010) (Detail) exhibited at Spectrum (2010) 
Figure 3.2.2: The Chase, The Budgietopia Super Rally (2010) (Detail) exhibited at Spectrum (2010) 
Figure 3.2.3: The Helicopter’s View, The Budgietopia Super Rally (2010) (Detail) exhibited at Spectrum (2010) 
Figure 3.2.4: Cool Blue, The Budgietopia Super Rally (2010) (Detail) exhibited at Spectrum (2010) 
Figure 3.2.5: The Winner, The Budgietopia Super Rally (2010) (Detail) exhibited at Spectrum (2010) 
Figure 3.2.6: The After-Race Parade, The Budgietopia Super Rally (2010) (Detail) exhibited at Spectrum (2010) 
3.3 Budgietopia 
The Evening Commuter 
Cake Off (2010) 
Figure 3.3.1:  The Lamington Pyramid, The Evening Commuter Cake Off (2010) (Detail) exhibited at Spectrum (2010) 
Figure 3.3.2:  The Birds Eye View, The Evening Commuter Cake Off (2010) (Detail) exhibited at Spectrum (2010) 
Figure 3.3.3:  The Gossip, The Evening Commuter Cake Off (2010) (Detail) exhibited at Spectrum (2010) 
3.4 Budgietopia for City in 
Bloom (2010) 
Budgietopia (2010). Installation, Budgies, artificial lawn, artificial flowers and mixed media. 5m x 5m x 7m 
Figure 3.4.1: Budgietopia (2010) (Detail) for City of Perth, City in Bloom exhibition, Murray Street Mall, Tourist Information Kiosk, Perth, Western Australia 
Budgietopia (2010). Installation, Budgies, artificial lawn, artificial flowers and mixed media. 5m x 5m x 7m 
Figure 3.4.2: Budgietopia (2010) (Detail) for City of Perth, City in Bloom exhibition, Murray Street Mall, Tourist Information Kiosk, Perth, Western Australia 
Budgietopia (2010). Installation, Budgies, artificial lawn, artificial flowers and mixed media. 5m x 5m x 7m 
Figure 3.4.3: Budgietopia (2010) (Detail) for City of Perth, City in Bloom exhibition, Murray Street Mall, Tourist Information Kiosk, Perth, Western Australia 
Budgietopia (2010). Installation, Budgies, artificial lawn, artificial flowers and mixed media. 5m x 5m x 7m 
Figure 3.4.4: Budgietopia (2010) (Detail) for City of Perth, City in Bloom exhibition, Murray Street Mall, Tourist Information Kiosk, Perth, Western Australia 
Figure 3.5: Image of my studio during the development of Budgietopia (2011) 
Section 4: 
Snow Domes and Dream 
Spheres (2009-2010) 
Snow Domes and Dream Spheres (2009). Glass, stainless steel, water and various mixed media. 32cm x 25cm x25cm  
Figure 4.1: Snow Domes and Dream Spheres (2009) exhibited at The Moores Building and Gallery, Fremantle, Western Australia (2009) 
Ganesha Glory (2009). Glass, stainless steel, water and various mixed media. 32cm x 25cm x25cm  
Figure 4.2: Ganesha Glory (2009) exhibited at The Moores Building and Gallery, Fremantle, Western Australia (2009) 
Call Me Golden Sugar Britches (2009). Glass, stainless steel, water and various mixed media. 75cm x 50cm x 50cm 
Figure 4.3:  Call Me Golden Sugar Britches (2009) exhibited at The Moores Building and Gallery, Fremantle, Western Australia (2009) 
Section 5: 
Jesus (2010) 
Jesus (2010)  Wood, plaster and mixed media 95cm x 380cm x 195cm 
Figure 5.1: Jesus (2010), view 1,  exhibited at Wesley Church, Perth, Western Australia (2010) 
Jesus (2010)  Wood, plaster and mixed media 95cm x 380cm x 195cm 
Figure 5.2: Jesus (2010) (Detail) exhibited at Wesley Church, Perth, Western Australia (2010) 
Jesus (2010)  Wood, plaster and mixed media 95cm x 380cm x 195cm 
Figure 5.3: Jesus (2010), view 2, exhibited at Wesley Church, Perth, Western Australia (2010) 
Jesus (2010)  Wood, plaster and mixed media 95cm x 380cm x 195cm 
Figure 5.4: Jesus (2010), view 3, exhibited at Wesley Church, Perth, Western Australia (2010) 
